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Abstract 
 
This research tests the claim made by some rural officials that windfarms help to preserve 
farmland.  Using a mixed-methods case study approach, I draw on evidence from four windfarm 
communities located in nine townships in two regions in  Michigan to test three different 
mechanisms by which wind turbines might be altering the farmland conversion process, as 
derived from both the rural planning and wind energy literatures.  Data from five nearby 
townships where there are no wind turbines were also examined.  First, a large-scale (n=1730) 
mail survey of farmland owners is used to determine that landowners with turbines on their 
property invest significantly more in their farms than both their neighbors and farmland owners 
in a similarly situated non-windfarm community.  Landowners with turbines are also more likely 
to have a succession plan in place for their farm and less likely than other landowners to believe 
their land will go idle in the future.  However, the more indirect financial benefits of wind 
development—local jobs and increased property tax revenues—do not appear to have positive 
impacts on landowners who live in the windfarm community but who do not have a turbine sited 
on their property.  Second, interviews with realtors and public officials in the four windfarm 
communities indicate that, rather than reduce demand for new homes in the vicinity of the 
windfarm, windfarm income may be inducing some landowners to build new homes within sight 
of the turbines.  Finally, , I find that though farmland preservation is rarely considered when 
officials establish setback distances for wind turbines, the amount of land rendered 
undevelopable by the presence of the turbines is often substantial.  These findings can inform 
officials and rural planners who might consider whether and how to welcome wind development 
xv 
 
within their jurisdictions by providing information about the social and economic impacts of 
wind development to local communities.  Research findings can inform wind developers and 
planners about the key benefits and drawbacks of wind energy as seen by landowners in 
communities with wind turbines.  
 
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1 Wind Energy and Rural Land Use 
Since the advent of the interstate highway system in the 1950s, exurban development has 
been the key driver of growth in metropolitan areas, even in cities where the urban and suburban 
populations are in decline (Brookings Institution 2010).  As has been the case for the last fifty 
years, most of the development on the urban fringe has occurred on previously farmed land.  
While much was written in the 1980s and 1990s of ways to discourage farmland conversion, the 
rural planner’s agricultural preservation toolbox has remained essentially unchanged for the past 
two decades.  Sliding-scale and agricultural zoning, purchase and transfer of development rights, 
and agricultural districts have produced impressive results in a number of communities (Pruetz 
2012), but far too few fringe municipalities have been willing to adopt and implement policies to 
arrest exurban development.  While some authors have argued that our current suite of policies is 
perhaps the best we can manage given decentralized land use regulation in the U.S. (Daniels 
1990), I propose that it is time for a fresh look at farmland preservation and posit that wind 
energy development might offer a promising new tool.   
Driven by federal production tax credits that offer tax breaks to renewable energy 
producers as well as state-level renewable portfolio standards that force utilities to increase the 
portion of their electricity coming from renewable sources, wind development in rural America 
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has exploded in the last decade.  These wind developments have not been confined to 1000+ acre 
parcels, as were the earliest large-scale windfarms in the Western U.S. and Texas.  Instead, 
especially in the Great Lakes region, windfarms are increasingly being sited community-wide, 
with dozens of landowners each hosting a single turbine on their land.  Economic development, 
particularly the increase in local tax revenues and rents received by affected landowners, 
undoubtedly drive a community’s decision to accept wind development proposals, but vague 
claims of preservation of farmland have also been cited by local officials and rural planners as 
public justification for the projects (Cudd 2011; Lundberg). 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The overall objective of my dissertation is to explore claims that wind turbines help to 
preserve farmland.  I hope not only to uncover whether windfarms have actually impacted rates 
of farmland conversion, but also to begin to understand why it is that they might be having such 
an impact. 
Though it is relatively straightforward, the first part of this question—whether wind 
turbines have preserved farmland—is the more difficult one to answer.  This is because more 
than 80% of the wind capacity in the U.S. and 98% of the wind capacity in the Great Lakes 
region has been built since 2005—the same time period in which new home construction 
effectively ground to a halt as a result of the “Great Recession.”  Consequently, a statistical 
assessment that includes any of these newer windfarms is likely to be inconclusive since any 
“control” communities are likely to have had practically no residential development over that 
period.  Furthermore, even if the quantitative assessment is limited to the small subset of 
windfarms built before the recent economic downturn, such an approach would not necessarily 
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be able to answer the second part of my question:  why it is that windfarms reduce agriculture 
land conversion? 
Instead, my study operationalizes this overarching research question by directly testing 
three different mechanisms by which wind turbines might be altering the farmland conversion 
process, as derived from both the rural planning and wind energy literatures.  These mechanisms, 
which form the core of my research questions and hypotheses, are as follows:   
1. Supply-side mechanism:  Windfarms provide additional revenues to rural 
landowners—either directly through lease agreements or indirectly through increases 
in local jobs or property tax revenues—which reduce the financial need to sell land to 
residential developers (Zollinger and Krannich 2009). 
2. Demand-side mechanism:  Due to real and perceived impacts of wind development 
(e.g., noise, shadow flicker, aesthetics), the presence of turbines reduces demand for 
new residential development, even miles away (van der Horst 2007). 
3. Zoning mechanism:  Setback distances within zoning codes create a relatively large 
footprint surrounding each turbine which can be farmed, but where development is 
not permissible  (Rynne et al. 2011). 
 
Even in the absence of definitive proof that windfarms are reducing farmland conversion, by 
testing each of these mechanisms, this research aims to determine whether wind energy projects 
might indeed be a new tool to add to the rural planner’s farmland preservation toolbox. 
1.3 Analytical Approach 
These mechanisms—and subsequently my research questions and hypotheses—explore 
the windfarm-farmland preservation question from very different angles—some lending 
themselves to quantification and others to more nuanced explanation.  Rather than force-fit my 
research questions to a single method, I instead opted for a mixed methods research design.  I 
utilize a large-scale (n=1730) mail survey of farmland owners to test the supply-side mechanism, 
determining whether landowners in communities with windfarms make more on-farm 
investments or have different long-term plans for their land than landowners in similarly situated 
non-windfarm communities.  To test the demand-side mechanism, I employ semi-structured 
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interviews with realtors, appraisers, and auctioneers, as well as local government leaders, to 
document the possible impact of the windfarms on new home construction.  Finally, I explore the 
zoning mechanism—the impact of setback distances on the availability of farmland for 
residential development—through geospatial analysis, looking at both existing and hypothetical 
zoning ordinances. 
Because my overall research question is derived from practice but largely exploratory, I 
also opted for a research design that would allow me to test the generalizability of my wind 
energy-farmland preservation hypotheses by looking across a number of windfarms.  Conducting 
the research on all 50+ utility-scale wind projects in the Great Lakes region, however, would be 
impractical.  Instead, I selected four case study windfarms, using a diverse case approach to 
maximize the variation between cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008) as a way to test the limits of 
my hypotheses.  Though all four windfarm cases are sited in Michigan and three are even built 
within the same county, they cover a wide spectrum of taxing structures, revenue-sharing 
arrangements, and historical population growth pressures—variables I expected might impact 
farmland preservation. 
Even so, given that it is based upon case studies from a single state, there are limits to the 
generalizability of this research.  While I make some remarks in Chapter 8 about how different 
state-level policies (e.g., property tax policy, wind siting regulations, etc.) or ownership 
arrangements (e.g., community/cooperative rather than investor-owned) might lead to alternate 
outcomes, there is no way of knowing whether my findings would hold in other states.   Given 
the dearth of academic research about U.S. windfarms, additional research is certainly warranted 
to determine how the windfarm-farmland preservation connection plays out in other contexts. 
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Additionally, this research does not consider all possible social, economic, and 
environmental impacts of the selected case studies, but rather hones in on those issues directly 
tied to farmland preservation.  Quantification of environmental impacts such as bird or bat 
fatalities or carbon emission reductions are beyond the scope of this study, as is an assessment of 
the impact of the windfarms on tourism in the region.  Furthermore, while this study considers 
farmland owners’ perceptions of the positive and negative impacts of wind development, it does 
not include the opinions of residents in the vicinity of the turbines who do not own farmland.   
1.4 Findings and Conclusions in Brief 
I found, in fact, that while there are some small differences between cases, there was much 
more commonality across these communities with regards to my research questions than I 
expected.  In fact, there was perhaps too much commonality.  While I selected cases that I 
thought represented a wide range of development pressures—ranging from a small (-4%) loss of 
occupied housing units to relatively large gains (11%) in the period from 2000 to 2010, all 
interviewees recounted that demand for new houses had historically been very low.  
Furthermore, only one interviewee saw residential development on previously farmed land as a 
concern.  As a result, the premise of my research—that wind turbines might help preserve 
farmland by reducing the rate of farmland conversion—did not resonate with most local officials 
in my selected case studies.  Even so, my research yielded a number of interesting findings 
regarding the mechanisms that I tested, which should also be relevant in rural areas where 
residential development is a concern.   
With regards to the supply-side mechanism, I found that the payments wind developers 
make directly to landowners does appear to impact their investment decisions, as well as their 
long-term plans for their land.  Landowners with turbines on their property invest twice as much 
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to improve their property as their neighbors and landowners in a matched case.  Even when 
accounting for the size of the farming operation—a strong predictor of increased investment—
landowners who farm the land and have turbines on their property invest more than all other 
landowners.  Furthermore, landowners with turbines on their property were significantly more 
likely to say that their land would be farmed and less likely to say it would be idle or used for 
recreational purposes in the future.  Interestingly, there is evidence that the supplemental 
drought-safe revenues from the wind turbine payments are making farming more attractive to 
young people who might otherwise leave the farming community for jobs in an urban area.  
According to most local officials in my study area, this is the primary benefit to local 
agriculture—ensuring that there is a younger generation willing to take over the family farm. 
The financial benefits of wind development, however, do not appear to have nearly the 
same impact on landowners who live in the windfarm community but who do not have a turbine 
sited on their property.  Only in communities where royalties are pooled—that is, shared with all 
landowners who were willing to host turbines on their property, even if a turbine was not 
ultimately sited there—report making higher investments in their farms than those in the 
matched case communities.  In communities where only landowners with turbines on their 
property receive royalty payments, these neighboring landowners actually invest less in their 
farms than landowners in the matched case communities.  In addition, very few landowners in 
windfarm communities—whether royalties are pooled or not—acknowledge that any indirect 
local economic benefits of wind energy, such as additional local jobs and increased property tax 
revenues, have impacted them.   
The demand-side mechanism was particularly difficult to research because realtors, like 
others in the case study areas, insisted that there was no or very low new residential building 
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going on, even in Windfarm 4, which had seen double-digit housing unit growth from 2000 to 
2010.  As a result, there was no discernible change to report.  However, asking about demand for 
new housing may have turned up an unexpected link between wind-related income and new 
home construction.  Specifically, several interviewees asserted that landowners who are 
receiving wind income are building new houses on their property, either to replace an aging 
farmhouse or to use as a retirement home so that their heirs can move into the original farmstead.   
Data from my survey of landowners confirms that those with turbines on their property are 
investing more in home improvements.  Building permit data for one of the nine windfarm 
townships show that landowners receiving wind revenues are nearly three times more likely to 
pull a permit to build a new home than farmland owners without turbines.  However, an even 
greater number of new homes are being built by people who did not own farmable tracts, 
indicating that the wind turbines do not appear to be deterring non-farmers from moving to the 
area.  Additional research is warranted, though, to determine whether these permits were for 
greenfield development or replacement of old homes. 
Finally, in my geospatial analysis to look into the zoning mechanism, I found that, though 
farmland preservation considerations are rarely a motivating factor as officials establish setback 
distances for wind turbines, the amount of land rendered undevelopable by the presence of the 
turbines can be substantial.  These land preservation benefits increase with larger setback 
distances, but large setbacks also make it more difficult for wind developers to site projects 
within communities and may effectively “zone out” wind turbines.  My geospatial analysis found 
that though the number of turbines in a windfarm does have some bearing on the amount of land 
theoretically preserved, the specific setback distances have an even greater impact.  Turbine 
spacing is also a determinant:  the more space between turbines, the less overlap there is in the 
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setback distance circles between them; as a result, siting regimes in which turbines are widely 
spaced preserve more land per turbine than those in which the turbines are closer together. 
These findings should be of interest to a range of policy makers and practitioners.  At the 
local level, these findings can help inform officials and rural planners who might be considering 
whether and how to welcome wind development within their jurisdictions, by providing needed 
information about the social and economic impacts of wind development to local communities.  
Wind developers, in turn, can find in this research quantitative data on what landowners in 
communities with wind turbines see as the key benefits and drawbacks of wind energy.  This 
data might, in turn, help wind developers better communicate the benefits and improve their 
practices to minimize the drawbacks, for example, with less disruptive turbine siting and 
construction practices, so as to encourage more rural communities to accept wind energy 
development.    
This research, which tests practitioners’ assertions of a connection between wind energy 
and farmland preservation, represents an initial analysis of an emerging phenomenon.  In many 
respects it poses more questions than it answers, providing me and other researchers at the nexus 
of rural land use and energy policy with promising additional research projects.   
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Chapter 2. Literature Review and Research Questions 
 
In some ways, my dissertation is not so different from other planning research:  At its 
core, it explores how land use policies impact both landowners and their communities.  
However, because I focus on rural rather than urban jurisdictions and simultaneously engage 
with energy policy that is often beyond the planner’s typical repertoire, I first need to set the 
stage for how this work draws from and contributes to existing scholarship.  That is my goal in 
this chapter.   
To lay the groundwork for this study, I first differentiate between two types of “rural” 
communities:  those that are shrinking due to depopulation and those that are growing as a result 
of suburbanization.  I then focus on the latter group, first summarizing the mechanisms that drive 
agricultural land conversion at the urban fringe and then presenting the most common strategies 
for preventing farmland conversion.  I explain how these strategies should theoretically alter the 
conversion process and assess their relative success.  Finally, I situate existing research on the 
impacts of windfarms within the framework of farmland conversion to demonstrate why wind 
development should theoretically be an effective tool for preserving agricultural lands; in so 
doing, I lay out the research questions and the hypotheses explored in the remainder of this 
thesis. 
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2.1 The Two Rural Americas 
Though urban planners often see rural America as one homogeneous expanse of 
everything that is not urban or suburban, in reality, “the rural” includes such varied landscapes as 
the hills of Appalachia, the forests of the Pacific Northwest, the deserts of the Southwest, and the 
farmland of the Midwest, each with its own unique set of issues (Bryan 1986, 10).  There are 
many typologies for “the rural” (see Marini and Mooney 2006), but I find Daniels and Lapping’s 
(1996) concept of “Two Rural Americas,” which categorizes land based on proximity to a 
metropolitan area, to be the best fit for my specific interest in the American Midwest.   
The first rural America—the one driving U.S. Census reports that show a shrinking 
percentage of the population living in rural areas (see Figure 2-1)—is the remote or declining 
rural.  These predominantly far-flung municipalities are usually tied to one industry—whether 
agricultural, extractive, or manufacturing—and face depopulation as that industry declines, or, in 
the case of agriculture, industrializes to require less labor (Salamon 1992).  In an effort to retain 
population or adapt to dwindling numbers, the primary planning focus in these communities has 
been on economic development (Murray and Dunn 1995).   This has traditionally taken the form 
of attracting a replacement industry, revitalizing Main Street, or investing in the service sector to 
attract tourists (Daniels 1989; Sears and Reid 1995).    
The second rural America—the one that has prevented the overall rural population 
numbers from plummeting–is the fringe rural.  Though referred to variously as the exurbs 
(Nelson 1992b), metropolitan fringe (Daniels 1999), urban fringe (Theobald 2001), or rural 
fringe (Sharp and Clark 2008), the fringe is characterized by urban-influenced parcels just 
beyond the suburbs.  In the fringe, non-residential land uses have traditionally predominated, but 
the land is increasingly in demand for development, especially residential development.  Thus, 
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the primary concern of planners in the fringe is managing land use change.  Because agricultural 
lands are particularly attractive for development—they are already cleared and the soil typically 
allows for on-site septic systems—most literature about the fringe focuses on agricultural land 
conversion, or farmland preservation.   
Figure 2-1.  Rural population of the United States, by census year 
 
Source:  US Census Bureau.   
Note:  The downward shift in the rural population in 1960 does not reflect an actual decline so much as a change in 
the Census Bureau’s methodology.  Additional changes were made in 2000 and 2010. 
 
While, as John Fraser Hart notes, “rural” and “farm” are no longer synonymous, many of 
the changes in both of these rural Americas can be attributed to changes in the agricultural sector 
and farmer demographics (1995).  The industrialization of agriculture means that significantly 
fewer farmers are needed to cultivate the same number of acres, and far fewer young people are 
choosing farming as their occupation (D’Souza and Gebremedhin 1998).  There are now 1 
million full-time farmers in the nation (roughly half of all working-age Americans), down from 
4.5 million (and 6.4% of the working population) in the 1960s (Ilg 1995). The 2012 Census of 
Agriculture further found that the average age of farmers is now 58.3 years, up from 57.1 years 
in 2007 “continuing a 30-year trend of steady increase (US Department of Agriculture 2014).”  
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This report also found that the number of new farmers was down 20% from 2007-2012.  The 
aging of the farming population and decreases in absolute numbers of farmers not only directly 
contributes to decline in remote rural areas reliant on agriculture, but also a smaller contingent of 
farm families is less effective in combating urbanization in agricultural communities at the urban 
fringe (Smithers, Joseph, and Armstrong 2005). 
Within my own area of interest in the American Midwest, both of these rural Americas 
are present.  You can certainly find farming communities in which decades of changes in 
agricultural practices have led to devastating population loss, closure of rural schools and 
abandonment of small towns.  At the same time, other rural communities in the Midwest are 
facing an equally devastating influx of people and find themselves struggling to hold on to 
agricultural land in the face of urbanization.  Though both situations constitute a threat to the 
rural community, only the second is really a threat to farmland itself.  Because this research 
explores claims that wind energy preserves farmland, the next two sections focus on previous 
research about the second rural America—that is, the communities on the metropolitan fringe 
that are facing urbanization.  First, I look at what drives agricultural land conversion in these 
communities; then, I examine the traditional planning response to help preserve farmland. 
 
2.2 Agricultural Land Conversion  
 Agricultural land conversion—the shift of a parcel from active farmland to some other 
use—is the primary planning concern in rural municipalities at the metropolitan fringe.  In a 
setting where farmers and residential developers compete for farmland, economic theory holds 
that the highest bidder—in nearly every case, the developer—wins, and the land is converted to a 
non-agricultural use (Plantinga and Miller 2001; Logan and Molotch 1986).  The following 
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sections detail first what drives residential demand for farmland, and then what impels the 
current landowner to sell. 
2.2.1 Residential Demand for Farmland 
Research aimed at understanding what drives exurban development has largely pointed to 
systemic rather than individual-level factors, particularly the perverse outcomes of governmental 
policies (Raup 1975; Nelson 1992b).  At the federal level, the interstate highway system makes it 
possible to live in far-flung residential suburbs and still commute to jobs in the city (Lapping 
2006).  State and federal policies that encourage homeownership effectively subsidize single-
family homes (Daniels 1999).  Furthermore, local municipalities have traditionally failed to pass 
on to developers and, subsequently, new homebuyers the cost of extending infrastructure to more 
remote sites (Ford, Lopach, and O’Donnell 1990).  As a result, greenfield development at the 
metropolitan fringe is often cheaper than redevelopment at the urban core.  
Of all land types on the metropolitan fringe, farmland has been the prime target for 
development for two main reasons.  First, farmland is particularly attractive to developers 
because it is already cleared, which saves on the cost of excavation to remove trees and level 
slopes (Esseks et al. 2009).  Second, the same well-drained soils that are ideal for farming can 
also accommodate on-site septic systems on plots beyond the reach of municipal sewers 
(Marcouiller, Clendenning, and Kedzior 2002).  As a result, the cost of land preparation on 
farmland is significantly less than on alternative sites, so developers are often willing to pay 
more for the land than its market value as farmland.      
Though governmental policies effectively subsidize farmland conversion in general, 
homebuyer preferences largely drive which specific parcels are developed.  In an early study in 
Portland, Oregon, Davis and colleagues (1994) found that residents moved to the metropolitan 
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fringe to gain a closer connection to rural landscapes while remaining within commuting 
distance of urban jobs.  Subsequent literature, however, has largely split on whether rural scenic 
amenities or metropolitan accessibility are more important to homebuyers.  Vogt and Marans 
(2004), for example, used survey and focus group data to find that transportation access and 
good schools were more important than natural features and open space, while a cross-study 
analysis of 30 different studies by Irwin et al. (2010) found that proximity to open space was 
much more important to current fringe residents than it was to fringe residents in the past.  In 
summary, while there may be disagreement about their importance relative to more practical 
considerations like job accessibility, scenic amenities do appear to be non-trivial factors in the 
real estate decisions of exurban homebuyers.     
2.2.2 Why Landowners Sell Farmland 
Just as it is important to understand the demand for farmland on the metropolitan fringe, 
it is necessary to understand why current owners of farmland choose to sell their land.  Found 
and Morley (1973) underscored the complexity of the motives underlying such a decision:  All 
farmland owners must weigh economic considerations and emotional attachment to the land; 
those who are practicing farmers must also weigh career considerations, since their livelihood is 
tied to their property.   
A number of more recent willingness-to-sell studies have looked at which of these 
numerous factors are most influential.  In two studies of farmland real estate transactions in 
exurban Minnesota, Pyle found that non-economic motives were highly significant in 
determining which landowners put their land up for sale.  She found that willingness to sell 
decreases with length of ownership (1986), and that older landowners and those with family ties 
to their land are less likely to sell (1989).  Furthermore, Pyle’s 1986 study found that farmers 
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were less likely to sell than non-farmers (i.e., those whose land was farmed by others) even when 
accounting for other factors; this finding demonstrates that the intertwining of agricultural 
landownership and career affects willingness to sell.   
As a result, a number of later willingness-to-sell studies focused only on differences 
among farmers themselves.  These studies largely highlight the importance of farm viability to 
farmland conversion decisions.  Zollinger and Krannich found that farmers’ willingness to sell 
increases with “perceived negative change (particularly difficulty in obtaining and retaining 
rental land and in purchasing land)…lack of a child who will take over the operation, and 
declining profits from the operation” (2009, 442). In the same year, Esseks et al. (2009) found 
that farmers who believed that local government sided with non-farmers were more likely to 
consider selling part of their land for development.  As development and the number of non-
farmers increases, then, more and more farmers are likely to consider selling their farms. 
This last finding highlights the self-perpetuating, if incremental, nature of farmland 
conversion.  Within rural planning, the theory of the impermanence syndrome holds that as 
neighboring parcels urbanize, remaining farmers will refuse to invest in their own farming 
operations, accepting as inevitable that their own land will be sold to a developer.  While this 
seems accurate intuitively, the evidence that the impermanence syndrome actually exists is 
mixed.  Both Lopez et al. (1988) and Adelaja et al. (2011) argued that the impermanence 
syndrome is real.  Lopez et al. based this conclusion on econometric data from New Jersey farms 
showing that farmers become less responsive to agricultural price signals as suburbanization 
intensifies, while Adelaja et al. argued that the impermanence syndrome is confirmed by 
evidence that farmers on the fringe shorten their planning horizon as a result of increasing land 
values.  On the other hand, Lockeretz (1986) and Heimlich (1989) used county-level data to 
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refute the impermanence syndrome, finding that farmers in fringe counties adapt their operations 
rather than throw in the towel.  Lockeretz found that farms in metropolitan counties were smaller 
but more productive per unit area than non-metropolitan farms.  Heimlich similarly found that 
metropolitan farms have higher-value products, leave less land idle, and sell more goods directly 
to the public than non-metro farms.  Rather than viewing these seemingly contradictory studies 
as a referendum on the impermanence syndrome, I see them as evidence that only farms that 
adapt to urbanization will survive. 
2.2.3 Summary 
 Agricultural land conversion is the result of high residential demand for new homes on 
the metropolitan fringe, coupled with the willingness of current farmland owners to sell their 
property.  Residential demand for farmland is facilitated by governmental policies that subsidize 
exurban development, and it reflects consumer preferences for rural landscapes within 
commuting distance of urban jobs.  As a result, residential developers are willing to pay more for 
farmland than its market value as farmland, especially for parcels with scenic views.  These 
buyers often find willing sellers among farmland owners who don’t farm their own land or 
farmers with less profitable farming operations.  Once neighboring fields are developed into 
residential estates, remaining farmers begin to see urbanization as inevitable and disinvest in 
their own farming operations.   
2.3 Traditional Farmland Preservation Strategies 
While widespread agricultural land conversion began with the rise of the interstate 
highway system in the late 1950s, local concern over loss of farmland dates back to the 1970s 
and garnered national attention in 1981 with the publication of the National Agricultural Lands 
Study (1981) which aimed to quantify farmland conversion, understand what was causing 
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conversion, and explore options for preventing future loss of productive lands.  Since that time, 
planners in the metropolitan fringe have developed a number of strategies to prevent farmland 
conversion.  Duke et al. (2006) identified and evaluated 28 farmland retention techniques that are 
essentially variations of five basic strategies:  agricultural zoning, purchase of development 
rights, urban growth boundaries, use-value taxation, and right-to-farm legislation.  While many 
handbooks (Daniels 1999; Getzels and Thurow 1979; Lapping, Daniels, and Keller 1989; Pruetz 
2012) provide more in-depth looks at the mechanics of each strategy, the following paragraphs 
summarize the theory behind each of these approaches and evaluate their effectiveness at curbing 
farmland conversion.   
2.3.1 Agricultural Zoning 
Agricultural zoning, which encompasses large lot and sliding scale zoning, is the most 
commonly employed farmland preservation technique.  Agricultural zoning aims to preserve 
farmland by requiring minimum lot sizes larger than non-farming residential landowners would 
desire.  In theory, this reduces residential demand for farmland and retains parcels that are large 
enough to viably farm.  The theoretically most effective lot size varies from place to place 
depending upon the preferences of residential consumers, the type of crop grown, and the crop’s 
attendant land needs.   
As Coughlin (1991) noted, however, the agricultural zoning policies that are actually 
implemented are rarely based entirely on effectiveness; they must also take into account political 
acceptability.  According to most studies, farmers fear that zoning will reduce their property 
value, so they tend to advocate for smaller minimum lot sizes and thereby effectively water down 
the technique’s effectiveness at curbing farmland conversion (Adelaja and Gottlieb 2009; 
Schnidman, Smiley, and Woodbury 1990). Deaton et al. (2007) found that farmer support for 
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agricultural zoning was largely a function of landowners’ plans for their farms.  Farmers 
planning to sell off some of their farmland were, indeed, generally unsupportive of zoning, but 
farmers who were planning to expand their farming operations by purchasing more farmland 
were generally supportive of agricultural zoning.   
The agent-based model developed by Magliocca et al. (2012) shows that the effectiveness 
of agricultural zoning is chiefly a result of the chosen lot size.  Smaller “large lots,” while often 
more politically acceptable to current landowners, do little to deter additional residential 
development.  As a result, existing agricultural zoning policies have been less than effective.  
Diaz and Green (2001) found that in Wisconsin, agricultural zoning was only marginally 
successful at reducing new residential development, especially as compared to municipal tax 
rates.  Healy and Short (1979) found that agricultural zoning, when controlled by non-farming 
residents, was much more effective at retaining rural character and open space than it was at 
preserving economically viable farmland.   
2.3.2 Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs) 
Urban growth boundaries (UGBs) and urban service boundaries (USBs) are a special type 
of agricultural zoning in which zoning is used to draw a hard line between urban and rural lands.  
Urban growth boundaries aim to reduce land conversion by establishing dramatically different 
minimum lot sizes inside and outside the UGB.  Urban service boundaries, on the other hand, 
make it clear to would-be fringe developers that municipal services will not be extended to them.   
Like agricultural zoning, however, UGBs as implemented rarely live up to their 
theoretical expectations in thwarting farmland conversion.  While generally supportive of 
Portland, Oregon’s UGB, Nelson (1986) noted that its effectiveness is attributed to its strict 
adherence to very large lot sizes in rural areas and little lenience in granting variances or 
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rezoning.  In California, Newburn and Beck (2006) found the rural zoning outside the UGB to be 
very effective at reducing the density of housing in rural areas, but rather than conserving 
farmland, it led to high-priced, low-density development.   
2.3.3 Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) 
PDRs are based on notion that it is possible to decouple development rights (i.e., the right 
to build) from the other rights of land ownership (i.e., the rights to occupy, use, sell, and exclude 
others).  In PDR programs, municipalities or land trusts buy the development rights to a parcel 
from the landowner with the expectation of holding it in perpetuity, effectively halting any future 
development on that land.  The owners are compensated for the difference between the land’s 
market value as a developable property and its value as farmland; since they retain all of the 
other rights, they can continue farming and eventually sell the property.  Any future landowners, 
though, would also be unable to develop.  PDR programs encourage landowners who still want 
to farm but are tempted to sell while market values are high to sell just the development rights 
instead.  Though far less common, transfer of development rights (TDR) programs work in a 
similar way, with the development rights from one property being transferred to increase 
development density on another property.   
Because PDR programs are based upon the voluntary sale of development rights and 
compensate landowners for loss of potential development value, farmers are generally more 
supportive of PDR programs than agricultural zoning (Norris et al. 2002).  Even so, most 
municipalities dominated by farming interests cannot garner enough support to fund a PDR 
program until substantial development has already taken place (Poor and Brule 2007).  
Furthermore, there is some evidence that in those circumstances, it is not the farmers but the new 
non-farming residents who are responsible for instituting a PDR scheme (Kline and Wichelns 
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1994); as a result, PDR programs tend to favor the preservation goals of non-farmers, 
particularly the preservation of open space rather than viable agriculture (Daniels 1999).  Indeed, 
Kline and Wichelns’ focus-group participants indicated that “preserved farmland provides a 
public benefit even if it is not actually farmed” (1996, 424).   
Research on the effectiveness of PDR programs has generally found them to be more 
successful at farmland retention than agricultural zoning.  Liu and Lynch’s (2011) study of Mid-
Atlantic states found that having a PDR program decreases a county’s rate of farmland loss by 
40-55%.   Some research indicates that the preservation effect extends beyond the parcels in 
easement.  Towe et al. (2008) found evidence in Maryland that development is less likely on 
parcels that are eligible for PDR, even if the rights have not yet been purchased.  Pruetz’s case 
study research revealed that PDR programs initiate a virtuous cycle whereby “farmers become 
more optimistic about the future of local agriculture when their neighbors permanently preserve 
their land. As a result, agriculture thrives, and more land is placed under permanent easement” 
(2012, 8).  However, other studies indicate that PDR purchases can inadvertently increase 
residential demand on neighboring parcels (Nelson 1992a).  Most authors agree that because 
PDR programs are expensive and require voluntary participation by landowners, they have 
limited effectiveness unless coupled with agricultural zoning (Daniels 1997; Esseks et al. 2009). 
2.3.4 Use-value Taxation 
 Use-value taxation, or use-value assessment, taxes farmed property only on its value as 
agricultural land and not on its potential market value for development.  In so doing, it lowers 
property taxes to make farming more economically viable.  This, in theory, reduces the pool of 
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willing sellers by offsetting the financial need to sell property.  Forty-nine of the fifty US states 
have some form of use-value taxation, with Michigan being the exception (Esseks et al. 2009).
1
  
 Despite its widespread use, there is little academic research on the effectiveness of use-
value assessment to prevent farmland conversion.  In a report for the Michigan Department of 
Environmental Quality, Norris et al. (2002) asked whether Michigan experienced more farmland 
conversion as a result of not using use-value assessment.  They concluded that while use-value 
taxation is viewed as more equitable by rural landowners, Michigan’s land conversion rate was 
comparable to that of other states, and “the level of agricultural taxes does not appear to impact 
the rate at which agricultural land is converted” (20).  Though anecdotal accounts have pointed 
to increased land values and the resultant increasing property taxes in urbanizing areas as one of 
the factors leading landowners on the fringe to sell to developers (Healy and Short 1979), the 
study by Norris and colleagues suggests that property taxes are a relatively small expense 
compared to other agricultural expenses, so a change in tax rates makes little difference in a 
farmer’s willingness to sell.   
2.3.5 Right-to-farm Legislation 
 Much of the farmer/non-farmer conflict in fringe municipalities arises from some of the 
externalities associated with farming operations:  noise, dust, odors, and slow-moving farm 
vehicles on the roads.  When such nuisance cases are brought to court, non-farmers have 
traditionally won because under common law, the argument that non-farmers “moved to the 
nuisance” is an insufficient defense for farmers.  In response, state and local governments may 
enact right-to-farm laws, which shield pre-existing farming operations from nuisance suits.  In 
theory, by protecting the rights of remaining farmers to conduct their business, right-to-farm 
                                                 
1 Michigan has a voluntary farmland preservation program that allows enrollees to deduct a portion of their property 
tax bill from their state income taxes in exchange for a 10 year (or more) commitment to not sell the land for 
development.   
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legislation should prevent farmland conversion by reducing the impermanence syndrome in 
fringe municipalities. 
 However, despite widespread use of right-to-farm legislation, very little is known about 
its actual effectiveness at preserving farmland.  Adelaja and Friedman (1999), in perhaps the 
most comprehensive scholarly study of right-to-farm laws, found that farmers were the key 
supporters of their enactment.  As the political clout of farming interests in a municipality 
decreased with development, however, right-to-farm laws were weakened or revoked entirely.  
This suggests the marginal effectiveness of such a preservation technique.  Furthermore, Esseks 
and colleagues (2009) found that farmland owners generally see right-to-farm legislation as less 
effective at preserving farmland than zoning, PDR, or use-value assessment.   
2.3.6 Summary 
 All five traditional approaches to farmland preservation theoretically aim to influence 
either the supply or demand side of the land conversion equation but have limited effectiveness 
in practice.  While agricultural zoning and urban growth boundaries aim to reduce demand for 
farmland by requiring unaffordably large residential lot sizes, political compromises with current 
landowners have led to weakened zoning regulations that result in lot sizes that are affordable—
and highly desirable—to the wealthy.  On the supply side, PDR programs have provided a 
desirable alternative to willing sellers, but they are extremely expensive and can lead to 
increased development on unpreserved neighboring parcels.  Use-value taxation, another widely 
utilized supply-side intervention, aims to reduce property tax costs for farmers, but the limited 
research on its effectiveness indicates that the tax reduction is not substantial enough to impact a 
practicing farmer’s willingness to sell.  Right-to-farm legislation provides legal protection for the 
remaining farmers in urbanizing municipalities, theoretically minimizing the disinvestment and 
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eventual exit that come with the impermanence syndrome, but there is no evidence that it 
actually achieves that goal.   
  In summary, no single technique is a silver bullet for preventing farmland conversion.  
Recognizing the policy flaws, most authors recommend combining techniques to help balance 
their pros and cons (Daniels 1997; Esseks et al. 2009; Nelson 1992a; Sokolow 2006), but few 
rural municipalities have the planning expertise or the political will to create a comprehensive 
farmland preservation strategy.  Thus, a single tool capable of simultaneously reducing demand 
and discouraging supply could fill an important niche.  The next section discusses whether wind 
energy projects might provide such an alternative. 
2.4 Wind Energy and Rural Communities 
In the absence of research on the effectiveness of wind energy projects at curbing 
farmland conversion, rural planning practitioners have relied primarily on their intuition that 
such a relationship ought to exist.  In my preliminary interviews with rural planners prior to 
developing this research project, they often cited arguments that wind projects should 
theoretically both reduce residential demand for farmland and reduce the supply of farms for sale 
by providing land owners with additional revenues, and that wind zoning regulations themselves 
restrict development on the land in the immediate vicinity of the turbines.  The following 
sections explore whether existing literature on the impact of wind energy on rural communities 
supports such theories.  On the demand side, I explore wind energy as an undesirable land use.  I 
then turn to the supply side and consider the revenues wind energy projects bring to host 
communities, both directly to leaseholders and more indirectly through community-wide 
revenue-sharing.  Finally, I consider elements often included in wind turbine zoning regulations 
that might impact ability to develop the farmland surrounding the turbine.  I begin, though, by 
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giving a short primer on wind development, especially as it intersects with rural land use in the 
Midwest. 
2.4.1 A Primer on Utility-scale Wind Development in the United States 
Though there are a number of good resources to introduce the public and even land use 
planners to the wind energy industry more generally (US Department of Energy 2014; Rynne et 
al. 2011), here I focus on the aspects of wind development that are most salient to the context of 
this particular study:  utility-scale wind development in the American Midwest. 
Utility-scale turbines have two defining characteristics:  their size and the end-user of the 
power they generate.  Specifically, utility-scale turbines are the largest modern wind turbines 
with generating capacity exceeding 1.5 MW (US Department of Energy 2014), which roughly 
translates into turbine blades that are at least 100 feet long.  The power that is generated, like that 
from any other electric power plant, is fed into the electric grid via high-voltage transmission 
lines.  This marks a distinction from distributed or community grid projects, which may also 
generate power through large turbines but use the electricity locally, in the lower-voltage 
distribution line system.  Though a single large wind turbine connected to the transmission line 
can constitute a utility-scale wind energy system, most often a group of turbines within the same 
general vicinity is installed at once in what is referred to variously as a windfarm, wind project, 
or wind park. 
Though utility companies buy the power generated by the turbines, few electric utilities 
own the turbines themselves.  Instead, the windfarm is often owned and operated by a wind 
developer who puts together the capital to pay for the up-front investment in the turbines, 
arranges for the power to be sold to the grid, and is responsible for planning and receiving all 
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necessary permits for siting the windfarm.  Windfarms can be sold from one wind developer to 
another, and occasionally an electric utility also acts as a wind developer. 
Though wind developers own the turbine itself, they very rarely own the land on which it 
is sited.  Instead, they enter into long-term leases or buy a permanent easement to site the turbine 
on the landowner’s property.  Again, because the power generated enters the transmission grid 
rather than the local distribution lines, the landowners with turbines on their property do not 
directly receive the electricity that those turbines generate.  Instead, they are compensated 
through annual lease or easement payments.  At a minimum, these payments are intended to 
compensate the landowners for the land taken out of agricultural production as a result of the 
windfarm (i.e., for the value they would have received by planting corn on the acreage that 
currently hosts the wind turbine and its attendant infrastructure).  As in oil and gas leases, 
though, the wind developer commonly agrees to pay a fixed per-acre lease or easement amount 
plus a royalty:  a fixed percentage of the profits from the energy that is produced and sold to the 
electric utility, which can fluctuate from year to year based on the amount of wind, the price of 
electricity, and other factors. 
Because the earliest windfarms in the U.S. were sited on vast tracts of land, that is the 
persistent image in most people’s minds.  In the Midwest, though, most windfarms are sited 
amidst a rural community, with multiple landowners each hosting one turbine or perhaps a 
handful of turbines.  In siting a windfarm, the wind developer will first go to the community and 
get exploratory leases or easements for the land, paying a very minimal per acre fee; this buys 
the wind developer time to test the wind resource and amass enough contiguous land for a viable 
project.  Once these early leases are signed, the wind developer determines the optimal turbine 
locations and decides which leases will be extended and which will be terminated.  In the 
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traditional model, only those landowners with wind turbines or other project assets (e.g., 
underground cables, access roads) on their property were entitled to royalties from the turbines.  
However, some wind developers are beginning to pool royalties with all landowners who signed 
an exploratory lease, whether they ultimately receive a turbine on their property or not.
2
  In these 
pooling arrangements, the royalty share of the lease payment is diluted as it is shared among 
more landowners, but a higher proportion of community members receive direct payments from 
the wind developer. 
2.4.2 Wind as an Undesirable Land Use 
 Though engineering and economic challenges were previously the primary obstacles to 
widespread adoption of wind energy, recent advances on both of these fronts mean that 
community acceptance is now the most common stumbling block in successfully implementing 
wind projects.  Both the popular and academic literatures are filled with stories about the 
contentious public hearings that arise in windfarm siting (van der Horst 2007; Toke 2005; R. D. 
Kahn 2000).  Because of the size of current utility-scale wind turbines—which commonly stand 
400+ feet tall—opposition is not limited to residents within the same country block, or even the 
same municipality as the proposed wind project, but can include detractors who live miles away.   
Much of the social science research into windfarm siting has focused on factors that 
influence an individual’s attitude toward wind development.   Van der Horst (2007) found that 
while opposition on average increased with proximity to a wind project, community-level 
contextual factors and the individual’s relationship to the land greatly impacted any particular 
response.  Landowners who believed the project would improve their community’s 
environmental image were more supportive of windfarms, as were landowners who valued the 
                                                 
2 Because this has not yet been studied in an academic setting and wind developers largely require leaseholders to 
keep lease terms confidential, it is unclear how widespread royalty pooling is. 
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rural landscape more for its utility (e.g., as a working landscape) and less for its scenic value.  
Park and colleagues (2011) similarly found that people less attached to rural landscapes were 
more supportive of changes to the landscape.  Both of these studies suggest that families moving 
to the metropolitan fringe for its scenic qualities might be deterred by wind development.  
To the extent that residential demand is reflected in property values, one would expect 
that wind development would lower property values.  Indeed, Bidwell’s (2011) research 
indicated that anticipation of adverse economic impacts, particularly on personal property values, 
underlies most opposition to wind.  However, research findings on the impact of wind 
development on neighboring property values have been mixed.  Hoen et al. (2011), who 
analyzed the results of 23 previous studies in conjunction with their own hedonic model using a 
nationwide sample of properties within view of a windfarm, found that these properties tend to 
retain their market value.  The notion that property owners anticipate adverse impacts but 
ultimately experience no reduction in property values is supported by Warren and colleagues’ 
(2005) public opinion research.  They found that prior to windfarm construction, local residents 
are often quite leery of wind energy, but following construction, the residents nearest to the wind 
turbines actually have the most positive attitudes towards them. 
Notably, all of the research on property values and local attitudes towards wind energy 
has focused on the residents and landowners who currently live in communities with windfarms; 
it is silent on how the presence of the wind turbines might affect potential new residents of these 
places—that is, people who might have previously considered moving to the area.  In an early 
scoping interview, a planning commissioner in Michigan whose agricultural municipality had 
accepted a wind project commented that it is the perception of an impact that matters.  He 
acknowledged, “The research says that land prices aren’t affected by windfarms.  We hope, 
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though, people think it [wind development] lowers their property values.  We don’t want 
[residential] developers here” (B. Dickens, personal communication, August 17, 2012).   
2.4.3 Wind as a Direct Source of Farm Income 
Each wind turbine requires roughly two acres of land for the tower (i.e., the base of the 
turbine) and the service road used to access it.  To compensate the landowner for taking this land 
out of production, wind leases typically amount to anywhere from $1,000 to $4,000 per turbine 
per year (Rynne et al. 2011), a sum that often exceeds the agricultural yield on the same acreage 
for all but the best farmland.  In addition, the landowner—and, in windfarms that pool royalties, 
the neighbors—are also paid royalties for the energy generated.  The size of the royalty payment 
is highly dependent upon how many landowners are in the royalty pool, the amount of power 
generated, and the wholesale price of electricity, but these royalty payments can amount to as 
much as $10,000 per turbine per year.  This wind income diversifies farmers’ income streams 
with a guaranteed revenue source that helps them weather the year-to-year variability in crop 
yields (Rynne et al. 2011; Union of Concerned Scientists 2003).   
There has not, however, been any research on the impact of wind income on farm 
viability and subsequent willingness to sell.  In anecdotal evidence from preliminary research, I 
found that farmers with wind leases for only one or two turbines were using the revenue to invest 
in new equipment, even in a summer in which drought had decimated crop yields (B. Dickens, 
personal communication, August 17, 2012).  It would follow, then, that they were not planning to 
put their farms up for sale anytime soon.  However, as I will soon explain, additional research is 
needed to determine whether this anecdotal evidence applies more broadly to wind leaseholders, 
and whether it also extends to landowners who do not have turbines on their property but are part 
of the royalty pool.   
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2.4.4 Wind as an Indirect Source of Income 
The economic benefits of wind developments often extend beyond the landowners 
participating in wind leases themselves to the entire agricultural community in which the wind 
development is located.  Opportunities for job creation are the most commonly cited benefit, and 
have been a key determinant in eliciting a broader base of support for state-level renewable 
energy policy (Rabe 2006).  Most authors have acknowledged that the longest-lasting job 
creation benefits are at the state or regional scale, in the form of manufacturing jobs to make 
turbine and tower components (Carlson, Loomis, and Payne 2010; Lantz and Tegen 2008).  
While some temporary local jobs are created during construction, far fewer rural communities 
gain more than one or two full-time positions once the windfarm is in operation (Munday, 
Bristow, and Cowell 2011).  Even so, in rural communities with few other employment 
opportunities, any job growth is often welcome (Black et al. 2014). 
Another indirect financial impact for communities that host windfarms is through tax 
revenues.  In the U.S., taxes assessed on energy production equipment are usually collected by 
local rather than state governments.  Thus, wind companies might provide direct benefits not 
only to landowners through lease payments but to the whole community through additions to 
local coffers.  These in turn may be directed to improve locally funded public services (e.g., 
roads, parks, human services), or they may be used to reduce the local property tax burden on all 
landowners.  Because most wind energy research has been conducted in Europe where property 
taxes, if collected at all, are not kept at the community level, there has been very little written 
about the local impacts of taxes paid by wind developers.  A recent study from Texas, however, 
did find that the schools in counties with windfarms “have improved over time based on 
expenditure per-capita increasing and the student–teacher ratio decreasing” (M. E. Kahn 2013, 
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804), even as property tax rates in those windfarm counties fell, resulting in lower tax rates than 
in similar non-wind counties.  Not all states tax wind turbine machinery, and the allocation of 
property tax revenue varies from state to state, so more research is warranted to ascertain the 
impact of wind energy in other states’ property tax regimes.  
2.4.5 Land Use Regulation of Wind Energy Projects 
Given the size of modern utility-scale turbines, it is not surprising that wind projects are 
subject to land use regulation, just as other large structures in the built environment are.  Most 
often, this regulation is aimed at ensuring that turbines are safely sited in case of a catastrophic 
failure (i.e., loss of a turbine blade) or shedding of ice, as well as minimizing the noise and visual 
impacts to neighboring landowners.  Such regulations usually take the form of minimum setback 
distances from roads, property lines, or inhabited structures; noise controls; and requirements for 
vegetative screening to reduce both noise and shadow flicker (Andriano 2009). 
In establishing appropriate limits for each of these standards, local planners must 
negotiate a number of competing interests: “provision of adequate land area for wind 
development, predictability and stability for developers, protection of the financial and health 
interests of residents, and protection of the local environment” (Watson, Betts, and Rapaport 
2012, 782).  Disputes arise largely between non-participating property owners who urge larger 
setbacks that shield themselves from impacts, and developers and participating landowners who 
argue for smaller setbacks that would enable them to site more turbines in the same area 
(McGowan and Connors 2000).  There are no hard and fast rules for “safe” setbacks; as a result, 
required setbacks vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, ranging from as little as the 
height of one turbine
3
 to 1,500 feet or more (Watson, Betts, and Rapaport 2012).  While some 
zoning codes permit landowners to sign waivers allowing turbines to be sited closer to a 
                                                 
3 Turbine height is generally measured from the ground to the tip of a blade in its most vertical position.   
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dwelling, most jurisdictions require turbines to be at least 1 to 1.5 turbine heights away from any 
homestead.  Given the size of today’s turbines, even a modest 1 turbine height setback would 
result in 17 acres of safety zone for each turbine.  Increase the setback to 1,500 feet, and the 
result is 162 acres per turbine.   
It is important to note that these setbacks are not intended to be no-man’s lands.  
Landowners usually can cultivate crops or graze livestock right up to the base of the turbine.  
Accessory buildings such as barns or garages may also be permitted within the setback area.  
Setbacks apply primarily to residences.  To the extent that residential development is the key 
threat to fringe farmland, a wind turbine that makes 17 to 162 acres off-limits to developers 
accomplishes what may have cost tens of thousands of dollars to achieve through a PDR 
program or may have been politically infeasible to accomplish with large-lot agricultural zoning.  
Because much of the land affected by the setback will be on a turbine leaseholder’s property, the 
wind developer will essentially be providing revenue to compensate the affected landowner  (D. 
Schurr, personal communication, August 8, 2012).   
2.4.6 Summary 
 While the existing literature on wind energy has not looked specifically at its impact on 
agricultural land conversion, we can anticipate a connection by piecing together what is known 
about wind energy and rural communities.  Though public hearings to site windfarms often 
attract vocal opposition from neighboring landowners who anticipate adverse impacts on their 
property values, research has not conclusively shown market price reductions on properties 
within view of windfarms.  Thus, it is unclear what impact windfarms might have on residential 
demand for farmland (i.e., for new homes).  On the supply side, the literature suggests that 
farmers with wind leases should benefit from a dependable revenue source that diversifies their 
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income stream.  Anecdotal evidence from preliminary research shows that soon after signing a 
wind lease, farmers make substantial investments in their farms, which suggests that they do not 
anticipate selling their property to a developer in the near future.  Furthermore, the benefits from 
tax revenues and job creation (even temporary job creation) should be felt community-wide, as 
long as state and local laws call for assessing taxes on the wind turbine and keeping a significant 
proportion of those revenues within the local jurisdiction.  Finally, the common practice of 
regulating setback distances of wind turbines from inhabitable structures means that some 
amount of land is rendered undevelopable, at least during the duration of the windfarm’s 
operation.  Which setback distances are chosen, however, can lead to an order-of-magnitude 
variation in the amount of acreage preserved.   
 Agricultural land conversion results when high residential demand for farmland finds 
willing sellers, especially among farmers with less profitable farming operations and those who 
believe development is inevitable.  Existing approaches to farmland preservation typically try to 
alter this dynamic by approaching either the supply or demand side of the equation, but in so 
doing, they create perversions in the other side of the equation that ultimately limit the 
effectiveness of the intervention.  On paper, wind energy development appears to provide an 
alternative approach that simultaneously reduces residential demand and provides farmland 
owners with revenues that increase profitability and reduce the need to sell farmland.  This 
research project is designed to determine if the theory holds in practice. 
2.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
My overarching research question is deceptively straightforward:  Do commercial wind 
energy projects preserve farmland, and if so, how?  Theoretically, at least the first part of this 
question could be measured directly by comparing data on new housing construction in 
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comparable municipalities with and without windfarms, using statistical analysis to see if the 
presence of a windfarm reduces farmland conversion.  However, more than 80% of the wind 
capacity in the U.S., and 98% of the wind capacity in the Great Lakes states, has been built since 
2005.  In that time period, new home construction effectively ground to a halt, not because of the 
wind turbines but because of the “Great Recession” (see Figure 2-2).  As a result, a statistical 
assessment that includes any of these newer windfarms is likely to be inconclusive, since any 
“control” communities are likely to have experienced practically no residential development over 
that period.  Furthermore, even if the quantitative assessment is limited to the small subset of 
wind energy developments built before the recent economic downturn, such an approach would 
not necessarily answer the second part of my question:  How do windfarms reduce agricultural 
land conversion?   
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Figure 2-2.  Wind energy and residential home development trends in the Great Lakes states 
 
 
  
Sources:  Wind Data:  Wind Powering America. Yearly Wind Installed Capacity.   
                     http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp 
 Housing Data:  U.S. Census Bureau.  New Residential Construction.   
     http://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/pdf/startssa.pdf  
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Instead, my study operationalizes this overarching research question by directly testing 
three different mechanisms by which wind energy development may lead to farmland 
preservation:  
1. Do the revenues rural landowners receive as a result of wind energy projects change their 
on-farm investments or long-term succession plans, especially whether they expect to sell 
their land to a developer?   (I will refer to this as the supply side mechanism.) 
1.1 Does it matter whether the landowner receives revenues directly through a 
lease agreement with the wind developer, or indirectly through other financial 
benefits such as an increase in local jobs or an increase in local property tax 
revenues?  
 
2. How does proximity to a windfarm impact residential demand for farmland? (I will refer 
to this as the demand side mechanism.) 
 
3. How do zoning ordinances affect the availability of developable land in the area 
surrounding a windfarm?  (I will refer to this as the zoning mechanism.) 
 
Given what is already known about rural land conversion and the local impacts of wind 
energy development, I hypothesize that my research will find: 
H1. Landowners in communities with windfarms are more likely to make investments in 
their farms and to anticipate that the next owner of the property will also keep the land in 
agriculture than landowners in rural communities without windfarms.   
 
H2. In municipalities with windfarms, landowners who hold wind leases are even more likely 
to make investments and anticipate longer farm viability than neighboring landowners 
without leases, though both groups will have longer planning horizons than landowners 
in communities without windfarms. 
 
H3. Proximity to a windfarm reduces residential demand for farmland, particularly for buyers 
who are moving to exurbia to enjoy its scenic amenities, not to be involved in the 
agricultural sector.     
 
H4. The impact of the windfarm on residential demand for farmland is felt most acutely in 
areas with higher overall demand for new residential housing. 
 
H5. The number of acres rendered ineligible for residential development is a function not 
only of the size of the windfarm but also, importantly, the zoning regulations adopted by 
the municipality. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design: Data and Methods 
  
The last chapter ended with three research questions and five hypotheses that this 
dissertation aims to test.  In this chapter, I explain my choice of a mixed methods case study 
research design, specifically how the diversity of my research questions and exploratory scope of 
this project lend themselves to such an approach.  I then describe the implementation of each of 
my data collection instruments and explain how the data I collected corresponds to each of the 
research questions and hypotheses, setting the stage for the analysis of this data in the next four 
chapters.   
In summary, this chapter outlines a mixed methods case approach, looking at the impact of 
wind energy on farmland conversion in four communities with windfarms.  The supply-side 
mechanism (research questions 1 and 1.1, and hypotheses H1 and H2) is tested using a mail 
survey of owners of farmland in these windfarm case study communities, as well as in matched 
cases without wind turbines.  The demand-side mechanism (research question 2 and hypotheses 
H3 and H4) is tested through semi-structured interviews with local officials and realtors.  Finally, 
the zoning mechanism (research question 3 and hypothesis H5) is explored through geospatial 
analysis of existing and hypothetical zoning ordinances. 
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3.1 A Mixed Methods Case Study Design 
3.1.1 The Rationale for Mixed Methods  
Though they are all intended to inform a single overarching question—whether wind 
energy development helps to prevent farmland conversion—my research questions and 
hypotheses look at the issue from varying angles, asking what impact the presence of wind 
turbines has on existing landowners, potential homebuyers, and availability of developable 
farmland.  Some of my questions are aimed at quantifying this impact (e.g., “How many acres 
are no longer eligible…”). Others aim to capture a more nuanced explanation of the windfarm-
farmland preservation connection (e.g., “How does proximity to a windfarm…”).  As a result, 
rather than force-fit my research questions into a single method, I chose a mixed methods 
approach, in which “the inductive results from a qualitative approach can serve as inputs to the 
deductive goals of a quantitative approach, and vice versa” (Morgan 2007, 72).   
This choice complements my own tendency toward more pragmatic modes of inquiry.  
While constructivist or positivist epistemologies tend to focus on context-specific investigation 
followed by generalization, the pragmatist “investigates the factors that affect whether the 
knowledge we gain can be transferred to other settings” (Morgan 2007).  Likewise, mixed 
method research is particularly adroit at answering research questions aimed at understanding 
“how different dimensions and scales of social existence intersect or relate” and “assembling 
data and argument that can be woven into meaningful and empirically well-founded social 
theory” (Mason 2006, 15).  Specifically, employing mixed methods allows me to better tailor my 
data collection and units of analysis to the research question or hypothesis at hand, but within a 
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framework that allows the various components of my research to inform each other.
4
  For this 
dissertation I employ three research methods, which largely correspond to the three broad 
mechanisms implied by my research questions.  Table 3-1 presents a summary of each of these 
methods, mapped to the research questions they address.  Each method is described in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
  
Table 3-1.  Research design summary 
 
3.1.2 The Rationale for the Diverse Case Approach  
Because my overall research question is derived from practice but largely exploratory, I 
also opted for a research design that would allow me to test the generalizability of my wind 
energy-farmland preservation hypotheses by looking across a number of windfarms.   
Conducting the research on all utility-scale wind projects in the Great Lakes region, however, 
would be impractical.
5
  As a result, I chose a case study design, selecting four windfarms from 
                                                 
4 For example, I use a mail survey of landowners primarily to inform the quantitative analysis of whether wind 
income alters landowner investment and land use expectations, while an open-ended question also invites landowner 
input on how the windfarm might be impacting the market for new homes in the area.   
5 First, there is no easy way to identify and contact a group of people crucial to my research on the supply-side 
mechanism—the landowners with wind turbines on their property.   Even after limiting the scope of my research to 
four wind projects, it took over a month to collect parcel-level landowner data and construct a list of landowners 
with turbines on their property.  Second, a region-wide study would be impractical because my hypotheses aim to 
understand “why” and “how”—e.g., how does proximity to a wind farm impact the residential demand for 
Method Mail survey  Semi-structured 
interviews 
Geospatial 
analysis 
Research 
Question / 
Hypothesis 
Supply-side mechanism 
(research questions 1 & 
1.1, hypotheses H1 & 
H2) 
Demand-side 
mechanism (research 
question 2, hypotheses 
H3 & H4) 
Zoning mechanism 
(research question 
3, hypothesis H5)  
Unit of Analysis Agricultural landowner 
within a case study or 
matched case 
Realtors / officials 
within a case study 
Case study 
Analysis Statistical (ANOVA, 
Chi-Square) 
Qualitative, using 
coded transcripts 
Buffer area 
Also informs Demand-side mechanism 
Zoning mechanism 
Supply-side mechanism  
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among the 53 possible sites in my areas of interest (see Table A-1).  Because the number of 
selected case studies was very small in comparison to all of the windfarms in the Great Lakes 
region, I would have gained very little assurance of representativeness by selecting these cases 
through probability sampling (Teddlie and Yu 2007).  Instead, I opted for purposive sampling, 
choosing the diverse case approach to maximize the variation between cases (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008) as a way to test the limits of my wind energy-farmland preservation hypotheses.   
In the diverse case approach, cases are selected based on criteria—i.e., independent 
variables—that are expected to have some bearing on the dependent variables of interest but are 
relatively easy to assess for the full range of potential case study sites.  By choosing cases with 
diverse (though not necessarily extreme) values of the independent variable, I aim to see how the 
dependent variable reacts in a range of situations. My study as a whole has a number of 
independent and dependent variables (i.e., they vary for each hypothesis), and so I selected three 
criteria that both theory and early interviews suggest may impact the windfarm-farmland 
preservation connection:  recent housing unit growth rate, royalty arrangement, and property tax 
policy (see Appendix A for more for more discussion on why these criteria were selected).    
3.1.3 Selecting Cases  
   Among these criteria, property tax policy is the most challenging because it is usually a 
state-level policy and therefore varies not from project to project but from state to state.  Using 
multiple states, however, introduces additional logistical complexity and a host of complicating 
differences that are not entirely germane to my topic of interest (e.g., some states in the region 
are civil township-based while in others, county government oversees all rural activities).  
Michigan, however, is a bit of a regional exception; it currently requires a uniform tax structure 
                                                                                                                                                             
farmland?  Thus, they lend themselves to “an open-ended, inductive approach” (Maxwell 2005, 75).  It would have 
been impossible to do the deep dive required by inductive research in all 53 Great Lakes windfarms.  (See Appendix 
A for a list of these windfarms.)   
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for all wind projects, but the first two projects in the state were given tax abatements.   Both 
projects are located in Huron County, which hosts six of Michigan’s 16 utility-scale windfarms 
(more than any other county in the state).
6
 Because multiple wind developers work in Huron 
County, there is also a wide array of royalty arrangements.  As a result, choosing cases from 
Huron County takes advantage of a natural experiment in which development pressures are 
similar, but royalty arrangements and tax policy vary.   
 Using the diverse case selection criteria, I therefore selected three cases from Huron 
County.  The obvious first choice was one of the projects that received a tax abatement:  
Michigan Wind 1.  Because this is the only case in my study with a full abatement, I refer to it as 
the “Developer-friendly” case (#1).  This project had a non-pooled royalty arrangement.  The 
next project selected was the only other project in the county that paid full taxes but did not pool 
royalties:  Harvest II.  Because I hypothesize that this represents a mixed bag for neighbors—
they benefit indirectly from the tax revenues but do not share in direct royalty payments—I refer 
to this case as “Mixed-benefit” (#2).  Of the remaining projects fully operational at the time, I 
opted for the only project not in the same municipalities as another project:  Sigel.  This project 
received no tax abatement and had substantial royalty pooling, so I refer to it as “Neighbor-
friendly” (#3).   
 While these cases provide diversity across the royalty and tax policy criteria, they lack 
diversity in housing unit growth.  Within the townships of the three selected case studies, 
housing unit change over this period ranged from -4% to +4% (see Table 3-2).  In keeping with 
the diverse case approach, for a fourth case study, I sought a project in an area with an increase 
in population.  Among all Michigan counties with wind projects, Missaukee County had the 
                                                 
6 This includes only the projects that were fully operational in November of 2013.  At that time, there were four 
additional projects under construction in the state, three of which were in Huron County.   
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highest housing unit growth rate over the last decade at 7%.  The Stoney Corners project saw 
housing unit growth of +2 and +11% in the two townships in which it is located.  I refer to this as 
the “High-growth” case (#4). 
Table 3-2.  Summary of cases, with expected findings from each 
 
 
Together, these four projects represent a diverse array of contexts for my research (see 
Table 3-2), even though they are all sited within the same state.  Among the projects, I would 
expect High-growth (#4), the case with the highest historic housing unit growth, to have 
landowners who are most concerned about farmland conversion and as a result are more aware 
of any changes to farmland conversion rates as a result of the wind project.  In Neighbor-friendly 
(#3), the only case in which royalty payments are made to a large number of landowners who do 
not host turbines and there was no tax abatement, I would expect that a larger percentage of 
landowners are investing in their farms as a result of direct payments from the wind developer.  
And in Developer-friendly (#1), where there is an abatement and no royalty pooling, I would 
expect to find the smallest demand for new residential construction, since there is little financial 
benefit to landowners without a turbine on their property. 
As described in more detail in Section 3.3, one of my three methods is based on 
comparing the results of a landowner survey in these four windfarm communities to how 
Case
Developer-friendly 
(#1)
Mixed-benefit 
(#2)
Neighbor-friendly 
(#3)
High-growth 
(#4)
Tax abatement yes no no partial
Pooled royalties no no yes yes
2000-2010 cccupied 
housing unit change 2% / 4% 3% / -1% / -4% -2% / -4% 11% / 2%
Expected findings
Neighbors make 
fewest investments
Neighbors make 
more 
investments 
than in Case 1, 
but not as much 
as in Case 3
Neighbors make 
most investments
More 
evidence of 
change in 
housing 
demand
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respondents might have answered had the windfarm not been built.  In experimental research, 
one would choose a “control case” for that purpose.  Because the presence of a windfarm is not 
randomly assigned to a community, and, indeed, was determined prior to my research, I do not 
have a true control case.  Instead, I selected matched case (non-windfarm) communities that are 
as similar as possible to my wind cases, except for the absence of a wind project; these matched 
sites are intended to model what might have happened in my wind cases if the wind turbines had 
not been built.  Details about how these matched case communities were chosen and analysis 
about the suitability of their selection is provided in Appendix A.  Ultimately, my study area 
included 14 townships:  nine with wind turbines and five without turbines (see Figure 3-1).   
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Figure 3-1.  Map of Michigan's windfarms, with selected case studies highlighted 
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3.2 Context of the Selected Cases 
While the following chapters provide more detail about each of the chosen cases as they 
relate to my research findings, in this next section I provide a general overview of wind energy 
and agriculture in these communities.  I begin by outlining wind energy development and policy 
in Michigan, drawing comparisons to regional and the national trends to better understand the 
extent to which generalizations might be drawn from these cases.  I then turn to the case studies 
themselves. 
3.2.1 Wind Energy Development and Policy in Michigan 
As of mid-2014, Michigan ranked fifteenth in the nation for the number of utility-scale 
wind turbines, with 680 turbines (American Wind Energy Association 2014).  Much of this wind 
energy development can be attributed to the state’s Clean, Renewable, and Efficient Energy Act 
of 2008, which requires all utilities in the state to generate 10% of their electricity from 
renewable sources by 2015.  This renewable portfolio standard (RPS) requires energy projects to 
be physically located either in Michigan or within the utility’s service territory (i.e., northeastern 
Indiana) to count toward the target.  While wind belongs to the standard suite of technologies 
that count toward the goal, the Michigan RPS gives bonus credits to solar photovoltaic projects 
but not to wind energy.  Even so, given the relative cost effectiveness of wind, wind energy is 
expected to make up 98% of the state’s renewables portfolio by 2015 (SNL Energy 2011) .   
 As in 27 of the 50 states, land-use regulation of wind turbines in Michigan is left to local 
units of government (Rynne et al. 2011).  As a result, the state’s 1,700+ local municipalities have 
considerable say in where windfarms are sited.  The majority of the wind turbines in Michigan 
are in “the Thumb”—the agricultural region north of metro Detroit that boasts the state’s greatest 
onshore wind potential.  The state’s largest windfarm, however, is in Gratiot County in mid-
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Michigan, where wind resources are more modest but local officials and landowners proactively 
sought wind development.   
In contrast to neighboring states that exempt wind development from property taxes but 
allow local governments to assess discretionary fees on wind development,
 7
 in Michigan there is 
more uniformity to property tax treatment of wind energy generation equipment.  As with all 
classes of property tax in Michigan, local governments set their own property tax rates, but the 
State Tax Commission (STC)—a three-member body appointed by the governor—sets statewide 
rules for how the tax base is to be calculated.
8
  The current rules set the taxable value for each 
wind turbine based on its original construction cost, but they apply a multiplier table that adjusts 
that number downward each year for the first ten years.  This multiplier table has been modified 
twice in the last two years (see Section 5.2.3 for more details).  Furthermore, prior to the passage 
of the state’s RPS, wind developers could ask local governments for a partial tax abatement on 
the turbine’s taxable value. 
3.2.2 Huron County (Cases 1, 2, and 3) 
Huron County, where three of my four case studies are located, hosts nearly as many 
wind turbines as the rest of Michigan combined: 328 of the state’s 680 turbines (48%).  
However, it isn’t just a state leader in wind energy.  Huron County also ranks number one in the 
state for the total value of agricultural products sold—and ranks 83rd of 3,079 counties 
nationwide (US Department of Agriculture 2012).  The county is the state’s top producer of corn, 
beans, sugar beets, and wheat.  It is also the state’s top producer of cattle and milk.9 
                                                 
7 This occurs in both Ohio and Wisconsin.  Indiana exempts property taxes entirely.  It was beyond the scope of this 
study to look at property tax treatment of turbines nationally, though the American Wind Energy Association offers 
a national database of property tax information to dues-paying members. 
8 Taxes are calculated by multiplying the tax base by the tax rate. 
9 This section and the next draw heavily upon the USDA’s Census of Agriculture, which goes out to all farms and 
ranches in the U.S. every five years. I have presented this data in aggregate at the county level because that is the 
smallest reporting unit provided by USDA.   
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While the number of farms in Huron County decreased 14% from 2007 to 2012, the 
average farm size increased by 19%, and an additional 1,400 acres of land were put into active 
agricultural use over the same time period (see Table 3-3).  That time period also saw a 75% rise 
in the market value of agricultural products produced in the county, and a similar (67%) rise in 
the value of land and farm buildings.  Over half of farm owners are full-time farmers, a statistic 
that may reflect recent farm consolidation. 
Table 3-3.  Select agricultural statistics from windfarm case study counties 
 
3.2.3 The McBain area (High-growth case #4) 
The fourth case study, High-growth (#4), is located just west of the town of McBain; it 
straddles Missaukee and Osceola Counties.  In sharp contrast to Huron County, these counties 
have only one windfarm, and their agricultural sector is substantially less dominant.  While 
Missaukee County is the state’s top producer of cut Christmas trees and ranks fourth in milk 
production, Missaukee and Osceola Counties combined have 50% less farmland and 74% less 
farm revenue than Huron County (see Table 3-3).   
Huron 
County
Missaukee 
County
Osceola 
County
Number of farms                         
(change 2007-2012)
1,205             
(-14%)
433           
(+11%)
750             
(-9%)
Land in farms, in acres                 
(change 2007-2012)
452,370  
(+3%)
99,510      
(+13%)
110,562         
(-9%)
Proportion of land area in farms 85% 28% 31%
Average farm size, in acres 
(change 2007-2012)
375                
(+19%)
230           
(+2%)
147               
(-1%)
Market value of products sold 
(change 2007-2012)
$654M            
(+75%)
$126M        
(+78%)
$46M              
(+51%)
Value of land / buildings, $/acre        
(change from 2007-2012)
5,202               
(+67%)
3,025          
(+4%)
2,536           
(-5%)
Full-time farmers                                   
(% of all farm owners)
669                  
(56%)
209              
(48%)
269                
(36%)
Average age of farm owner 56.2 53.6 56.9
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Though they share a windfarm, Missaukee and Osceola Counties have very different 
agricultural sectors.  From 2007 to 2012, Missaukee County saw an increase in both the number 
of farms and acres farmed, while Osceola County saw decreases in both.  As a result, there is 
very little indication of farm consolidation over that time period, with average farm size growing 
by only 2% in Missaukee County and shrinking by 1% in Osceola County.  Furthermore, while 
the value of farmland and buildings has been on the rise in Missaukee County, it has been 
decreasing in Osceola County.    
3.3 Landowner Mail Survey 
One of my three research methods is a mail survey aimed specifically at testing the 
supply-side mechanism, by which the additional revenues that windfarms bring to rural 
communities both directly and indirectly reduce farmers’ financial need to sell land to residential 
developers.   Research questions 1 and 1.1, as well as hypotheses H1 and H2, aim to compare the 
on-farm investments and long-term succession plans of different groups of landowners, which 
makes them variance questions.  As Maxwell notes, “Variance questions are normally best 
answered by quantitative approaches, which are powerful ways of determining whether a 
particular result was related to one or another variable, and to what extent these are related” 
(Maxwell 2005, 75, emphasis in original).   
 I constructed the sample frame for the survey from tax rolls of agricultural landowners in 
each of my 14 case study townships—both those with wind turbines (the windfarm cases) and 
those without (the matched cases).
10
  Because sampling from small populations can lead to 
greater error than sampling from larger populations (Isaac and Michael 1981), I opted to conduct 
a census and send the survey to all households in the sample frame.  For most household surveys, 
                                                 
10 The rationale and details about survey design are included in Appendix B.    
 48 
 
the unit of analysis is an individual, and secondary sampling is necessary to select one member 
of the household to take the survey.  My unit of analysis, however, is the farmland owner, an 
entity that is sometimes a single person but more often a group (e.g., spouses, siblings, parent 
and child, or business partners).  As a result, while randomization of final unit selection is a 
concern for most mail surveys (Gaziano 2005), my survey cover letter explicitly instructed that 
“the survey should be answered by the person (or people) that makes decisions about your 
farmland.” (See Appendix C for the full text of the survey cover letter.)   
I drafted the questionnaire (see Appendix C) specifically for my particular area of study. 
It was informed by cognitive interviews with farmland owners in my hometown (Maybee, 
Michigan) and refined through pre-testing and feedback from my faculty advisors.  Formatting 
and survey administration were conducted according to best practice (Dillman, Smyth, and 
Christian 2009), with multiple contacts,
11
 personalized communications, a pre-paid incentive 
(Groves and Couper 1998), and strategic timing based on the schedules of my target population 
(Pennings, Irwin, and Good 2002).   My final response rate of 71.9% (AAPOR RR2) is 
exceptionally high for mail surveys, which I largely attribute to my innovation of sending along a 
$2 bill,
12
 though it was probably due to a combination of best survey practices. 
 As a way to validate the data entry, the closed-ended questions on each survey were 
keyed in by two different research assistants.  Before analyzing the data, I also cleaned it, 
flagging and removing from analysis survey responses where an error might have occurred.  
Coding for the open-ended questions was facilitated with the NVivo software package.   
                                                 
11 Each household on the sample frame was contacted up to four times over a six-week period.  These contacts 
included 1) a pre-notification letter, 2) the questionnaire with a pre-paid incentive, 3) a postcard or letter reminder, 
and 4) a replacement questionnaire. 
12 Previous research has shown that including a small pre-paid cash incentive is more effective at boosting response 
rates than post-paid incentives because it evokes in potential respondents a sense of reciprocation (Groves and 
Couper 1998).  My decision to use $2 bills as opposed to two $1 bills was a bit eccentric, but it did not go 
unnoticed—there were 11 unsolicited comments on the survey about the $2 bill.  In the future, I would like to do a 
test to see if using a single $2 bill as opposed to two $1 bills has any impact on response rate.   
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Most of the closed-ended responses in the survey were analyzed using statistical 
methods:  linear regression models for continuous/ordinal values and Chi-squared contingency 
tables for categorical variables.  Though very few questions investigated a truly continuous 
dependent variable, some of the multiple-choice questions clearly indicated a continuum that 
could be treated as continuous.
13
  Most often, my null hypothesis tested whether the mean of the 
dependent variable remained constant across three types of respondents:  those with turbines on 
their property, landowners in windfarm communities who did not have turbines on their 
property, and landowners in the matched case (no windfarm) community.  These independent 
variables appeared as factors within the linear model.  In addition, I frequently included other 
independent variables to increase the fit of the linear model:  number of acres the respondent 
owned, number of acres the respondent farmed, whether anyone within the respondent’s 
household was a full-time farmer. 
Where the dependent variable of interest was more categorical, I constructed a 
contingency table and tested the null hypothesis that each of the respondent groups (turbines, 
neighbors, and matched case) would respond to the question with the same distribution.   When 
some of the cells in the contingency table had frequencies under five, I used Fisher’s Exact Test 
rather than a Chi-squared (χ2) statistic to determine statistical significance.  Where Fisher’s Exact 
Test indicated statistically significant differences in the observed data from the expected counts 
(p<0.05), I used a test of proportions of the observed and expected percentages in each cell to 
determine which cells were contributing to the difference. 
                                                 
13 For questions about investment, for example, I treated the midpoint of the range as a continuous rather than 
categorical response.  I also treated responses to a 5-point Likert scale as continuous for the purposes of analysis.    
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3.4 Interviews with Realtors, Local Officials, and Wind Developers  
In addition to the largely quantitative landowner mail survey, my research also employs a 
more qualitative method:  semi-structured interviews.
14
  In interviews with realtors, assessors, 
and land auctioneers—those with the best knowledge of the market for farmland—my primary 
aim was to understand the effect that windfarms are having, or are expected to have, on the 
demand for farmland, especially as building sites for new residential construction.  These 
interviews are the primary source of data to answer research question 2 and hypotheses H3 and 
H4 about the demand-side mechanism.  As noted in Chapter 2, a number of recent studies have 
looked at the impact of windfarms on nearby home values, most commonly using hedonic price 
models.  My research, in contrast, asks the “how” question:  how does proximity to a windfarm 
impact new home buyers’ location decisions?  “[B]ecause…these types of questions involve 
situation-specific phenomena, they do not lend themselves to the kinds of comparison and 
control that variance theory requires. Instead, they generally involve an open-ended, inductive 
approach” (Maxwell 2005, 75).  My use of semi-structured interviews, then, is a logical choice. 
In addition to conducting interviews with real estate professionals, I also interviewed a 
variety of local officials in each of my wind case study communities:  township supervisors, 
planning commission chairpersons, and county commissioners.  The purpose of these interviews 
was to better understand the historic land use issues at play in the jurisdiction, how wind energy 
intersected with longer-term issues, and how planning decisions related to the wind project were 
made.  I also conducted interviews with the developers of each of the wind projects.  In these 
interviews, my primary goals were to understand whether farmland preservation factored into 
                                                 
14 More details about the design and procedures used in these interviews are provided in Appendix E.  
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siting decisions or communications with potential leaseholders, and to better understand the 
rationale for their varying approaches to community engagement and pooling of royalties.   
The unit of analysis for this portion of my research varies.  For the 
realtor/auctioneer/appraiser interviews, the unit of analysis is the region.  This is because the 
geographic reach of most of these real estate professionals is quite large—often multiple 
counties.  As a result, the three case studies in Huron County (Cases 1, 2, and 3) are all served by 
the same realtors.  While I have multiple observation points (i.e., individual realtors) within a 
particular county, I aggregate my data to compare interviews in the Huron County “Thumb” 
region with those in the McBain region. In contrast, the local officials spoke largely in terms of 
their jurisdiction:  a township or the entire county.  The township as a unit of analysis is sub-
case-study level (i.e., there are multiple townships within a case study).   Interviews with Huron 
County officials cross three case studies, while the interviews with Missaukee and Osceola 
County officials all pertain to the same High-growth (#4) case study.  The discussions with wind 
developers provide data that corresponds to a specific case study.    
In order to identify realtors to interview, I used online real estate listings to find realtors 
with active listings of vacant farmland parcels.   I then used snowball sampling to identify 
additional realtor interviewees in each region until I had reached the point of saturation or 
redundancy (Kuzel 1999), when I began to hear the same responses over and over again and/or I 
had run out of suggestions for knowledgeable interviewees.  In total, I interviewed six 
realtors/auctioneers:  four in the Thumb region, and two near McBain. 
Identifying the remainder of interviewees—local officials and wind developers—was a 
largely formulaic process.  I used publicly available listings of local officials to contact the 
township supervisor, planning commission chairperson, chair of the county Board of 
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Commissioners, and the chair of the county Board of Commissioners finance (or tax) committee.  
In the end, only two people in this list refused to be interviewed, both of them township 
supervisors.  This resulted in 14 interviews with local officials.  I also contacted the project 
manager for each of the case study windfarms.  Though they were initially reluctant, I succeeded 
in talking to developers in two of the four projects.
15
  In place of the developer who refused, I 
spoke to an environmental consultant who works for a variety of developers and did much of the 
feasibility analysis and community outreach on Mixed-benefit (#2).  Finally, I interviewed the 
Program Manager for the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development’s 
Farmland Preservation Office.    
I developed a semi-structured interview guide for each type of interviewee (e.g., realtor, 
local official, and wind developer), which I refined with comments from my faculty advisors and 
slight tweaks after my first couple of interviews.  As the transcripts show, my interviews rarely 
followed the interview guide.  Most often, we talked about the same questions but in a different 
order, and I sometimes introduced previously unasked questions.   
To aid in the analysis of the interview data, I coded the transcripts from each of the 
interviews using NVivo.  I began by developing a rubric based on the interview guides for each 
of the questions, and on some of the common themes that emerged as I conducted the interviews.  
As I conducted the coding, if I felt that a theme was not properly captured by the existing rubric, 
I would add another code (or set of codes) and return to the interviews that I had already 
transcribed to recode them as necessary.   
Most of the analysis of the interviews focuses on the words of the interviewees 
themselves.  In some situations, I compare the opinions of interviewees within the same case, 
                                                 
15 The Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefit (#2) cases were done by the same developer, who refused to be 
interviewed, citing legal concerns. 
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while in others I contrast opinions across different cases.  While I rarely look for an actual count 
of the number of times a given word came up within an interview or the amount of time spent 
talking about a specific topic, in some situations I do quantify the number of interviewees who 
discussed a particular topic, especially if it was in response to a question posed to all 
interviewees. 
3.5 Geospatial Analysis of Zoning Regulations 
The third method used in this research is geospatial analysis, which I employ to quantify 
the acreage rendered off-limits for residential development by the zoning applied to each 
windfarm case study.  I also use geospatial tools to build scenarios to determine the impact of 
changes to the existing regulation.  This analysis provides insights into research question 3 as 
well as hypothesis H5. 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are commonly used in the turbine siting process 
to determine where turbines can legally be sited.  These analyses consider not only land use 
regulation (zoning), but also proximity to sensitive species, microwave corridors, and land that is 
not under lease.  After identifying all of these constraints, the wind developer can determine 
where to place the turbines and the infrastructure that connects them. 
The geospatial analysis that I use in the project, however, is much closer to a build-out 
analysis in that it applies alternate regulatory regimes to the existing land use to understand how 
zoning regulations impact the availability of land for development.   As its name implies, this 
approach assumes that all available land will be built out to the maximum extent possible.  This 
tool is often used in communities worried about urbanization, either to determine whether 
existing infrastructure could handle the theoretically allowable population growth or to 
determine what impact regulation changes might have on managing growth (Godschalk 2006).  
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For this project, rather than determining changes in the number of people as a result of wind 
turbine siting regulation, I look at the number of acres impacted because the farmland itself is my 
primary concern. 
In order to match this component of the research project to the other two, the unit of 
analysis for the GIS component of my research is the windfarm.  Each windfarm in this study 
straddles at least two local jurisdictions (Mixed-benefit (#2) straddles three).  Therefore, where 
regulation varies across a project, I applied those regulations at the jurisdiction level and then 
aggregated the analysis at the case study level for comparative purposes. 
At a minimum, geospatial analysis requires knowledge of both existing land use—
specifically, the location of turbines—and existing regulation.  Both of these pieces of 
information were relatively easy to obtain.  I obtained latitude/longitude data for all turbines 
through a database maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration, and I asked township 
supervisors for copies of their zoning ordinance during our interviews.  To demarcate township 
boundaries, I used US Census shapefiles. 
I used ArcGIS to conduct the geospatial analysis for this project, primarily relying on the 
“Buffer” and “Measure a Feature” tools.  In the analysis to answer research question 3, I selected 
turbines by township and set the buffer distance around those turbines equal to the existing 
setback distance in the jurisdiction’s zoning ordinance.  I then used the measurement tool to 
determine the sum of the area of the resultant buffers, reporting this both in aggregate and on a 
per-turbine basis for each case study.  In testing hypothesis H5, I selected all turbines in my 
study and applied, in turn, three different setback distance buffers.  Similarly, I then used the 
measurement tool to determine the sum of the area of the resultant buffers, reporting this both in 
aggregate and on a per-turbine basis for each case study.  
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Chapter 4. The Supply Mechanism: Direct Payments 
 
 
Recall that in Chapter 2 I hypothesized that the revenues that wind developers pay to 
landowners who host turbines on their property would decrease their financial need to sell their 
property (H1), effectively reducing the supply of developable land in communities with 
windfarms.  The evidence to support this, I asserted, would be not only landowners’ own 
assessments of what would happen to their land far into the future, but also their reinvestment of 
wind income to improve their farm.   
In this chapter, I discuss evidence supporting this hypothesis.  I first use interviews with 
local officials to establish that the increase in farm income through direct payments by wind 
developers to those who host turbines on their property is the primary connection they see 
between wind energy and farmland preservation.  I then turn to the survey of landowners to find 
that landowners with turbines on their property are more likely to believe that their land will be 
farmed in the future and less likely to say it will be idle or used for recreational purposes than are 
their neighbors without turbines on their property and landowners in the matched case 
communities.  Landowners with turbines also report investing significantly more in their farms 
and buying more land than their neighbors.  I further discuss differences between the four 
windfarm cases and the impact of pooling royalty payments on investment, finding that pooling 
has no impact on neighbors’ investment behavior but does significantly improve their opinion of 
wind energy, leading to less conflict between those with and without turbines on 
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their properties.  Lastly, I connect survey respondents’ reports of damage done to farmland 
during windfarm construction to a possible explanation for increased investment in field 
drainage.   
 
4.1 Prevalence as a Stated Goal:  Interviews with Local Officials   
In my interviews with local officials and wind developers, the connection between wind 
energy and increasing farm incomes was the most common response to my question about 
whether wind turbines helped preserve farmland, with eight of 18 non-realtor interviewees (44%) 
mentioning such a connection.  These included local officials from Huron County as well as the 
McBain area, two of the three wind developers that I interviewed, and the Program Manager for 
the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development’s Farmland Preservation 
Office.   
Contrary to my hypothesis (H1) that wind-related incomes would reduce the financial need 
to sell, only one interviewee explained that these revenues deterred the landowner from selling 
land for a non-agricultural purpose.  Instead, interviewees more often portrayed revenues from 
wind turbines as a way to make farming more attractive to younger family members, thereby 
keeping the land in the family.  Wind energy, I was told, “adds a little stability for the land 
owner” in an otherwise cyclical or unpredictable commodities market.  One wind developer 
recounted that in one of his windfarms, “a few of them [i.e., farmers] have been able to solidify 
their succession planning to the next generation of farmers because and only because of the 
security of the revenue they’re receiving from the wind energy, the royalties.”  This relationship 
also seemed to be significant in the state’s determination that wind energy is compatible with its 
PA 116 farmland preservation program.  The program manager recounted: 
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We know that having additional income from the wind turbines would have a—
the farmers can make money, will keep their land in agricultural use, and will 
encourage our [their] kids to get involved in agriculture if you can make money 
on it.   
 
This, he added, seemed to counterbalance the few acres per turbine that were taken out of 
agricultural production for the turbine base and access road.   
 This refining of my hypothesis—to focus on family succession rather than conversion to 
non-agricultural conversion—clearly highlights how rural communities face very different land 
use related changes.  Under my original hypothesis, I assumed that, since all of my selected case 
studies were in communities where the population was remaining steady or growing, 
suburbanization is the key threat to farming. I expected to find, accordingly, that additional 
income would make development less financially attractive.  In contrast, most of the local 
officials that I interviewed believe that the loss of young people—a common problem in 
declining rural areas—is the key threat to agriculture in these case study communities, and that 
additional income makes farming more attractive to young people.  If wind energy can address 
both threats—suburbanization and youth flight—it would be unique among farmland 
preservation tools (I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 8).   
In the next two sections, I turn to the landowner survey data to learn the farmer’s 
perspectives on what impact wind income may be having on their farm budgets and long-term 
plans.  First, I find evidence to support local officials’ perceptions that wind energy incomes may 
be encouraging more young people to stay and farm.  In the second section, I find that wind 
energy income is being reinvested on the farm, which would also seem to help forestall farmland 
conversion in areas where suburbanization is the key threat. 
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4.2 Long-term Land Use Expectations 
One way to determine if wind energy is changing landowners’ plans is to ask them 
directly how they expect their farmland will be used when they sell it.  If the wind income has no 
effect on these plans, you would expect landowners with turbines on their property to answer in 
roughly the same way as both their neighbors without turbines and landowners in a matched case 
community.   
In order to facilitate quantitative analysis comparing different types of future plans, the 
mail questionnaire asked a multiple-choice question with six response categories (see Appendix 
C, question 3.3).  I collapsed these into 3 categories to minimize the degrees of freedom of my 
model (and thus increase the likelihood of detecting statistical differences):   “Farmed by a 
family member” and “farmed by a non-family member” were collapsed into a “farmed” 
category; “converted to a housing development / subdivision” and “Converted to an industrial, 
commercial, or retail use” were collapsed into a “developed” category.  Some respondents 
selected the “other” category, saying that their land would be used for recreation or hunting.  
Those responses were combined with the “idle—neither farmed nor developed” responses to 
form an “idle/recreation” category.   
For all valid survey responses for this question (n=1104), Fisher’s Exact Test indicated 
significance (p<0.001), and the test of proportions found that two cells statistically differed from 
the expected values (see Table 4-1).  Specifically, respondents with turbines on their property 
were significantly more likely to say that their land would be farmed and less likely to say it 
would be idle or recreational in the future.   
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Table 4-1.  Percentage of survey respondents answering the question "How do you think most your land in [x] county will 
be used when you sell it?" 
 
 
Because future expectations might well be linked to the size of one’s landholdings or to 
the size of the farming operation, I also employed multinomial logistic regression to see if these 
factors better predicted future land use expectations.  The number of acres owned by the 
landowner was significant in the model.  As Figure 4-1  shows, farmers who own more land are 
more likely to think that their land will continue to be farmed, with 95% of landowners with 150 
or more acres believing that their land will be farmed.  The model also shows, however, that 
even after I account for acres owned, landowners with turbines on their property are still 
significantly more likely to say that their land will be farmed, and less likely to say that it will be 
developed or left idle.   
  
Developed Farmed
Idle or 
Recreation
Matched case 4% (16) 84% (376) 12% (55)
Neighbors 1%   (5) 90% (476) 9%  (48)
Turbines 0%   (0) 98% (125)**     2%     (3)*
Expected / Total 2% (21) 89% (977) 10% (106)
Numbers of respondents in each category given in parentheses ().
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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Figure 4-1.  Multinomial logistic regression of future land use expectations 
The three graphs show the probability of the respondent selecting each of three possible response options.  As the 
number of acres farmed (x axis) increases, all respondents are more likely to say their land will be farmed in the 
future.  However, at small acreages, respondents in the matched (no turbine) communities are more likely to say 
their land will be developed or remain idle and less likely to say it will be farmed, as compared to the respondents in 
the windfarm communities. 
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Analysis at the case study-level shows that this finding holds true in the windfarms both 
in Huron County and in the McBain area.  Running the same contingency table analysis on the 
respondents in Huron County (Windfarms 1, 2, and 3, and their matched case communities; 
n=905) produced similar results to the sample as a whole (see Table 4-2, Fisher’s Exact Test p = 
<0.001).  The test of proportions showed significant differences in the same two cells as the 
analysis as a whole, though the test of proportions p-values were less significant, likely because 
of the reduced sample size.   A look at the observed and expected frequencies for the High-
growth (#4) windfarm (see Table 4-3) shows that 85.4% of landowners overall believe that their 
land will be farmed, as compared to 89.2% of landowners in Huron County.  All respondents in 
High-growth (#4) with turbines on their property indicated that their land would be farmed in the 
future—the highest percentage of any subgroup in the study.  However, because there were only 
12 such respondents, the contingency table analysis was not statistically significant, with a 
Fisher’s Exact Test p-value of .2305.  Even so, because over half (12 of 21 = 57%) of the 
landowners in High-growth (#4) with turbines on their property responded to the survey, it is not 
unreasonable to look at the raw numbers rather than relying on statistics (see the rationale for this 
argument in Appendix B).   
 
Table 4-2.  Percentage of survey respondents answering the question "How do you think most your land in [x] county will 
be used when you sell it?" in ONLY Windfarms 1, 2, and 3, and the corresponding matched case communities 
 
Developed Farmed
Idle or 
Recreation
Matched case 3% (11) 85% (299) 11% (40)
Neighbors 1% (3) 90% (395) 9% (41)
Turbines 0% (0)    97% (113)*    3%  (3) *
Expected / Total 2% (14) 89% (807) 9% (84)
Numbers of respondents in each category given in parentheses ().
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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Table 4-3.  Percentage of survey respondents answering the question "How do you think most your land in [x] county will 
be used when you sell it?" in ONLY High-growth (#4) and the corresponding matched case community 
  
 
4.2.1 Change in Plans Attributed to Wind Energy 
As a follow-up to the survey question about future land use expectations, I asked residents 
whether their expectations had recently changed and, if so, why.  I constructed the question 
specifically to ask about changes in expectations in the last five years to capture a time before the 
first of my case study windfarms were constructed.  Note, however, that this question did not 
specifically mention wind energy. 
Very few respondents (n=55, 4.2% of the total respondents) noted a recent change in their 
expectations, and only 44 respondents explained why their expectation had changed.  The coding 
of these responses shows that most (84%) attribute the change in expectation to something 
unrelated to wind energy (see Table 4-4).  Most commonly, respondents cited a change in their 
own health (e.g., “I probably would have farmed it myself but now I have a terminal illness and 
am unable to farm anymore”) or changes in succession plans (e.g., “At that time my daughter 
and her husband were not interested in farming”).  Other respondents cited increasing farmland 
prices that make it difficult to obtain enough land to farm, and changes in farming that favor 
larger tracts than they currently own. 
Developed Farmed
Idle or 
Recreation
Matched case 5% (5) 79% (77) 16% (15)
Neighbors 2% (2) 90% (81) 8% (7)
Turbines 0% (0) 100% (12) 0% (0)
Expected / Total 4% (7) 85% (170) 11% (22)
Numbers of respondents in each category given in parentheses ().
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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Table 4-4. Coding of open-ended question about changes in expectation of future land use:  "If you had been asked Q3.3 
[how your land will be used when you sell it] five years ago, do you think you would have answered the same way?  If no, 
why not?" 
 
 
Of those responses that mentioned wind energy, all seven implied that they were unhappy 
with the change (see Table 4-5).  Four of the seven made some mention of wind turbines not 
being pleasant to live near.  Notably, three of these comments were from respondents who 
owned less than 60 acres of farmland, and they indicated that they now thought their land would 
be idle in the future (presumably rather than being developed for housing).  The fourth 
respondent who noted that the turbines were unpleasant owned between 60 and 259 acres and 
anticipated that the land would remain farmed, but not by a family member.   
The responses from the landowners who owned the most land are more difficult to 
decipher.  One of the respondents was clearly upset with the wind developer and its contractors, 
but it is not clear how this would change his expectation of future land use.  The other noted that 
“the windmills are negative to our farming communities” but suggested that he expected his land 
to be farmed by a family member in the future, so, again, it is unclear what his previous 
expectation was.   
Most curious is the response from a landowner in Developer-friendly (#1), who wrote 
“The land could have remained farmland before windmills,” and indicated that the land would 
likely be converted to some sort of non-farming use (he checked both “converted to a housing 
development/subdivision” and “converted to an industrial, commercial, or retail use”).  
Explanation for change 
Number of 
responses
Change in health or family plans 28
Wind turbine-related 7
Change in farmland prices 6
Change in farming 3
Total open-ended responses 44
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According to the respondent’s other answers on the survey, he does not have a turbine on his 
property and owns 20-59 acres, a plot that is on the small side for the area but likely large 
enough to farm.  There are no other clues as to what he expects might be built on his land now 
that might have not been built before, or why farming is not a feasible future option. 
While local officials may be concerned that these landowners are displeased by the 
windfarms and their impact on the future use of their farmland, from a farmland preservation 
perspective, it is good news that most of these respondents believe that the wind turbines make 
their land less likely to be developed.  Three of the seven believe that their land will remain idle, 
but they also own some of the smallest tracts, which may be too small to farm.  Three more of 
the seven, notably those with the largest landholdings, believe that their land will remain farmed.  
Overall, this would seem to indicate that, at least for a small group of landowners, the wind 
turbines are indeed helping to stop farmland conversion, even if that outcome is against their 
wishes. 
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Table 4-5.  Open-ended responses that wind energy had changed expectations for future land use, arranged by increasing 
number of acres owned by respondent. 
 
Explanation of change in expectation [open-ended] 
Current 
expectation 
[multiple choice] 
Acres 
currently 
owned 
“Turbines are not desirable to live or farm near.  They 
belong in areas far away from housing.  Land value 
plummets near wind farm.” 
Idle – neither 
farmed nor 
developed 
0 - 19 
“I would have passed the land onto my kid, but I will not 
encourage them to live here because of the negative 
health effects of the nearly turbines.” 
Idle – neither 
farmed nor 
developed 
0 - 19 
“Didn’t know they were going to shove 10,000 turbines 
down our throats.  They have destroyed the landscape.  
Who the hell wants to move next to a windmill.” 
Idle – neither 
farmed nor 
developed 
20 - 59 
“The land could have remained farmland before 
windmills.” 
Converted to 
some sort of non-
farming use 
20 - 59 
“One of our children had mentioned [moving] here from 
Town when their children were grown, but forget that 
now with this noisy windmill running day and night 24/7 
365” 
Farmed by a non-
family member 
 
60 - 249 
“The windmills are negative to our farming 
communities.” 
Farmed by a 
family member 
250 - 499 
“Had not been lied to and screwed yet.  Had not yet met 
subcontractor with their attitude.” 
Farmed by family 
member or non-
family member 
500+ 
 
 
4.2.2 Wind Turbine Impact on Succession Plans 
Recall that many of my interviewees—both wind developers and local officials alike—
directly linked wind energy income and succession planning, arguing that the additional revenue 
was making farming more attractive to young people.  None of my landowner survey 
respondents explicitly made such a connection, though respondents did separately mention the 
presence of wind turbines or a change in their child’s career choice as having recently altered 
their future land-use expectations. 
When asked whether they “have a succession plan in place for their land,” overall 62% of 
respondents indicated in the affirmative, but there is a large difference based on whether or not 
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the landowners have a turbine on their property (see Table 4-6).  Among those with turbines on 
their property, 80% have a succession plan in place, compared to only 62% of their neighbors 
and 57% of landowners in the matched case community.  Using binomial logit regression, I find 
that the likelihood of having a succession plan increases with each additional acre farmed (see 
Table 4-7).  However, even after I account for the size of the farming operation, landowners with 
turbines on their property are significantly more likely to have a succession plan in place than 
their counterparts in the matched case community.  Neighboring landowners in windfarm 
communities are also more likely than matched case landowners to have a succession plan, but 
this is not nearly as statistically significant.   
Table 4-6.  Prevalence of succession plans among survey respondents 
 
 
Table 4-7.  Binomial logit model of having a succession plan in place 
For all respondents, as the numbers of acres they farm increases, so does their likelihood of having a succession plan in place.  
But the presence of the wind farm is also predictive.  Those with turbines on their property are 2.5 times as likely to have a 
succession plan in place as respondents in the matched case (no-turbine) communities who farm just as many acres.  Succession 
plans are also 1.34 times more prevalent among the neighbors in the windfarm than in the matched case community. 
 
 
My research did not ask landowners when they created a succession plan, so I cannot 
definitively confirm that windfarm revenues are helping landowners to solidify succession plans, 
All 
Respondents
Matched Case 
Respondents
Neighbors Turbines
Yes 62% 57% 62% 80%
No 38% 43% 38% 20%
Number of 
respondents 1164 471 559 134
Wind Respondents
Probability of 
having a 
succession plan Significance
As acres farmed increases 1.00 ***
If  "Neighbor" rather than "Matched Case" 1.34 *
If "Turbine" rather than "Matched Case" 2.49 ***
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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as my interviewees implied.  An alternate explanation for the difference in succession planning is 
that those landowners who had pre-existing succession plans may have been more inclined to 
diversify farm income and therefore would have proactively sought out wind leases.  This theory, 
however, conflicts with the fact that in all of my chosen case studies, it was the wind developer 
and not the farmland owners who initiated the windfarm leasing process.  Furthermore, while 
this alternate explanation may explain differences in succession planning between landowners 
with turbines and their neighbors, it does not adequately explain differences between the turbine 
group and their matched case counterparts who have not (yet) been approached by a wind 
developer but include a number of landowners who—my survey reveals—would welcome wind 
development. 
 
4.3 On-farm Investment 
The analysis up to this point has looked at whether landowners who receive direct 
payments from wind developers say that their land will remain actively farmed for longer than 
the land of those who do not receive these direct payments.  However, previous survey methods 
research has found that people are not always able to predict their own future actions, especially 
actions that would take place far into the future.  Therefore, my survey was designed to test this 
same hypothesis using an alternate approach: asking them about recent investments in their farm.  
The rationale is that farmers who invest more in their farms expect to be farming longer than 
those who do not invest in their farms; it is unlikely that someone would build a brand-new barn 
or lay drainage tile only to sell the land to a developer shortly thereafter.  As a result, farm 
investment should be a proxy for longer-term land use expectations.   
In the following subsections, I look at the survey responses on questions related to farm-
related improvements and buying additional farmland (another type of investment).  I also look 
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at what impact direct payments from wind developers are having on farm budgets, in the words 
of the landowners themselves.  Throughout, I compare the data from each of the four windfarm 
cases to look at the impact of royalty pooling—sharing the royalties more broadly with neighbors 
who do not have turbines on their property—on investments of neighbors within each case study.  
Finding little evidence of additional investment by these neighbors, I also discuss whether 
pooling royalties might have other benefits for rural communities. 
4.3.1 On-farm Investment 
In order to capture the investments that owners of farmland have been making to their 
property, the survey sent to landowners asked four parallel questions:  “Since 2008, about how 
much money have you spent on improvements to your [… home? …outbuildings? …drainage 
and irrigation?  …new or used farm equipment including trucks, tractors or other farm 
machinery?]”  The purpose of breaking this overall question into pieces was twofold.  First, it 
made it easier for respondents to accurately answer the question, ensuring that they included 
each of the investments of interest but did not have to add these numbers in their heads.  Second, 
breaking the question into parts enabled me to see if wind development differentially impacts 
certain types of investments. 
 When looking at the data from all respondents, I find that the average investment per 
landowner is consistently higher in communities with wind turbines than in the matched case 
communities.  This is true for all types of investments, though most pronounced for investments 
in farm equipment. Landowners in communities with windfarms spend on average $29,813 more 
on farm equipment than their counterparts in communities without windfarms (see Table 4-8).  
When all investment types are combined, the difference in spending between landowners in 
matched case and windfarm communities is $47,456 over this five-year period.   
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Table 4-8.  Mean landowner investment in home and farm 
 
 
There are even larger differences, though, when we differentiate between respondents in 
windfarm communities with turbines on their property (“turbines”) and those without 
(“neighbors”).  This differentiation makes it clear that the landowners with turbines on their 
property are largely driving the difference.  In most of the investment categories, landowners 
with turbines invest nearly twice as much as their neighbors.  Furthermore, landowners with 
turbines reported spending over $250,000 more than both their neighbors and the landowners in 
the matched case communities on improvements to their properties over the five-year period.  In 
contrast, in all but High-growth (#4), landowners in wind communities who do not have turbines 
on their property invested less than landowners in the matched case community, though not 
statistically significantly so (see Figure 4-2). 
 
Type of Investment
All 
Respondents
Matched Case 
Communities
 Wind 
Communities
Neighbors Turbines
Home  $               26,897  $                  24,035  $              28,829  $       25,681  $    41,970 
Outbuildings  $               36,521  $                  29,639  $              41,118  $       33,786  $    71,780 
Drainage / Irrigation  $               25,321  $                  22,105  $              27,474  $       20,236  $    57,863 
Equipment  $            125,027  $                107,208  $            137,021  $     102,901  $ 279,539 
Total Investment  $            215,433  $                186,899  $            234,355  $     183,593  $ 449,087 
Number of respondents* 1096 437 659 533 126
* The number displayed is the number of respondents who answered all four investment-related questions.
Wind Respondents
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Figure 4-2.  Average total investment by owners of farmland, by respondent group and case study (in $1,000s) 
 
 
Note that some of these “neighbors” in the windfarm communities are part of royalty 
pools; they originally leased some of their land to the wind developer, and though a turbine was 
not placed on their property, they receive some of the profits from the energy that is produced 
each year.  If we compare the investments of this group to the investments of neighbors outside 
of the pool (i.e., neighbors who receive no wind-related income) and the investments of 
neighbors with turbines on their property, it becomes clear that landowners in the pool are much 
more similar to their uncompensated neighbors than to those with turbines on their property (see 
Table 4-9).  Because there is no statistically significant difference in the investments of 
neighbors who receive wind royalties and those who do not, they are treated as one—simply as 
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“neighbors”—for the rest of this analysis.  (I will return to the impact of pooling royalties later in 
this chapter.) 
Table 4-9.  Mean landowner investment of landowners in communities with windfarms, comparing neighbors in and out 
of the royalty pool and those with turbines on their property 
 
Recall that landowners with turbines on their property tend to own and farm more land 
than their neighbors.  Since many of the improvements that the survey investigated were directly 
related to farming (i.e., drainage and irrigation, farm equipment), the size of the respondents’ 
farming operation is also likely to play a role.  Using a linear ANCOVA model to factor acres 
farmed and acres owned into the model shows that acres farmed is a significant predictor for all 
investments except home improvements (see Table 4-10).  The ANCOVA model also indicates 
that the presence of a turbine alone is rarely a significant predictor of additional investment 
(except in the case of drainage and irrigation; see Section 4.4 for a possible explanation).  
However, there is a significant interaction between acres farmed and having a turbine: for every 
additional acre farmed, landowners with a turbine invests more in their property than do their 
neighbors and landowners in communities without wind energy (see Figure 4-3).  This means 
that while the differences in investment are small for landowners who do not farm or farm very 
Type of Investment
Neighbors 
outside of 
pool
Neighbors 
in pool
Turbines
Home  $      25,782  $      25,349  $         41,970 
Outbuildings  $      32,842  $      36,914  $         71,780 
Drainage / Irrigation  $      19,552  $      22,540  $         57,863 
Equipment  $   103,210  $    101,855  $      279,539 
Total Investment  $   180,878  $    192,642  $      449,087 
Number of respondents 410 123 126
Windfarm Respondents
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small acreages, as the size of the farming operation grows, so does the difference between those 
with turbines and those without.   
Table 4-10.  ANCOVA model coefficients for investment 
The numbers in this table represent the slope of the regression lines modeling the connection between acres farmed, type of 
respondent, and a range of on-farm investment categories. These values can be interpreted as “additional dollars per acre 
farmed.”16     
 
 
                                                 
16 The first row demonstrates that for every additional acre farmed, a respondent in the matched case community invests an 
additional $791 in the farm as a whole, including $121 in the outbuildings, $113 in drainage or irrigation, and $523 in farm 
equipment (home improvement is not significant).  [Note that each column was an independent ANCOVA model using all data 
available.  Because of item-missing data, each is based on a different number of observations.  Total investment was calculated 
only for respondents who answered all four of the investment-related questions, which explains why the number in the total 
investment column is not equal to the sum of the preceding numbers (i.e., 7+121+113+523≠791).] 
 
The fifth row shows that for respondents with turbines on their property, for every additional acre of land farmed, the respondent 
invests an additional $172 across all categories, for a total of $963 more [$791+$172] per acre.   
 
As a result, though the investment figures are similar across respondent types for respondents who do not farm or who farm small 
acreage, the differences grow with the size of the farming operation. 
 
Home 
Improvements Outbuildings
Drainage/
Irrigation
Farm 
Equipment
Total 
Investments
Increasing acres farmed (for "Matched Case") 7 121*** 113* 523*** 791***
"Neighbor" rather than "Matched Case" -1835 1452 1709 1924 7886
"Turbine" rather than "Matched Case" 2927 -137 10351* -16093 -4566
Increasing acres farmed & "Neighbor" rather than 
"Matched Case" 20* 35** n/a 44 70
Increasing acres farmed & "Turbine" rather than 
"Matched Case" 31* 30* n/a 134*** 172**
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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Figure 4-3.  ANCOVA model for total investment, all respondents 
 
 
Looking at each pair of matched case studies, we see that the trends are similar.  In all 
case studies, the number of acres a landowner farms is the strongest predictor of total investment 
(see Table 4-11), and having a turbine alone does not have a significant impact on investment.  
However, in Neighbor-friendly (#3) and High-growth (#4), there is a positive interaction 
between the number of acres farmed and being in a community with a windfarm.  In these cases, 
landowners both with and without turbines invest more than their counterparts in areas without 
wind energy for each additional acre farmed (see Figure 4-4).   
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Table 4-11.  ANCOVA model coefficients for total investment, by case study 
The numbers in this table represent the slope of the regression lines modeling the connection between acres farmed, type of 
respondent, and total investment. These values can be interpreted as “additional dollars per acre farmed.”  See footnote on page 
72 for assistance in interpreting this table. 
 
 
It is not immediately clear why this does not also hold true for Developer-friendly (#1) 
and Mixed-benefits (#2).  Recall that pooling wind royalties is not as widely practiced in 
Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefits (#2), so the wind income is concentrated in the 
hands of fewer landowners.  This, you might expect, would actually lead to more differentiation 
between those with turbines and their neighbors or those in the matched case community, but the 
data actually show the opposite.  Another explanation is that this could be the result of a poor 
choice in matched case.  Recall from Chapter 3 that Neighbor-friendly (#3) and High-growth 
(#4) appear to be a poorer match, with more full-time farmer landowners and higher percentages 
of household income coming from farming in the windfarm communities than in their respective 
matched case communities.  While adding these factors to the model does not statistically 
improve the fit in any of the case study pairs, it is possible that these underlying differences may 
be indirectly impacting on-farm investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
Increasing acres farmed (for "Matched Case") 917*** 866*** 763*** 341***
"Neighbor" rather than "Matched Case" 36829 -3420 -26124 -23049
"Turbine" rather than "Matched Case" 63299 -34275 -60677 38679
Increasing acres farmed & "Neighbor" rather than 
"Matched Case" -106 -123 261*** 525***
Increasing acres farmed & "Turbine" rather than 
"Matched Case" -43 50 432*** 495***
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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Figure 4-4.  ANCOVA model for total investment, my case study 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Buying Land 
One common investment in rural communities that is missing from the preceding analysis 
is the purchase of land itself.  In my survey, rather than asking about the dollar value of land 
purchases as with other investments, I asked instead about the number of acres purchased, since 
over the last five years—my time period of interest—land values have nearly doubled in some of 
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my study areas.  Having data reported in acres helps to account for this change in value.  I was 
also interested in gauging the size of parcels transacted, as larger tracts tend to be more suitable 
for farming.  Overall, nearly 21% of landowners reported purchasing additional farmland in the 
last five years.  Landowners in windfarm communities were slightly less likely to buy land than 
those in the matched case communities, though they did report more purchases of the largest 
parcels (see Table 4-12).  Within communities with windfarms, there are vast differences 
between landowners with turbines on their property and those without.  Landowners with 
turbines were much more likely to buy land (34.3% bought compared to only 15.5% of their 
neighbors), and they were significantly more likely to buy large tracts of 80 acres or more. 
 
Table 4-12.  Percentage of respondents who bought (or did not buy) land 
 
Like other on-farm investments, farmland purchases are closely linked to the number of 
acres that the landowner farms.  Using a binomial logistic regression model, after accounting for 
the number of acres farmed, I find that landowners with turbines on their property may be less 
likely to buy additional farmland than those in the matched case community, though this 
relationship is not statistically significant (see Table 4-13).   
  
All 
respondents Matched case
Windfarm 
respondents Neighbors Turbines
Did not buy 79.1 76.9 80.6 84.5*** 65.7***
Bought <40 4.3 5.0 3.8 3.7 3.6
Bought 40 - 79 4.4 6.2 3.1 2.3*** 5.8
Bought >80 12.2 11.9 12.4 9.5* 24.8***
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
Windfarm respondents
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Table 4-13.  Binomial Logit Model coefficients, representing the probabilities of a landowner buying additional farmland, 
using all survey respondents 
Probabilities greater than 1 indicate increased likelihood of buying additional farmland, while probabilities below 1 indicate 
decreased likelihood of buying additional farmland.   
 
 
 
Because of the very small numbers of landowners who reported buying land, statistical 
analysis at the case study level is relatively limited.  Even so, summary statistics within each case 
study pair show much the same pattern as the overall data (see Table 4-14).  Overall, respondents 
in areas with windfarms are less likely to buy, though landowners with turbines tend to buy at a 
higher rate than their neighbors.  In High-growth (#4), however, this is not the case, with 
residents in the matched case communities buying less land than respondents in the townships 
with the windfarm.  Again, this is likely a result of the matched community not being a 
particularly good choice for this case study.  After I use binomial logit regression to include 
acres farmed into the model for each of the case studies, the impact of having a turbine on one’s 
property completely disappears (see Table 4-15). 
 
 
  
Probability of 
buying additional 
farmland Significance
As acres farmed increases 1.005 ***
"Neighbor" rather than "Matched Case" 1.023
"Turbine" rather than "Matched Case" 0.845
Increasing acres farmed & "Neighbor" rather 
than "Matched Case" 0.998 *
Increasing acres farmed & "Turbine" rather 
than "Matched Case" 0.999
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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Table 4-14.  Percentage of respondents who reported buying additional farmland, by case study 
 
 
Table 4-15.  Binomial logit model coefficients, representing the probabilities of a landowner buying additional farmland, 
by case study 
Probabilities greater than 1 indicate increased likelihood of buying additional farmland, while probabilities below 1 indicate 
decreased likelihood of buying additional farmland.   
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Impact on Farm Business:  Open-ended Responses 
The analysis so far in this section has used self-reported investment data to test the 
hypothesis that revenues received from hosting a wind turbine on one’s property increase on-
farm investments, which in turn extend the planning horizon for a farm and reduce farmland 
conversion.  But another way to test this hypothesis is to ask directly what impact wind income 
has on the finances of a farm family.  The survey sent to landowners did just that.  First, a 
screening question asked whether the respondent “received any royalties from a wind energy 
project in 2013.”  Respondents who answered in the affirmative were further asked how much 
All 
respondents
Matched case 
respondents
Windfarm 
respondents Neighbors Turbines
Developer-friendly (#1) 19 25 16 16 23
Mixed-benefit (#2) 22 25 21 13** 36**
Neighbor-friendly (#3) 23 28 19 16 33
High-growth (#4) 17 12 22 19 46**
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
Windfarm respondents
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
As acres farmed increases 1.004*** 1.005*** 1.007*** .003**
"Neighbor" rather than "Matched Case" 0.673 0.791 1.115 1.108
"Turbine" rather than "Matched Case" 0.269 1.055 0.597 0.987
Increasing acres farmed & "Neighbor" rather 
than "Matched Case" 0.999 0.999 0.997* 1.001
Increasing acres farmed & "Turbine" rather 
than "Matched Case" 1.000 0.999 0.997 1.163
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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money they received (in a multiple-choice format) and were then asked the open-ended question 
“How does this royalty income affect your farm business?” 
A total of 198 respondents answered this open-ended question.  Less than half (41%) 
indicated that this wind income had a positive impact on their farming business, and the majority 
said that the income had little (20%) or no (35%) impact.  Four of the respondents—both of 
whom are leaseholders in windfarms that neighbor Mixed-benefit (#2) and Neighbor-friendly 
(#3) but are still under construction—said that it was too soon to tell what impact the royalty 
income would have.  Four more landowners said that the royalty income has had a negative 
impact on their farm.   
The perceived impact seems at least partially correlated to the size of the royalty check.  
Those who report a positive impact, for example, had the highest overall average annual royalty 
at $2,751, while those who said the royalty had no impact received on average nearly $1,000 less 
per year (see Table 4-16).  Interestingly, three of the four respondents who noted that the royalty 
had a negative impact on their farm business reported an annual royalty exceeding $3,000—the 
highest category on the survey.   
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Table 4-16.  Categorization of open-ended comments to the question "How does this royalty income affect your farm 
business ?" 
 
Most of the positive comments about wind energy royalties note that it simply adds 
another source of income.  “Helps add to revenue generated,” wrote one landowner.  Another 
noted, “This is added income for our family farm. It is like receiving rent for your property but 
still being able to use it.”  Five respondents noted that one advantage of wind royalty payments is 
that they help diversify farm income:  “Helps out a little bit when crops are poor or prices are 
weak,”  and “Gives us an income that is more reliable than the commodity market.”  Some 
respondents (n=12) wrote that they used the royalty income to pay property taxes; others (n=6) 
noted that it would help to fund their retirement.  Only three of the respondents made direct links 
between wind income and on-farm investment.  Just one directly linked wind royalty income to a 
change in future plans, noting that it “Makes it easy to pass farm to next generation.”   
Many of the remaining responses—those that I classified as “little” or “no impact”—were 
very terse, which made it difficult to understand what they meant.  However, a couple of the 
longer responses might shed light on why over half (55%) of respondents say there is little or no 
impact when they are receiving, on average, over $1,700 per year.  For many of these 
Overall Turbines
Paid 
neighbors
Average 
royalty*
Positive impact 41% 56% 31%  $         2,751 
Little impact 20% 13% 25%  $         1,931 
No Impact 35% 26% 41% 1,754$         
Negative impact 2% 3% 2%  $         2,750 
Too soon to tell 2% 3% 2% 283$            
Number of responses 198 78 120
*  Note that this  i s  defini tely an underestimate s ince 49% of respondents  who
answered this  question fel l  into the last category ($3,000 or more).  In ca lculating the 
mean, I  assumed (conservatively) $3,500 for these respondents , though I have heard
that some landowners   receive in excess  of $10,000 per turbine per year.  Landowners
with multiple turbines  on their property would receive even more.
 81 
 
landowners, especially those for whom farming is a full-time occupation, $1,700 is just a drop in 
the bucket.  One landowner wrote, “Very little effect as it is a small percentage of income 
compared to the gross farm income.”  Even so, some acknowledged that even a small increase is 
helpful:  “Very little but what we receive does help a lot with property taxes.”   
Overall, there were few differences between the four windfarm case studies, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively.  If we treat the classification of responses like a contingency table, 
only two of the cells differ statistically from the expected / average values (see Table 4-17).  
Specifically, more landowners in High-growth (#4) believe that their wind royalties positively 
affect their farm business, while a higher percentage of landowners in Neighbor-friendly (#3) 
believe that the royalties have little impact.  This is noteworthy since the windfarms in both of 
these case studies utilize a pooling arrangement.  If pooling alone is impacting the size of the 
royalty and its subsequent impact on farm budgets, landowners would respond similarly in both 
cases—but clearly that is not the case. 
 
Table 4-17.  Categorization of open-ended comments about royalty income, by case study 
 
 
Overall
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
Positive impact 41% 52% 35% 32%  65%* 
Little impact 20% 6% 20% 36%** 12%
No Impact 35% 42% 39% 30% 19%
Negative impact 2% 0% 3% 0% 4%
Too soon to tell 2% 0% 3% 2% 0%
Number of responses 198 31 97 44 26
Average annual royalty payment 2,210$       3,184$        1,925$       1,907$       2,731$       
Test of proportions p-values significance:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
 82 
 
Comments made by two different respondents from Neighbor-friendly (#3) might begin to 
explain why the responses in Neighbor-friendly (#3) and High-growth (#4) are so dissimilar.  
The first respondent, a landowner with a turbine on his property in Neighbor-friendly (#3), 
specifically blamed the pooling arrangement used there for reducing his royalties.  He wrote, 
“Revenue is spread around to all landowners in windfarm even if they have no turbines.”  This 
may suggest why opinions are lower than average in Neighbor-friendly (#3).  But the second 
respondent, a landowner who is part of the pool in Neighbor-friendly (#3), notes that the 
developer of High-growth (#4) offers landowners higher royalties than the other wind developers 
in my study.  The landowner wrote, “[the developer of Neighbor-friendly (#3)] weaseled out on 
the price [the developer of High-growth (#4)] agreed to.  Royalty is very low.”  Both of these 
wind developers acknowledged this difference in royalty payment in my interviews with them, 
but because a wind lease is usually an exclusive arrangement, few landowners know the terms of 
other contracts.
17
  According to the royalty payments reported by landowners in the survey, the 
lease payments in High-growth (#4) are significantly (43%) higher than in Neighbor-friendly 
(#3) (see Table 4-17).
18
   It is therefore perhaps less surprising that respondents in High-growth 
(#4) would be pleased with their royalty income, even if pooling does slightly dilute it.  
The hypothesis that large, less-diluted royalty payments lead to more positive impact on 
farm budgets is also supported by qualitative evidence from landowners in Developer-friendly 
                                                 
17 Neighbor-friendly (#3) is a rare exception. The developer of High-growth (#4) originally leased the land but then 
sold the contracts to the developer of Neighbor-friendly (#3).  In order to remain consistent and treat all landowners 
within the project equally, the developer of Neighbor-friendly (#3) renegotiated the contracts.  The developer of 
Neighbor-friendly (#3) acknowledged that some landowners were originally reluctant, but said in his interview with 
me, “In the end it worked out.  We’re clearly happy with it.  I think they [landowners with renegotiated contracts] 
will be relieved knowing that everybody’s going to be treated equally.  And even the ones that had the better 
agreements recognized the need to have everybody on the same playing field.” 
18 The average royalties reported are definitely an underestimate, since 49% of respondents who answered this 
question fell into the largest category ($3,000 or more).  In calculating the mean, I conservatively assumed royalties 
of $3,500 for these respondents, though I have heard that landowners with multiple turbines on their property may 
receive more than $40,000 per year and, in Windfarm 1 where there are very few leaseholders, I have heard that a 
single landowner may be receiving upwards of $80,000 per year.  Again, though, this is all hearsay, and most of the 
wind contracts prohibit disclosing the financial terms to outside parties.   
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(#1).  Recall from case study selection (Section 3.1.3) that royalty payments appear to be more 
concentrated (or less pooled) in Windfarm 1 than in any other windfarm in this study.  As a 
result, each landowner receives a larger share of revenue per turbine than in the other wind 
projects, all else being equal.  As Table 4-17 demonstrates, leaseholders in Developer-friendly 
(#1) receive 44% more than the average of all leaseholders in the study.  Correspondingly, over 
half of the survey respondents noted that these payments had a positive impact on their farm 
budgets, and none noted a negative impact.   
4.3.4 The Impact of Pooling 
In Section 4.3.1, my analysis showed that there is little evidence that landowners who are 
part of the royalty pool but who do not have a turbine on their property invest more in their land 
than other landowners in the windfarm community who receive no wind income.  Furthermore, 
as just reported, these landowners are much more likely to report that the income has little or no 
impact on their farm business, and there is some indication that the dilution of royalty payments 
due to pooling makes all leaseholders—those with and without turbines on their property—less 
likely to see an impact on their farm’s budget.  So, at least through the supply-side mechanism, 
pooling would seem to be counterproductive to farmland preservation.   
 The interviewed wind developers who have used pooling arrangements reported that the 
primary motivation for doing so is to expedite the project.  While none of the developers 
explicitly said it was to help “buy” local support for the project, all of them agreed that having 
contiguous leasing not only gives them more flexibility as they try to site turbines and access 
roads, but also helps to reduce some of the opposition that might delay construction.  As one 
developer noted, “We wanted everybody together because really what counted was getting the 
wind farm built and then we could get the real cash flow [royalty payments rather than 
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comparatively lower lease payments] to move to the landowners.”  The other developer, who 
extends payments even to landowners of smaller tracts, reported: 
Everybody in the footprint has an opportunity to participate and be 
compensated…. [If, for example,] I got a nice little two-acre cottage and now all 
of a sudden five wind turbines are surrounding it and I’m not getting a penny and 
the farmers around me are getting thousands of dollars, I’m gonna be a little 
irritated…. [If I include them in the royalties, these landowners] are getting more 
and more stake in it [the windfarm]. 
 
No interviewee recounted a situation where the lease terms—specifically, being pooled versus 
unpooled—made the difference between the project being viable or not.  To take their reasoning 
to its logical conclusion, however, pooling may make wind energy palatable in more 
communities.  This, of course, is true only if the wind developers are correct that these lease 
arrangements significantly increase public acceptance of wind.  
 While my survey of landowners did not ask a standalone question about acceptance of 
wind energy, it did ask a battery of 10 questions about the landowner’s level of agreement with a 
range of commonly cited (though not scientifically substantiated) impacts of wind energy.  These 
range from job creation and revenue creation to disruption of weather patterns and human health 
problems (see Table 4-18).  For all but one of these questions
19
, landowners who live in 
communities with windfarms but who did not participate in a wind royalty pool more strongly 
believed in the negative impacts and less strongly believed in the positive impacts than 
landowners with turbines on their property.  For most questions, neighbors outside of the pool 
answered similarly to landowners in the matched case communities, though the former group 
                                                 
19 Note that the majority (69%) of landowners surveyed disagreed that “wind turbines help limit climate change.”  
This is true both in the communities with turbines and in the matched case communities, and there were no 
statistically significant differences between more pro-wind respondents and those who (according to their answers to 
other questions) were decidedly anti-wind energy.  This issue, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, is 
nevertheless worth exploring.  The survey results suggest that although the environmental argument is often invoked 
to increase support for wind energy, it may be less effective in the very rural areas in which turbines are to be sited.  
If the goal is to sway opinion in rural communities, it might be more effective to focus on economic impacts, citing 
some of the more concrete numbers included in this dissertation.  
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was less convinced of the job creation benefits and more convinced that turbines cause human 
health problems.  In contrast, landowners in the windfarm communities who are part of the 
royalty pool but do not have turbines on their property had answers that were more similar to 
those of landowners with turbines on their property.  For three questions—job creation, 
providing revenues to landowners, and preserving rural land—these two groups had statistically 
indistinguishable answers.  On two other questions—noise pollution and disruption of local 
weather patterns—the responses of this group were the same as both the matched case 
respondents and those neighbors who were not part of the pool.  For the rest of the questions, 
their responses fell somewhere between the more positive reports of the landowners with 
turbines on their property and the more negative assessments of neighboring landowners who 
were not included in the pools. Thus, these findings seem to support the wind developer’s 
intuition that pooling makes for happier neighbors. 
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Table 4-18.  Landowners’ opinions on potential impacts of wind energy, by whether or not they receive wind-related 
income 
 
 
 
 In their open-ended responses, landowners also echoed the idea that sharing the royalty 
income more broadly results in far fewer complaints.  As one respondent said, “People who have 
leased, or plan to lease, are in favor of the energy producing windmills, while those who may 
live in an area that may not be leased are strongly against it.”  Another noted, “When people 
receive a check [from the wind developer], it can make noise go away and other annoying things 
like traffic and flickering of blades in the sunlight disappear.”  Notably, three-quarters (15 of 20) 
of such comments—i.e., that receiving wind income changes one’s perception of wind energy—
came from landowners in windfarm communities who were not part of a royalty pool (see Table 
4-19).  While there were comments from landowners in each of the windfarms, there were more 
Wind turbines…
Matched 
case
Neighbors 
outside  the 
royalty pool
Neighbors in 
the royalty 
pool Turbines
Provide revenues for land owners 1.13ab 1.03a 1.24b 1.25b
Create jobs 0.91b 0.63a 0.95bc 1.17c
Reduce nearby property values 0.10a 0.11a -0.26b -0.91c
Produce visual or aesthetic problems 0.09a 0.14a -0.02b -0.84c
Create noise pollution -0.12a 0.00a -0.24a -0.65b
Preserve rural land -0.22ab -0.42a 0.05bc 0.26c
Disrupt bird migration -0.34a -0.38a -0.83b -1.30c
Help limit climate change -0.51a -0.58a -0.51a -0.47a
Cause human health problems -0.89b -0.67a -0.90b -1.36c
Disrupt local weather patterns -1.02a -0.98a -1.05a -1.32b
Mean is calculated by assigning numbers to the response categories: Strongly Agree = 2
Agree = 1
Disagree = -1
Strongly Disagree = -2
Values in rows with the same superscript are not statistically different (p<0.1)
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comments from landowners in Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefits (#2) than in 
Neighbor-friendly (#3) and High-growth (#4), where pooling is used more extensively.   
 
Table 4-19.  Count of open-ended responses related to the inequity of royalty payments or its consequences 
 
Landowners in Developer-friendly (#1), where the fewest landowners receive direct wind 
payments, also more commonly reported that wind energy was causing tension in the 
community.  Their comments include, “This type of energy has ripped apart farmland and 
communities, neighbors and families,” and “Wind turbines have created a strong divide (and 
rightfully so) between people owning large tracts of land and those owning small parcels.”  This 
tension was mentioned by at least one landowner in each case study, but there is a notable divide 
regarding whom the landowners blame.  In Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefits (#2), 
where pooling is less frequently used, survey respondents attributed this tension to the greed of 
landowners who were receiving royalty checks.  One respondent in Developer-friendly (#1) 
wrote:   
Greed has led to the deterioration of the landscape and relationships with total 
disregard to anyone but themselves.  There is absolutely no benefit to these 
monstrosities to anyone but the landowners that have signed leases and the wind 
power companies that receive huge subsidies for them.   
 
All 
respondents*
Matched 
case 
In royalty pool 
(with or without 
turbine)
Not in 
royalty pool
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
Different perceptions 
of those who are and 
are not paid 23 3 5 15 7 6 4 3
Leads to tension in 
community 9 1 8 4 1 1 2
Greed of those who are 
getting paid 5 1 1 3 1 2 1
Jealousy of those who 
aren't getting paid 2 0 2 1 1
*  Exceeds the total number of responses related to the inequity of royalty payments (31) 
         because some commenters made multiple points within their statements.
Wind CasesWindfarm respondents
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Another implored, “Put greed aside and be logical!!! This is not good for our community.”  In 
contrast, one respondent in Neighbor-friendly (#3) and another in High-growth (#4) noted that 
this tension is motivated by jealousy on the part of those not being paid.  The respondent in 
Neighbor-friendly (#3) wrote, “Here in Huron County we have a very vocal minority against 
wind energy.  I believe they are motivated by several things:  1) jealousy:  if I’m not getting the 
money and controlling everything, I’m against it….”   
 In summary, though the survey’s quantitative data demonstrates that wind income has 
little discernible impact on the on-farm investments of neighboring landowners who participate 
in the royalty pool, these landowners do seem to have a higher opinion of wind energy.  They 
believe more strongly in the positive impacts and less strongly in the negative impacts of wind 
energy than landowners who are not part of the royalty pool.  Furthermore, the qualitative data 
seem to suggest that there is less tension in communities where royalty pooling is used more 
extensively.  While the supply-side hypothesis considers only increased investments as a means 
of retaining farmland, all else being equal, leasing arrangements that help to keep the peace 
within a rural community are arguably far better for that community than those that pit neighbors 
against one another.  As a result, I would not go so far as to dismiss royalty pooling as non-
beneficial for rural communities.   
  
4.4 Countervailing Effects:  Damage to Farmland 
An underlying assumption of the supply-side mechanism is that farmers who receive wind-
related income are using the money to make improvements in their farm that are otherwise 
unrelated to the wind development.  They might be renovating their house or building a new 
barn—things that they perhaps have long wanted to do but could not have done without 
additional resources.  A number of survey respondents, however, made comments on their 
 89 
 
questionnaires that challenged this assumption, suggesting that investment may not simply be 
opportunistic, but rather is required to correct damage done to their fields during turbine 
construction. 
Though most outsiders think primarily of the impacts of a fully operational windfarm (e.g., 
noise, aesthetic changes, etc.), most of my interviewees and survey respondents in locations with 
wind turbines recounted that the construction phase of the project is significantly more disruptive 
to the farming operation than the long-term nuisance of farming around the turbine once it is 
operational.  The cranes and heavy machinery used to erect the towers can compact dry soil or 
leave deep ruts in soft soil, making planting difficult.  Grade changes to accommodate access 
roads and cover tower foundations can change surface water flow, leading to ponding.  Perhaps 
the most common complaint, mentioned by 20 survey respondents, is broken field tile
20
, which is 
crushed by heavy cranes or disturbed when crews bury underground cables connecting the 
turbines to each other and, ultimately, to the substation.    
In theory, the wind developer, not the landowner, would pay to correct any damage done.  
All of the wind developers that I interviewed noted that their contracts with landowners 
compensate landowners not only for long-term use of land taken out of production (i.e., where 
the turbine base or access road sits), but also for temporary disturbances during construction.  
Commonly, wind leases hold the developer liable for paying to de-compact soil and replace or 
repair broken runs of field tile.  The developers also noted that they try to schedule construction 
activities based on soil conditions to make minimal impact on fields, and that they try to use 
existing roads in order to minimize moving cranes across the fields.  
                                                 
20 Field tile or drain tile is used to remove excess water from cropland, preventing crop damage from waterlogged 
soil or standing water (i.e., puddles) in the field.  Field tiles—typically clay or perforated plastic pipes—are buried 
roughly three feet deep and arranged in parallel rows throughout the field to collect excess water and channel it to 
nearby ditches or creeks.  
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Even so, a number of survey respondents with turbines on their property commented on 
damage that they had paid to repair, particularly damage to field tile.  One respondent wrote, 
“Subcontractor ruined my tile drainage system--some of it cost about $800 per acre.”  Another 
noted that he expects that it will “maybe take 10-20 years to correct [the damage done]” and 
assumes that he will have to shoulder the burden.  Still another notes that addressing the damage 
with the wind developer takes “more time with additional paperwork for filing a loss claim,” so 
he pays out of pocket for small claims.   
Because I did not anticipate such a finding, I did not ask directly whether on-farm 
investments were made to repair damage from wind turbine construction.  Of all the investment 
categories—home, outbuildings, irrigation/drainage, and farm equipment—the category most 
likely to include corrective action is irrigation and drainage.  Notably, as first reported in Section 
4.3.1, investment in irrigation and drainage differs from the other types of investment in that 
there is no significant interaction between the presence of the turbine and the number of acres the 
landowner farms.  Additional research might help explain whether this difference is related to 
uncompensated construction-related damage or some other factor. 
4.5 Answering Research Questions and Testing Hypotheses 
The first of my overarching research questions asks whether wind turbines alter the supply 
side of the farmland conversion equation.  Specifically, “Do the revenues rural landowners 
receive as a result of wind energy projects change their on-farm investments or long-term 
succession plans, especially whether they expect to sell their land to a developer?”  According to 
the data presented in this chapter, the answer is that it depends on whether or not the landowners 
have a turbine sited on their property.   
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Among those with turbines, the answer is a resounding “yes.”  Landowners with turbines 
on their property invest twice as much to improve their property as their neighbors and 
landowners in a matched case.  Even after I account for the size of the farming operation—a 
strong predictor of increased investment—I find that landowners who farm the land and have 
turbines on their property do invest more than all other landowners.  Additional research is 
warranted to determine if a portion of these investments—specifically investments in drainage 
and irrigation—are pure improvements, or necessary to remedy damage done during the 
construction of the windfarm.  However, even if the latter were true, it would not negate the 
sizeable increase in investment these landowners make to their homes, outbuildings, and farm 
equipment.  Furthermore, to directly answer the second half of the question, landowners with 
turbines on their property were significantly more likely to say that their land would be farmed 
and less likely to say it would be idle or in recreation in the future.  It should be noted, however, 
that very few landowners in my study thought that their land would be developed in the future, 
and there is no difference in this opinion between landowners with and without turbines on their 
property. 
Other landowners do not have a turbine sited on their property but still receive direct 
payments from wind developers for being part of the royalty pool.  These landowners have 
investment patterns similar to those of the neighbors in the windfarm community who are not 
part of the royalty pool; as a result, the supply-side mechanism does not appear to apply to this 
group of landowners.  This is interesting since royalty pooling seems to be increasing in 
popularity, with wind developers saying that pooling makes siting a project easier because more 
community members directly benefit and are therefore more likely to be receptive to the project.  
Survey responses of landowners confirm this, finding that those neighbors who are part of the 
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pool believe much more strongly in the positive impacts of wind energy and believe less strongly 
in the negative impacts than neighbors not in the pool or landowners in the matched case 
communities.  Furthermore, landowners in communities where there is no or less pooling 
(Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefits (#2)) report more community conflict as a result.  
Therefore, pooling seems important to help gain community acceptance for wind. It might 
ultimately make more communities willing to accept windfarms, with their knock-on farmland 
preservation benefits; it might also help to keep the peace among neighbors, which should not be 
dismissed as an unimportant goal. 
In addition to providing overall insight into the supply-side mechanism, the data presented 
in this chapter also allow me to test hypotheses 1 and 2.  On the first of these (H1), the data 
suggests that I should reject the null hypothesis—that is, my original hypothesis has a high 
probability of being correct.  Because the financial benefit of wind income is so great to 
landowners with turbines on their property, in aggregate, landowners in communities with 
windfarms are more likely to make investments in their farms than landowners in rural 
communities without windfarms.  Landowners in communities with windfarms are also more 
likely to anticipate that the next owner of the property will keep the land in agriculture than are 
landowners in rural communities without windfarms.  However, these effects are largely limited 
to landowners with turbines on their property and do not apply, even to a lesser extent, to their 
neighbors, as I hypothesized in H2.  While neighbors without turbines in Windfarms 3 and 4 
make more investments in their farms than those in the matched case communities, the opposite 
is true in Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefits (#2).  Furthermore, there is no statistical 
difference between the future land use expectations of landowners without turbines in windfarm 
communities and those of landowners in the matched case communities.  As a result, I suggest 
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rejecting my hypothesis that there are measurable supply-side farmland preservation benefits for 
those in windfarm communities who do not receive direct payments from wind developers. 
Though my original hypotheses relating to the supply-side mechanism do not appear too 
far off base—wind income is altering on-farm investment and long-term land use plans, at least 
for landowners with turbines on their property—the use of multiple research methods provided 
an important correction to my initial assumptions about how these effects translate into farmland 
preservation.  Building on rural planning theory, I assumed that increased farm investment would 
reduce the landowner’s financial need to sell to a developer—effectively keeping more land in 
production.  In my interviews with local officials, however, they insisted that the additional 
income was “saving the farm” by increasing the likelihood that the landowner’s children would 
take it over the farm, as opposed to selling it to a neighboring farmer.  Clearly, the threat these 
officials see as most pressing is not the loss of farmland to residential development, but rather 
the loss of a tradition of family farming and its subsequent impact on the rural community.  The 
evidence for both of these phenomena is the same—increased investment, future land use 
expectations—but under which conditions a rural planner might employ wind energy as a 
farmland preservation tool is clearly different.   
Though I selected cases based on population trends that I believed would indicate a threat 
of growth, in fact, most local officials seemed to classify themselves as “the other rural 
America,” in which the threat of decline is the more pressing concern.  The fact that the supply-
side mechanism, theorized as a solution to combat urbanization, also appears to be effective at 
combatting depopulation would make it unique among rural planning tools, which tend to be 
designed for one purpose or the other.  It would be worthwhile to test the efficacy of the supply-
side mechanism in alternate communities where the key threat is, indeed, suburbanization.     
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Chapter 5. The Supply Hypothesis:  Indirect Benefits 
 
In the last chapter, I found evidence that the direct payments made to landowners with 
turbines on their property are translating into benefits closely linked to farmland preservation.  
These landowners expect their land to be farmed longer into the future, and they are investing 
more in improvements to their farms.  I also found, however, that the impact is much less 
noticeable when those direct payments are smaller—as they are for neighboring landowners who 
participate in a royalty pool but have no turbine sited on their property.  What the last chapter did 
not address was why the second part of my supply-side hypothesis (H2) failed.  That is, it did not 
explain why the financial benefits of the windfarm were not also evident in the future land-use 
expectations and increased investments of landowners without turbines on their property.  Recall 
from Chapter 2 that I based this hypothesis on the reasoning that all landowners in the windfarm 
communities benefit indirectly through increased economic activity, especially during the 
construction of the turbines and via the local property taxes paid by the wind developer.  In this 
chapter, I look at what impact the windfarms have had on property tax revenues and job creation 
in my case studies, finding that far fewer positive impacts can be attributed to the former than the 
latter.  I then speculate as to why these positive property value benefits have not (yet) altered 
landowner expectations and family budgets. 
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5.1 Job Creation 
The job creation benefits of wind energy are often touted, especially when wind 
developers are trying to appeal to audiences where the environmental benefits of renewable 
energy might not resonate.  Reportedly, the new jobs are not only in manufacturing the 
components of the turbine, but also in  constructing and maintaining the turbines once they are 
built.  Wind proponents often cite manufacturing-related jobs when asserting that windfarms will 
promote statewide economic development or even benefit urban areas, but the latter two 
categories—construction and maintenance jobs—are often seen as benefitting the rural 
communities that host the turbines.   
To gauge what impact wind development has had on local job creation in my windfarm 
case studies, I asked farmland owners directly about this through a Likert-scale question on the 
survey.  A number of landowners also mentioned the issue in their open-ended survey responses, 
and it frequently came up unsolicited in my interviews with local officials.  Overall, landowners 
in windfarm communities were disappointed by how few local jobs had been created, and local 
officials noted that the primary job-creation benefits were not in technical or construction fields, 
but in the lower-paying hospitality industry. 
5.1.1 Survey Data 
 The very first question in my survey of landowners asked about wind turbines and job 
creation.  Overall, a strong majority (84%) agreed that the wind energy industry does create jobs.  
However, landowners in the matched case communities were statistically more convinced of the 
job-creation benefits than were landowners in communities with windfarms (see Table 5-1).  
Similarly, while the majority of respondents in all wind cases agreed that wind turbines create 
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jobs, landowners in High-growth (#4) were stronger in this conviction than landowners in 
Developer-friendly (#1). 
Table 5-1.  Landowner response to the question "How strongly do you agree or disagree...that wind turbines create 
jobs?" 
 
 
 A look at respondents’ open-ended comments helps to explain some of these differences.  
Overwhelmingly, respondents in areas with wind turbines were much more likely to comment on 
the job-creation aspects of wind energy; of the 17 comments on the job-creation aspects of wind 
energy, 88% were made by respondents in areas with wind turbines (see Table 5-2).   By far the 
most common comment refuted the idea that wind development means more local jobs.  As one 
respondent recounted: 
One of the main arguments for wind energy is that it brings jobs to communities. 
They do bring jobs, but it is not permanent local jobs that they bring. I had an 
opportunity to witness a wind turbine being installed about a mile away. A parade 
of pickup trucks escorted the turbine carriers as they went past. Not a single truck 
was a local contractor. Technicians stay on an installation site, then they move on 
to the next site. This does not benefit the local job market whatsoever. 
 
All 
respondents
Matched case 
respondents
Windfarm 
respondents
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
Strongly disagree 4% 3% 4% 7% 2% 5% 0%
Disagree 12% 10% 14% 13% 14% 16% 12%
Agree 64% 66% 63% 62% 65% 60% 64%
Strongly agree 20% 21% 20% 18% 19% 19% 24%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of respondents 1170 472 698 202 222 167 107
Mean 0.91 0.8 0.70a 0.85ab 0.72ab 1.00b
Standard deviation 0.94 1.03 1.12 0.97 1.08 0.86
p value
Mean is calculated by assigning numbers to the response categories: Strongly disagree = -2
Disagree = -1
Agree = 1
Strongly agree = 2
The superscripts next to the mean scores indicate whether means across case studies are statistically different.  
   Where columns share a letter, they are statistically indistinguishable.  
Windfarm cases
0.05 0.0655
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Additionally, four respondents in Huron County commented that wind development actually 
resulted in a loss of jobs.  Specifically, they linked the rise of wind power in the area to the 
closure of a coal-fired power plant in nearby Harbor Beach, which led to employee layoffs.   
Table 5-2.  Count of open-ended survey responses related to job creation 
 
 
 In contrast, five of the 17 responses about job creation noted that jobs were created as a 
result of wind development, but perhaps the jobs were not directly linked to wind energy.  Three 
respondents noted that the hospitality industry, in particular, saw an increase in business to 
accommodate out-of-town contractors during the construction phase.  One wrote:  “Have the 
windmills added jobs? Motels and restaurants [have]… but these are temporary at best.”  
Another noted that there are also impacts beyond the hospitality industry, since “a few local 
truckers are used to haul sand and gravel,” but that these also represent only a short-term boost 
for local employment.  
 Only two respondents, both in Neighbor-friendly (#3), noted that the windfarms 
indirectly create local jobs through their payments to local landowners.  As one explained, 
“Farmers spend money locally more than any other group of people.  This is where the 
improvement to our economy will come from.  Building the project will put money in [their] 
All 
respondents*
Matched case 
respondents
Windfarm 
respondents
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
Jobs, but not local 11 2 9 2 5 2
Job loss from 
Harbor Beach coal 
plant closure 4 4 1 3
Temporary 
hospitality-sector 
jobs 3 3 2 1
Wind lease-related 2 2 2
Windfarm respondents
*  Exceeds the total number of responses related to job creation (17) because some commenters made multiple points within                        
their statements.
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pockets.”  Another respondent tied this benefit directly to the fact that leases in his project are 
pooled:  “Farmers receive payments for being part of the pool.  And when farmers have money, 
they spend it, which boosts the local economy.”   
 Returning to the differences in opinion on job creation between landowners in windfarms 
and those in matched case communities, we see from Table 5-2 that there are far more opinions 
among those in communities with windfarms than in the matched case communities (18 versus 
2).  While the only comments from landowners in the matched case communities were negative, 
in areas with windfarms, the number of negative comments well exceeds the number of positive 
comments; moreover, the comments tended to be stated with much more fervor.  Table 5-2 
shows that no respondents from High-growth (#4) made any comments about job creation—
positive or negative.  In contrast, the only comments from respondents in Windfarm 1 refuted 
claims that windfarms create local jobs.  This might help to explain the statistically significant 
differences between these two groups of landowners on the multiple-choice survey question. 
 
5.1.2 Interview Data 
Though wind energy’s impact on job creation was not a topic that I brought up in my 
interviews with local officials, it is something that came up unprompted in six of the 14 
interviews (43%).  Most of the local officials presented information consistent with what 
landowners had written on their surveys:  that outside contractors do much of the windfarm 
construction, which leads to short-term benefits to the hospitality industry, but long-term benefits 
may result from landowners spending wind income at local businesses.  While the majority of 
landowners’ comments were negative, four of the six local officials portrayed wind development 
as a local economic benefit (see Table 5-3).   
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 The interview with one Huron County official was especially helpful in reconciling the 
conflicting opinions of those who see large job creation benefits and those who see them as more 
modest.   This official (Interviewee 4 in Table 5-3) admitted that wind development had some 
impact on local jobs: the developer did hire “a tiling company and a few people got some 
contracts to help them out—and the quarry makes out well.”  He emphasized, though, that many 
of the non-local contractors were doing jobs that could have been filled locally:   
You can’t just hire somebody off the street to do a windmill project.  I can 
understand that, but they also went as far as bringing in concrete batch plants.  We 
have vendors in the county that deal with concrete.  And then also excavating 
equipment to build roads and so forth.  There’s a lot of that equipment and 
personnel to do the entire development.  A very small percentage of any of that 
work was given to companies in Huron County or people in Huron County. 
 
He further commented that job creation was touted as one of the benefits of hosting wind 
turbines, and he believes that this argument influenced voters to pass a referendum on the wind 
zoning ordinance. Now, however, having seen “what jobs they create and just the general look 
and so forth that they’re changing the county,” he thinks that the majority would no longer 
support additional wind development.   This may help explain why, as the landowner survey 
suggests, those in communities without windfarms believe there are greater job creation benefits 
than those where wind development has already taken place. 
 My interview with the county official in the McBain area (Interviewee 6 in Table 5-3) 
may further explain why landowners in High-growth (#4) felt most strongly that wind energy has 
job creation benefits.  Ironically, this interviewee was the most emphatic in his assertion of the 
opposite viewpoint.  As he noted, “From an economic development standpoint it has zero 
impact.”  However, he also pointed out that no promises of direct employment had been made to 
the community.  Instead, he said, “If you go ahead and talk to a wind developer, they will talk 
about x people getting payments,” which would then make their way back into the economy.  
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This might have lowered residents’ expectations of local employment, leading them to 
experience to higher satisfaction if they did ultimately experience this indirect benefit.   
Table 5-3.  Quotations from local officials about the impact of wind development on local jobs 
Interview 1 Local official  
 
Developer-
friendly (#1) 
Construction-related jobs:  “While they [wind turbines] were going up, they 
[contractors] spent a lot of money at … the bars, the gas stations, the restaurants.” 
 
Wind lease benefits:  “My neighbor’s got it [a turbine on his property.]  I cannot tell 
you exactly what he’s getting off of that windmill, but I know he’s doing a lot of 
improvements around his farm and they’re [people in town with wind leases] all 
driving new vehicles.  So it has helped the economy that way.  There’s no doubt 
about it, they’ve helped the economy.” 
Interview 2 Local official  
 
Mixed-
benefit (#2) 
Wind lease benefits:  “[If you are part of the pool] you’re going to be getting a check 
every year…. We’re not going to count on it but that’s something that’s there that 
will be coming in so we can utilize it. …  So it’s going to help.  It will help with farm 
improvements, whatever.  The money’s going to pretty much stay in the—here in the 
county.” 
Interview 3 County 
official  
 
Windfarms 
1, 2, 3 
Construction-related jobs:  “There is no recession in this county.  We are booming.  
A big piece of the reason we’re booming…is that one energy company [alone was] 
talking to me about [spending] two million dollars a month…on goods, services, and 
housing in the county.  And [they] spent two million dollars a month for the last two 
years.” 
 
Wind lease benefits:  “Most of the land owners are farmers.  Most of those farmers, 
if you do your survey and you ask them they will tell you, ‘The vast majority of the 
money that I’m getting for those [wind leases] goes into improvements on my 
projects or is spent back in our community….  I increased my tile.  I hired local 
people to work.  I built a new building that I hired local contractors to work.  And I’m 
spending that money in this county adding to the value of the county.  And that’s 
because those [turbines] came and are here on my property.’” 
Interview 4 County 
official 
  
Windfarms 
1, 2, 3 
No local jobs:  “They [wind turbines] brought jobs to the county, but they brought 
jobs to the county from outside people, hired very few people from inside the county.  
And let’s say they have to be skilled or—you can’t just hire somebody off the street 
to do a windmill project.  I can understand that, but they also went as far as bringing 
in concrete batch plants.  We have vendors in the county that deal with concrete… 
they never hired anyone or very few, maybe like a tiling company and a few people 
got some contracts to help them out with—and the quarry makes out well and so 
forth, but other than that, nothing.” 
Interview 5 County 
official  
 
Windfarms 
1, 2, 3 
Construction-related jobs:  “We have a big stone quarry.  Was talking with them 
yesterday.  Their production since the windmills came in went from 300,000 ton one 
shift to 800,000 two shifts.”   
 
Construction-related jobs:  The other day I went to downtown Pigeon....  I stop at a 
restaurant and get a salad….  And you can’t find a place to park.  I can’t find a place 
to sit down….  Ah, phooey, I’ll grab a pizza and go home.  Well the pizza place, 
they’re all sold out.  Well, we got another pizza place right over there.  They’re sold 
out.  I thought, “What the heck’s going on?”  And they [restaurant employees] said, 
“Well it’s like this every noon now”…construction workers! 
Interview 6 Local official  
 
High-growth 
(#4) 
No local jobs:  “From an economic development standpoint it has zero impact.  
Maybe they haven’t been here long enough.  If you go ahead and talk to a wind 
developer, they will talk about x people getting payments.  It hasn’t brought in any 
growth.” 
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5.2 Property Tax Revenue 
In Michigan and other states that levy property taxes on wind turbine equipment, there is 
another opportunity for an indirect benefit to the community at large, and not just those 
landowners receiving direct payments from the wind developer.  These additional revenues, I 
hypothesized, could be used to stabilize or reduce tax rates, which should have a direct impact on 
the family budgets of all taxpayers.  Alternately, this additional revenue could be directed 
towards schools, roads, or other locally funded public services, allowing improvements in these 
services without increasing tax rates.   
Better understanding how local governments were using the additional tax revenues from 
wind turbines was a key goal of my interviews with local officials.   Though I did not pose the 
question directly to landowners, this topic also emerged in a number of their open-ended 
responses.  Overall, it seems that these revenues have been a huge boon to the tax base of 
townships with windfarms, even in jurisdictions that granted partial tax abatements to wind 
developers.   However, recent statewide changes in property taxation rules have significantly 
reduced the amount of tax revenues that local governments will be able to collect from wind 
developers in the future.  Local officials worry that the state might make further changes to the 
taxation of wind turbines; thus, they have been reluctant to lower tax rates.  As a result, while 
wind developers have paid millions of dollars of additional tax revenue to rural communities, 
there has been no discernible improvement in the household budgets of taxpayers throughout 
these windfarm communities. 
5.2.1 Impact on Township and County Budgets 
Township officials were overwhelmingly positive about the impact of the additional tax 
revenue generated by the wind turbines in their jurisdictions.  That is perhaps unsurprising given 
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that most of these jurisdictions have relatively small tax bases with limited commercial or 
industrial development.  For them, any additional revenue makes a significant impact.  In 
contrast, only two of the three county officials I interviewed thought there was any noticeable 
positive impact on their local budgets, and even then they were less than emphatic about the 
benefits.  This is understandable since the tax base in counties is much larger and more diverse, 
at least in part because it includes more urbanized and industrialized jurisdictions.  The only 
officials interviewed who said that there was no discernible impact on tax revenues were in 
jurisdictions (Township 4A and County C in Table 5-4) with only five turbines, two of which 
had received tax abatements.  Even so, the first of these officials did note that the local school 
district was benefitting from increased tax revenues. 
Looking at the tax records filed with the State of Michigan helps to put this impact in 
context.
21
  For two of the nine wind-energy townships in my study, the taxable value in the 
jurisdiction has more than tripled in the last six years following the construction of the wind 
turbines (see Table 5-5), with the tax base increasing over 400% (five-fold) in one of these 
townships.  In three others, the total taxable value has nearly doubled.  In the remaining 
jurisdictions, the smallest saw an 11% increase in taxable value, and the supervisor I interviewed 
was not at all disappointed with this additional revenue.  Instead, he recounted that it allowed the 
township to purchase a new ambulance and a new fire truck, worth “close to $400,000.”  In 
contrast, three of the five matched case communities without wind turbines saw their total 
taxable value decrease in the last six years, and only one had double-digit growth—largely a 
result of a quarry that had recently expanded.   
                                                 
21 Determining exactly how much of the industrial personal property tax revenue is related to wind turbines rather 
than other equipment (e.g., dairy operations, light manufacturing machinery, etc.) would be a very time-intensive 
process for (often part-time) township staff to carry out.  Even so, these numbers support—and better put into 
perspective—the impact reported by local officials. 
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Table 5-4.  Officials’ views on the impact of wind tax revenue, by jurisdiction 
 
 
Jurisdiction Abatement Impact of wind tax revenue, from local official
Township 
1A
50% for 12 years on 
all turbines
Would we survive without them?  Absolutely, but 
we’re surviving better with them.
Township 
1B
50% for 5 years on 
all turbines It helps...anything helps.
Township 
2A
None (though 50% 
for previous 
project)
It’s just something that we as a township never 
had to look at that kind of increase in such a short 
span.  It’s--all of a sudden it--we’re looking at 
how to set up accounts so that we’ve got money 
available for future contracts and everything else. 
Township 
2B None
Being a small township we don’t generate that 
terribly, terribly much money.  So that’s a…big 
impact.  Positive impact.
Township 
2C
None (though 50% 
for previous 
project) It’s been a nice shot in the arm for us.
Township 
3A None [n/a]
Township 
3B None
It will be over double [previous tax revenues], 
but some of that's to do with ITC and we've had a 
big substation and the ITC line coming through 
and that's as big for our township as what the 
windmills are probably.
Township 
4A
50% for 5 years on 2 
(of 5) turbines
It goes to the school.  As far as the township, no, 
we ain’t getting anything.
Township 
4B Unknown [n/a]
Windfarms 
1, 2, 3 County A Plugged some holes in our budget.
County B
It’s appreciable for our county but nothing in 
comparison to the two big counties down south 
[Huron and Gratiot].
County C
Little to no discernible impact
High-
growth      
(#4)
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
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Table 5-5.  Change in tax base of case study communities, 2008 to 2014 
 
 
Because the tax bills paid by wind developers are not differentiated from other property 
tax revenues, few of the interviewees could point to specific projects made possible by the 
additional wind revenue.  In the words of one interviewee, “It goes all over, just the same as any 
other tax money.”  Most of these townships offer few public services and, with or without wind 
turbine revenue, spend nearly all of their money on roads.  As a result, four interviewees 
mentioned that they planned to increase road maintenance with the additional money.  Two of 
these four were putting the money toward graveling unpaved roads, while the other two planned 
to resurface paved roads.  None had plans to pave previously unpaved roads, citing very high 
Increase in 
total property 
tax base (2014 
vs. 2008)
2008 2014
Township 1A 3% 4% 11%
Township 1B 0% 14% 39%
Matched township 0% 0% -10%
Township 2A 0% 72% 415%
Township 2B 0% 37% 94%
Township 2C 13% 41% 87%
Matched township 0% 0% -3%
Township 3A 0% 39% 99%
Township 3B 0% 31% 249%
Matched township 0% 1% 5%
Township 4A 0% 17% 31%
Township 4B 0% 39% 95%
Matched township A 9% 17% 46%
Matched township B 4% 5% -3%
County A (Cases 1, 2, 3) 2% 17% 32%
County B (Case 4) 2% 7% 9%
County C (Case 4) 7% 7% 2%
Industrial personal 
property as a 
percentage of total 
property tax base
Counties
Source:  Michigan Department of Treasury (2014).  Taxable Value Reports  2008-2014.  
Retreived from http://www.michigan.gov/treasury/0,1607,7-121-1751_2228_21957_45818-
--,00.html
Developer-
friendly     (#1)
Mixed-benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     (#3)
High-growth      
(#4)
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costs of such an activity as a poor use of the funds compared to maintaining the existing roads 
that are “past due” for resurfacing.  As noted above, one township official said that they used the 
tax revenue to purchase a new ambulance and new fire truck, and one county official said that 
they used a portion of the money to upgrade their financial accounting software system. 
Though I did not bring up the issue in all interviews, in four of my early interviews with 
local officials I asked whether there were any plans to reduce tax (millage) rates.  Though three 
of the four were not surprised by such a suggestion, they had not yet made any changes to 
millage rates and did not have any intention to do so in the future.  As one noted, because the 
taxable value of the wind turbines decreases every year (regardless of the recent change in the 
multiplier table, which accelerates this depreciation
22), “right at this point we’re at the all-time 
high,” and so a reduction in millage rates would only make sense if it were temporary.  In the 
township where the idea appears to have been most seriously considered, the supervisor noted 
that Michigan tax law requires that a reduction in the millage rate apply not just to landowners, 
but also to the taxable value of the wind turbines.  As a result, any tax rate reduction “is going to 
benefit the wind companies a lot more than a person with a house [who] might save 30, 40 bucks 
[a year].”  He said that instead, his township was contemplating keeping the tax rate where it is 
and adding additional urban services, for example, “pay[ing] for garbage pickup or provid[ing] 
another service that they [landowners] are currently having to pay [for] themselves.”  
None of my interviewees implied that the additional tax revenues factored into their 
decision to adopt a zoning ordinance that was conducive to wind development, though three 
interviewees mentioned that they believe it does impact how landowners without wind leases 
feel about wind energy.  One said that while he wouldn’t go so far as to say that the tax revenues 
                                                 
22 In 2013, the State Tax Commission (STC) altered the multiplier table (sometimes referred to as the depreciation 
schedule), in effect lowering the tax liability for each turbine over its usable life, and thereby lowering expected 
property tax revenues for host jurisdictions. This is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2.3. 
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are key to community acceptance, he believed they were “right close to the top.”  The other 
noted that while most of his constituents are farmland owners who receive direct wind-related 
income, he feels that he has a responsibility to ensure that the benefits are more widely 
distributed.  He believes that “if we can show that through the added increase that some dollars 
are coming in for road improvement and the like, why, it all helps.”  In contrast, another local 
official said that wind developers led residents to believe that they would see the same sort of tax 
benefits as in Alaska
23—“they have oil reserves and people that live in Alaska get paid to live 
there, they don’t pay property tax.”  This, of course, has not come to pass, so he believes that 
residents without wind leases, in particular, are less keen on any additional wind development in 
the area—a theme that echoes the idea of unmet expectations related to job creation.  
5.2.2 Abatements 
As Table 5-4 shows, three of the nine windfarm townships included in this project have 
given a tax abatement on at least some of the wind turbines within their jurisdiction.  Under 
previous tax code, officials in local jurisdictions were enabled to vote to offer abatements (more 
colloquially, “tax breaks”) to development projects that meet requirements set by the state.  In 
order to receive the abatement, the wind developer needed to petition the township’s board, 
which would hold a public hearing and then decide whether to offer the abatement and for how 
long (e.g., 50% of all taxes for 5 years, 25% for 12 years).  As part of the state’s property tax 
restructuring, these abatements were discontinued in 2008, although any abatements that had 
previously been approved were honored.  In the case of the townships in Mixed-benefits (#2), 
this abatement was for the very first windfarm in the area, though four more projects have 
subsequently been built without any abatement.  In High-growth (#4), because the windfarm was 
                                                 
23 For more information about taxation in Alaska, former Governor Jay Hammond (2012) has an interesting essay on 
the establishment of the Alaska Permanent Fund, which pays residents an annual dividend through levying a 
severance tax on oil extraction. 
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built in phases over the course of four years, some of the first turbines in the windfarm were 
abated, though later turbines were not.   
However, if we look at the comments of local officials (see Table 5-3) as well as the tax 
revenues generated by the turbines (see Table 5-5), it is very difficult to distinguish which of 
these townships offered an abatement and which did not.  In the words of one official, “This is a 
big project.  We’re still going to get a nice chunk of change.”   
In describing the public hearing where the abatement was granted, and their rationale for 
agreeing to abate a portion of the property taxes on turbines, many officials raised the issue of 
fairness.  The official from township 1A, which approved arguably the largest abatement, was 
unapologetic about the township’s decision. He recounted the most contentious public hearing as 
follows: 
[The wind developer] approached us for a tax abatement, and we gave it to them.  
The room was full, and everyone that was in there was against the windmills.  But 
we gave all the factories, everybody, we gave them—anybody that came and 
qualified for a tax abatement, we gave it to them and we did the same with the 
windmill…. [Typically] nobody shows up when we give an abatement.  These 
factories have got bigger abatements than they got, nobody showed up for that.  
They [the people in attendance] were just against the windmills.   
 
In other townships, I heard echoes of this rationale for granting the abatement:  “We had done 
this with the co-op elevator,” and “It seemed like the right thing to do.” 
 Others said that they granted the abatement because they feared that without it, wind 
development would not come to their township and would instead go to another township that 
would approve the abatement.  This, they feared, would upset the landowners who had signed 
leases with the wind developers and would stand to gain from turbines being built.  One 
township supervisor recounted, “Some of them [township board members] were afraid that, well, 
if we didn’t give them this tax abatement they wouldn’t put no more windmills in here.”  Three 
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local officials who cited similar reasoning added that, “in retrospect [this was] not a very good 
move because they would have put them there anyway.” 
 Conversations with officials who had granted abatements suggested that if they had 
known that the state would change the multiplier table for wind turbines, thereby reducing the 
overall amount of taxes paid by wind developers, they might not have so readily agreed to the 
abatement.  One interviewee said so explicitly:  “At that point in time we were looking at—our 
great State Tax Commission had a multiplier table that was set up to handle how we value the 
turbines and the like.  And it was—it was something that we could live with.  It seemed to make 
sense.”  Though other interviewees were less explicit, they commonly used my question, “If you 
could do it over again, would you still offer an abatement?” to talk about the state’s wind turbine 
tax multiplier table. 
5.2.3 State Tax Commission changes 
Perhaps the most consistent theme in my interviews with local officials—on any topic—is 
their dissatisfaction with recent state changes to the property tax treatment of wind turbines.  
Eleven of the 14 local officials that I interviewed mentioned this change, some even before I 
started asking questions about property taxes. 
While property taxes in Michigan are used to fund local government (e.g., county, 
township/city/village, and school districts) and these local units set the tax rate, the State Tax 
Commission (STC) sets statewide rules about how the taxable value of a property is calculated 
(see Table 5-6).  Prior to 2013, the multiplier table (sometimes referred to as the depreciation 
schedule) for wind generation equipment set each turbine’s tax liability as 100% of the original 
cost for the first year, depreciating over 15 years to 30% of the original cost.  The change for the 
2013 tax year reduced the first-year liability to 80% of the original cost, with depreciation over 6 
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years to 30%.  A revision for the 2014 tax year is a compromise between the earlier tables:  the 
tax liability is 100% of the original cost for the first year and depreciates to 30% over 10 years.  
This change lowered the tax liability for each turbine over its usable life, thereby lowering 
expected property tax revenues for host jurisdictions.  Through the interviews, I learned that 
most of the local governments in the state with taxable wind turbines—including all of those I 
interviewed in Huron County, but not the townships in the McBain area—jointly hired an 
attorney to press the STC to revoke the change.  In the midst of data collection, the STC 
compromised by revising the table once again. 
 
Table 5-6.  Comparison of Michigan State Tax Commission Wind Energy System multiplier tables 
To calculate the taxable value, the original cost of the turbine is multiplied by value in the applicable cell based on the age of the 
turbine.  
  
 
 Still, the latest revision does not negate the core concern of many local officials—that the 
fate of this large revenue stream is entirely in the hands of the state.  Some interviewees were 
Turbine age 
(in years) Pre 2013 2013 2014
1 1.00 0.80 1.00
2 0.95 0.75 0.80
3 0.90 0.70 0.75
4 0.85 0.60 0.70
5 0.80 0.50 0.60
6 0.75 0.40 0.50
7 0.70 0.30 0.45
8 0.65 0.40
9 0.60 0.35
10 0.55 0.30
11 0.50
12 0.45
13 0.40
14 0.35
15 0.30
Alternate Tax Tables
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concerned that, since the STC changed the multiplier table once, it could happen again.  One 
said, “Quite frankly, I don’t know if that revenue stream is going to be there two or three years 
down the road.”   Officials in two other townships noted that fear of future changes was 
hampering their ability to make any long-range plans for the increased revenue.   
Local officials were even more concerned that these changes seemed capricious.  One 
interviewee noted,  
To this day I still do not understand how the state tax commission could—well I 
know how they did it—but how it was allowed to happen?  And while everybody 
agrees it doesn’t make any sense, nobody seems to have the power to override 
them.  And that one there has got me buffaloed.  That scares the living daylights 
out of me that someone can have that kind of power that would influence 
something that dramatically. 
 
To three of the interviewees, however, it was clear how this change occurred:  at the request of 
utility companies.   In fact, though most local officials generally had good things to say about the 
wind developers and utility companies (if not their construction sub-contractors), a number noted 
that the change in the multiplier table showed that the developers were clearly reneging on 
earlier promises of long-term tax benefits. One county official said it most colorfully: 
When they [wind developers] came in here, they had took [sic] full page ads out 
in the paper saying “we’re going to do this” and “we’re going to do that” and 
“you’re going to have these tax dollars” and everything.  And now [our wind 
turbines are] online and, “Oh, by the way, now we’re filing a lawsuit.  We’re 
going to fight this tax structure.”  Huh?  What happened to old buddy, old pal? 
 
Regardless of who initiated the change, it seems to have soured at least one interviewee to 
additional wind development.  “I’ve got a bad taste in my mouth about these things,” he said.  “If 
they would have been forthright and stuff it would have been a little bit different, but it’s like 
they have a plan out there that they’re trying to implement that we don’t know about.” 
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5.2.4 Landowners’ Perceptions 
The potential property tax benefits associated with windfarms were not mentioned within 
the landowner survey, but even so, 15 respondents wrote comments related to property taxes on 
the back cover where open-ended responses were solicited.  Six of these comments were critical 
of the recent change to the depreciation table, five comments praised the positive impacts of the 
property tax revenue generated, and four more suggested that either the turbines hurt the tax base 
or the additional tax revenues were not enough to make up for negative impacts on the 
community.   
Four of the 15 responses came from landowners in jurisdictions that had granted at least a 
partial abatement.  Much like the views of the local officials, the landowners’ views on tax 
benefits received did not appear to have been soured by the abatements.  While one of the 
respondents was critical of the STC, the other three wrote very positive comments about the tax 
benefits that have accrued to the community.  One landowner from Developer-friendly (#1) 
wrote, “The money brought into the township in the taxes paid by our wind company allowed us 
to purchase a new ambulance and fire pumper truck in the last 2 years that would not have been 
possible without the wind turbines!!!”  Another in High-growth (#4) noted, “The township tax 
base has been greatly enhanced and is really showing up in different township projects. When 
can we have more turbines??” 
Only two of the four landowners who talked about negative tax impacts of windfarms were 
landowners in communities with turbines.  Neither of these respondents has a turbine sited on his 
property, though the first of these respondents did report receiving some royalty revenues 
because he is part of the pool in Neighbor-friendly (#3).  This respondent’s comment speaks less 
to the lack of tax revenues generated by the wind turbines, and more to the wind turbines’ 
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indirect impact on the closure of the nearby coal plant, which caused “a significant tax base issue 
for the town.”  The other respondent, who was from Mixed-benefits (#2), suggested that the 
windfarms primarily benefit the county and do not lead directly to local benefits.  To remedy 
this, he suggested that surrounding property owners “should receive a tax deduction.”  The other 
two respondents were landowners in the matched case communities, who presumably have less 
direct experience with wind turbines.  Both had rather lengthy open-ended comments that were 
critical of wind energy, and both thought that the current amount of taxes paid by wind 
developers was insufficient, since “every member of a community has to look at the non-natural 
structures of the windfarms” or experience a “nighttime horizon filled with red lights, blinking 
on and off in unison.” 
5.3 Answering Research Questions and Testing Hypotheses 
This chapter has been devoted entirely to better understanding a corollary of my first 
research question:  Whether the supply-side mechanism’s farmland preservation benefits are felt 
differently by those who receive direct payments from the wind developer, and those who 
potentially benefit more indirectly through an increase in local jobs or local property tax revenue.  
The answer, as established in the last chapter, is a definite “yes.”  This chapter has explored why 
evidence of these potential indirect benefits is not appearing in landowner investment behavior 
and future land use expectations.   
Most landowners, both in communities with windfarms and in those without, agree that 
wind development is associated with job-creation benefits.  A number of landowners and some 
local officials noted, however, that the majority of the jobs during the construction phase of a 
wind project are filled by contractors from outside the area, so the primary boost to the economy 
is in the hospitality sector, which hosts these visitors.  Notably, though these hospitality jobs 
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might be in the vicinity of the windfarm, they are most likely in adjacent villages and not in the 
actual township where the windfarm is located.  A smaller number of landowners and local 
officials also noted that the payments made by wind developers to landowners (in the form of 
leases or royalty payments) make their way back into the local economy, thereby indirectly 
boosting employment in the area.  Again, though, because most of this commercial activity takes 
place beyond the township boundaries—in cities and villages—it is no surprise that I did not 
detect a change in the economic fortunes of all windfarm landowners included in my survey.  
Had I surveyed owners of area restaurants, hotels, or even farm equipment suppliers, I might 
have better captured the benefits.   
My interviews with local officials suggest that the way that the wind developer frames 
job creation benefits might affect the community’s expectations.  In places where claims of 
direct job creation were made, as in Huron County, once the project has been built, landowners 
are actually less convinced of such benefits than landowners in areas without windfarms, 
presumably because they are disappointed that so much of the construction work was done by 
outside contractors.  In contrast, when job creation is portrayed by the developer as an indirect 
benefit that results in leaseholders spending wind income on farm improvements, landowners in 
these communities have an even higher opinion of the job creation benefits of wind energy.  
Additional research directed specifically at this framing question is warranted to confirm this 
assertion. 
Regarding property tax revenues, the majority of local officials believe that the additional 
revenues associated with wind energy have a noticeable positive impact on their local budgets.  
This is especially true among township officials who have traditionally had relatively small tax 
bases.  In these jurisdictions, the property tax base has grown by anywhere from 11% to 415% 
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since the introduction of wind energy.  The impact is far less noticeable at the county level, 
likely because the tax base was much larger and more diverse.   
As of winter 2014 when I conducted my interviews, most of this additional tax revenue 
had been used to fill holes in budgets or to provide additional funding for road maintenance.  
While three townships mentioned that they had considered reducing property tax rates, none of 
them have done so.  As a result, the taxpayers in these jurisdictions who do not participate in 
wind leases, while perhaps benefitting from improved roads and services, have not seen any 
direct financial benefit from the wind turbines.  This might explain why so few landowners 
mentioned the impact on property taxes and why I could not find evidence for my hypothesis that 
these landowners are investing more in their farms than landowners in the matched case 
communities.  Even if officials in these windfarm communities do not lower tax rates in the 
coming years, it is possible that as more time passes, the effect of wind energy tax revenues 
might become more apparent.  For example, the matched case communities may increase tax 
rates to maintain their current level of service, while the revenue provided by the wind turbines 
might allow windfarm communities to hold tax rates steady.   It may be useful to test this 
research question a few years from now. 
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Chapter 6. The Demand-side Mechanism 
 
The last two chapters have explored the evidence for the hypothesis that wind turbines 
help to prevent farmland conversion by reducing the current landowners’ willingness to sell 
farmland.  In this chapter, I look at the demand side of the farmland conversion equation, to 
understand whether wind turbines are making the farmland surrounding them less attractive as 
potential building sites for new homes.  
Though I specifically selected my case study communities in areas where recent census 
data have shown growth of housing units, interviews with realtors and auctioneers in these areas 
reveal that there has historically been very little new home construction on previously farmed 
land.  Furthermore, contrary to my hypothesis, these interviewees suggested that new homes 
were being built in the shadows of the wind turbines, notably not by newcomers to the 
community but primarily by landowners who had turbines on their property.  Using my survey of 
landowners and analysis of building permits, I find evidence to support this claim, although I 
propose additional research exploring this in more detail.  I conclude the chapter by examining 
evidence—primarily anecdotal at this point—that the presence of wind turbines impacts the 
property value of the farmland surrounding them, finding that while it may reduce its value as a 
building site, there is no negative impact—and perhaps even a positive one—on its value as 
farmable land. 
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6.1 Prevalence as a Stated Goal:  Interviews with Local Officials  
In each of my interviews with local and county officials, I asked a very open-ended 
question about what connection they saw between wind energy and farmland preservation.  Only 
three of 14 (21%) mentioned that wind energy could reduce residential demand.  Two of these 
interviewees—one a local official in Mixed-benefits (#2) and the other a county official in High-
growth (#4)—explicitly said that wind energy might have that effect in some communities but 
not in their jurisdictions, since demand for new residential development has historically been so 
low there.   
A third interviewee made it clear, however, that discouraging new residential 
development was not only one of the possible effects of wind energy development, but that this 
deterring effect was a primary motivation for adopting a zoning ordinance that would allow wind 
development into the community.  He reasoned, “We frankly and flat out assumed that if you 
build wind turbines, they will not come.  And therefore, it will stay as agriculture and you will 
have less development that takes place, and that’s what we wanted.”  He went on to add, though, 
that this was rarely explicitly stated: 
When the ordinance went in and we had the first hearings, the people that would 
talk about property values had nothing to base it on. And we really had very little 
response to give back to them other than the fact of—and we had—you had to be 
very careful what your response and how you say it because for us to say, “You’re 
right.  People won’t build houses there.  We don’t want people to build.”  You 
can’t say that.  In a public hearing that you’re doing for land preservation all you 
can say is, “Our ordinance is put in place and developed for agricultural land 
preservation.  That’s one of the pieces that we feel is important for this county.”  
 
In my initial research in 2012 to scope out this dissertation, an academic researcher 
observed that the reduction in new housing demand is the “dirty little secret” connecting 
windfarms and farmland preservation.  In communities where owners of farmland are 
hoping to earn a profit someday by selling their land for development, knowingly taking 
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actions to reduce the desirability of that land as a building site would be politically 
unpopular, at best.   
If windfarms really do reduce demand for new home construction in their vicinity, 
then perhaps it is unsurprising that so few local officials openly discussed such an impact 
in my interviews.  An alternate explanation, of course, is that windfarms do not impact 
the market for new homes, or at least not in the majority of my selected case study 
communities. 
6.2 Realtor Interviews 
 My primary method of determining if there is, indeed, an impact on the market for new 
homes in my selected cases was to interview realtors and auctioneers familiar with the market for 
farmland in each of my case study communities.  These interviews included a historical 
understanding of the demand for new homes in each of these areas, whether new homes tend to 
be built by newcomers or by long-time residents, and what impact the presence of wind turbines 
might be having. 
6.2.1 New Home Demand in Huron County:  Windfarms 1, 2, and 3 
 Recall from Chapter 3 that Windfarms 1, 2, and 3 are located within 20 miles of each 
other in the same county.  My discussions with four real estate professionals familiar with this 
market confirmed that, in fact, there are few distinctions between them.  The topography 
surrounding Developer-friendly (#1) is significantly less flat than in Mixed-benefit (#2) and 
Neighbor-friendly (#3), and there is more variability in the soils, but this would likely have more 
of an impact on agricultural land uses than on new home construction.   
 All of my interviewees insisted that there has been very little demand for new homes in 
the area, not just in recent years, but for the past couple of decades (see Table 6-1).  None could 
 118 
 
think of any recent platted developments (“subdivisions”) beyond incorporated cities or villages, 
though one interviewee mentioned a higher-than-average concentration of large-lot rural 
residences in the townships immediately surrounding Bad Axe.  (These townships do not have 
utility-scale wind turbines and therefore were not within my area of interest.
24
)   
Table 6-1.  Realtor responses to questions about new the home construction market in Huron County 
  Demand for greenfield 
residential development 
Who is building new homes? Impact of wind 
turbines on market 
for farmland 
Realtor 1 “Even going back a 
decade…development 
pressure was almost nil.” 
“Maybe we saw some transition where 
some recreational property became 
second homes or ma and pa farmer 
built a new house and junior moves 
into the homestead.” 
Agricultural:  
“Positive income 
stream” but also 
obstacle “to farm 
around.” 
Realtor 2 “Nothing was being 
developed here.  We are 
almost immune because of 
our, like I said, [Huron 
County is a] peninsula on 
the peninsula.” 
“Primarily new construction is …an 
expansion of farm in terms of junior’s 
house or senior’s house because junior 
got the farm house and I’m building a 
retirement house.” 
Much too soon to tell, 
but “I haven’t had a 
single conversation 
where the windmill 
has played a part.” 
Realtor 3 “Building is really down 
[in the 2000s, compared to 
the 1970s].” 
“People buying those new homes are 
definitely top growers, building big 
homes….  Even doctors aren’t 
building new homes.  It’s the farm 
grower that’s putting the homes up.” 
Agricultural:  “It’s 
income—income 
they didn’t have 
before.” 
Realtor 4 “There has not traditionally 
been much development at 
all.” 
“Only new houses are retiring farmers 
who give the farmstead to son and 
they live in the new house.” 
“It’s really too soon 
to tell.” 
 
All of the interviewees independently observed that rather than posing a threat to 
agriculture, most of the new homes constructed on previously farmed land were built to house 
someone directly related to the farmland owner.  A farmer might also parcel off an acre or two to 
build a retirement home for himself so that successors could move into the farmstead.  
Alternately, the son or daughter of the farmer might build a new house to be within easy reach of 
his or her parents on the farm.   
                                                 
24 Note that some parcels within Colfax and Verona Townships are under lease to wind developers.  Though I am 
unaware of any plans to develop windfarms in these areas, they could be developed in the future.  
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This lack of demand for new homes seems linked to both geography and geology.  As 
one interviewee pointed out, Huron County is surrounded on three sides by Lake Huron, 
isolating it from the rest of the state.  The county’s largest city, Bad Axe, is home to only 3,070 
people, and most of the county is beyond commuting distance to large employment centers in 
Bay City or Saginaw.  Even so, interviewees did not cite the lack of job opportunities as the real 
deterrent for new residents.  Instead, they all commented that demand by farmers for Huron 
County’s rich soils was so high that, in one realtor’s words, “the highest and best use changes 
from potential for development…to agriculture.”  
Huron County, I was told again and again, has some of the richest soil in the state, 
yielding more crops per acre than most other counties.  Consequently, this farmland is highly 
prized even when crop prices are relatively low.  When prices for agricultural commodities are 
high, as they have been for the last several years, the demand increases even more as local 
farmers with more money in their pockets often desire to reinvest it in nearby land.  As a result 
of this demand, the price for tillable land in Huron County is among the highest in the state, 
having reached an all-time high of $12,000 to $13,000 per acre within the last year.   
These high land prices make it difficult for a very weak market for new homes to 
compete.  One realtor recounted that, rather than taking land out of agriculture to build a new 
home, people are “tearing down old farmsteads so that they can farm the land.”  Two other 
interviewees noted that while wooded land used for deer hunting and other recreational purposes 
previously fetched higher prices than farmland, given high demand for farmland in recent years, 
even some of the area’s marginally fertile woodlots are now being clear and tilled.   
Unsurprisingly, then, when I asked these interviewees what impact the wind turbines 
were having on the market for farmland, none of their responses had anything to do with the 
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land’s suitability as a future building site (see Table 6-1).  Two realtors spoke specifically of the 
impact on the property value but focused on attributes that directly relate to agricultural use:  the 
presence of additional income in the form of a wind lease that might be conferred along with the 
title, but also the negative impact of adding an obstacle to the field (in the form of a wind turbine 
and access road).  The other two realtors said that it was too soon to tell what impact the turbines 
might have but gave no indication that they would affect new home building one way or the 
other. 
6.2.2 New Home Demand in the McBain Area:  Windfarm 4 (High-growth) 
 In the McBain area, my interviews with realtors revealed similar findings.  Demand for 
new homes in the area has historically been very low, but the recent recession seems to have had 
a particularly severe impact on the McBain area.  One interviewee recounted, “There has not 
hardly been a new house built in the last ten years after the downturn.”  The other interviewee 
agreed:  “You get out west of town here, if there’s a wooded piece, it would be a great building 
site.  You just don’t see people selling it or building on it.  I haven’t really seen—I can’t think of 
much at all in the last five years that have really gone on.” 
I pressed both of these interviewees (as well as the local officials in the McBain area) on 
this issue, noting that Census data shows that both population and number of occupied housing 
units in the area had grown from 2000 to 2010.  The interviewees did not seem particularly 
surprised by this information, nor did they disagree with it; however, they attributed most of this 
growth to young adults who had previously moved away and decided to move back to the area.  
Some of these young people, they suggested, acted much like those in Huron County—parceling 
off an acre or two from their parents’ homestead to build a new house.  Others interviewees 
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suggested that, especially recently, most of these returning young people have been living in 
previously unoccupied homes.   
One of the realtors I interviewed in McBain also thought that much of the population 
growth in the area could result from changes in farming practices.  In the last decade, he 
recounted, many of the dairy operations have seen dramatic increases in herd size.  “We’ve got 
farmers now that are milking over 1,000 cows that ten, fourteen years ago in 2000 were probably 
milking 200.”  As a result, a number of year-round migrant workers have moved to the area.  
Rather than building new homes, “farmers have bought several of the homes in the area that 
they’ve either refurbished or whatever.  But they rent those or it’s part of their pay.” 
  Whereas most of Huron County has prime agricultural soils, northwestern lower 
Michigan is predominantly forested.  In fact, some of the best farmland in the area is on the high 
ground near McBain where the windfarm is sited.  Because the region’s relatively small 
agricultural sector reduces competition for land, and the soils are more varied than in Huron 
County, farmland values in the McBain region are less than a third of the price of parcels in 
Huron County (both realtors quoted a price of $3,500 per acre).  One realtor who has sold land 
across the state noted that “farm ground in this greater McBain area is still a pretty good bargain 
for a lot of people.”   
As in Huron County, the realtors I interviewed near High-growth (#4) believe that the 
impact of the windfarm on the market for farmland is linked more to its use as tillable 
agricultural land than to its development potential.  Regarding what impact the turbines might 
have on its agricultural use value, both interviewees agreed that they have not seen it factoring in 
at all.  One commented, “It [the windfarm] makes no difference.  I mean, if they’re looking to 
expand their farm and it happens to be close to a windmill, believe me, I can—it will still get 
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sold for probably $3,500 an acre.”  The other realtor commented, “I think the vast majority of the 
change in values and demand and all that type of thing out there has been more of a reflection of 
the changes in the ag market than to say the turbines have had much of an impact in this area 
specifically.” 
 
6.3 Additional Evidence of Windfarm Impact on New Home Construction 
 The topic of windfarms’ impact on new home construction also arose unexpectedly in my 
interviews with two non-realtors.  Significantly, they both suggested that if there was any impact, 
it was that existing farmland owners—especially those with income from wind leases or 
royalties—were using this money to build new homes, a distinction that I had not anticipated in 
my original hypothesis.  A local official in Developer-friendly (#1), when asked about any new 
construction in his township, made this case directly:  “If you can believe it or not, the windmills 
created a couple new ones [homes].” He then went on to talk about the large royalty checks that 
landowners with multiple turbines on their property have been receiving.   
Even the planning official who made a direct, if not public, connection between the 
windfarms and a reduction in new home construction (see section 6.1, page 116) alluded to this.  
When asked whether he believed that the farmland preservation goal of the zoning code had 
proven effective, he admitted, “New houses are going up, they are.  New houses are going up in 
the country[side], they are.  Primarily the new houses that are going up in the country are new 
houses that are owned by the landowners that are there, not that they sold a 10-acre lot off.”  
Here, while not directly tying the new construction to windfarm-related income, this official is 
clearly making the distinction between new construction that is compatible with farming (i.e., 
built to house the farmer’s family) and new construction that threatens agriculture (i.e., carving 
out large lots for non-farming residents).   
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 Because my research questions were not set up to test this specific finding, I have no 
direct way of definitively verifying that the impressions of these two interviewees hold true, nor 
can I determine whether they apply more broadly across the four case study windfarms.  One of 
the questions on my landowner survey did, however, ask about expenditures on home 
improvements, which could potentially capture some evidence of new home building.  I also 
acquired building permit data from all 14 jurisdictions—both windfarm and matched cases—
within my study to assess the feasibility of analyzing these records.  As described in more detail 
below, both of these analyses give some credence to the idea that new homes are being built 
primarily by landowners with wind-related revenues.  However, analysis of the building permit 
data for one township also suggests that more than half of the new homes built in that township 
are not being built by owners of farmland, but additional analysis is required to determine if 
these landowners are related to the owners of the surrounding property. 
6.3.1 Survey Data 
As described in Chapter 4, in order to test my hypothesis (H1) that landowners with 
turbines on their property were putting more money into their farms, I asked a series of 
investment-related questions including one about home improvements.  The text of the 
question—“Since 2008, about how much money have you spent on improvements to your home 
(even if that home is not in [autofill] County)”—never explicitly mentions new home 
construction costs, which limits my ability to tie the responses directly to the claim that those 
with turbines on their property are building new homes.  Even so, at least one respondent noted 
next to her response for this question that she had “built [a] new home,” so there is some reason 
to believe that some respondents interpreted the question to include new construction expenses, 
though others might not have reported such expenditures. 
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ANOVA analysis of the 1,144 valid responses shows that landowners with turbines on 
their property have invested significantly more money in improvements to their homes in the last 
five years (see Table 6-2).  In contrast, landowners in windfarm communities without turbines on 
their property are statistically no different from their counterparts in a matched case.  This holds 
even after I account for the number of acres the landowner farms (see Table 6-3).  While 
investment in one’s home increases with each additional acre farmed, those with turbines on 
their property are likely to invest $11,135 more in their home than a neighbor who farms just as 
much land but doesn’t have a turbine, and $13,240 more than a similarly situated neighbor in an 
area without turbines.  This relationship holds true in both Huron County and the McBain area.   
Table 6-2.  Landowners’ investments in their homes since 2008 
 
  
 
Table Error! No text of specified style in document.-1.  Landowner investments in their homes since 2008 
 
Turbines Neighbors Matched case 
Less than $10,000 39.4 53.0 50.3 
$10,000-49,999 36.4 35.4 39.3 
$50,000-99,999 13.6 5.8 5.9 
$100,000-149,999 3.8 2.4 2.2 
$150,000-199,999 2.3 1.5 1.3 
$200,000-249,999 2.3 1.1 0.4 
$250,000-299,999 0.8 0.4 0.4 
More than $300,000 1.5 0.5 0.2 
    Number of respondents 132 551 461 
Mean*  $41,969  $25,680  $24,030  
Standard Deviation 63,045 46,945 40,290 
    *Calculated using mid-point of range for each response category, $0 for first category and $325k for last category 
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Table 6-3  Linear model of home improvements 
This table demonstrates that acres farmed and having a turbine are both important predictors of home improvement investment.  
Per the model, “Matched case” and “Neighbor” respondents who do not farm invest $19,513 in their farm, while “Turbine” 
respondents who do not farm invest $32,753 ($19513 + 13240).  For all respondents, with each additional acre farmed, home 
improvement investments increase by $21, so a “Turbine” respondent who farms 100 acres would be predicted to invest $34,853 
($32753 + 21*100).  The Multiple R-squared value, however, indicated that this model has very low predictive power (3.6%).  
Linear model terms 
Coefficients  
(in $) p-value 
Intercept (base amount of investment for “Matched case” 
respondents) 19,513 <0.001 
Acres farmed (additional investment for each acre farmed, 
in $/acre) 21 <0.001 
Additional base investment for “Neighbors” compared to 
“Matched case” respondents 2,105 0.47237 
Additional base investment for “Turbines” compared to 
“Matched case” respondents  13,240 0.0047 
   Multiple R-squared 0.036 
  
Again, because this question was not specifically designed to determine which 
landowners constructed new homes, it is impossible to know which of the respondents are 
reporting improvements to an existing home and which are reporting new home expenses. One 
way to account for this is to assume that the largest expenditures might be for new home 
construction as opposed to remodeling or routine improvements.  While a higher percentage of 
respondents with turbines reported at least $250,000 of home-related expenses (2.3% compared 
to 0.9% of their neighbors and 0.6% of respondents in matched case communities; see Table 
6-2), these numbers are not statistically different because of the overall low number of 
respondents (11) who reported such high expenditures.   
 In summary, while responses to the survey question about home improvement 
expenditures do support a claim that landowners with turbines are investing significantly more 
than average in their residences, there is no definitive evidence that it is for new construction. 
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6.3.2 Analysis of Building Permits 
When I first heard the claim that new residences being built in windfarms were on the 
property of landowners who also hosted wind turbines, I requested building permit data for each 
of the 14 townships in my study area, in communities with and without a windfarm.  My original 
plan was to closely investigate the permits in windfarm communities to determine if the 
homeowner also had a turbine lease, as well as to compare the total number of building permits 
for new homes in windfarm communities with their matched case counterparts.  After sorting 
through the data, I determined that neither of these approaches would be sufficient to better 
understand whether windfarm income was encouraging rather than discouraging new home 
construction, and what impact that might have on farmland preservation.   
One of the key hindrances to using building permit data is inconsistencies between 
jurisdictions in both record-keeping practices and the level of detail about permits that they make 
available to the public.  Because building permits were administered through a county 
department, there was consistency between townships within the same county, but no two of the 
four county-level reports contained the same information or level of detail.  For example, the 
report from one county provides a full description of the project, including floor space 
dimensions and construction value.  In the neighboring county, the only report that I was able to 
obtain does not even distinguish between new residences and new accessory buildings—the 
latter of which far outnumber the former.  Furthermore, some counties provided only lists of the 
permits that were issued, and so there is no way to tell if the structures had actually been built.  
Thus, without more data, it is impossible to make direct comparisons between case studies.    
Another problem with looking only at building permit data is that there is no way to 
determine if the new home was built to replace an old home, or if it was built on farmland that 
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had recently been in active use for agriculture.  If the former, there would appear to be little or no 
negative impact on farmable acres.  If the latter, though, this would appear to have a detrimental 
effect on farmland preservation, unless, as some of my interviewees suggested, the new home 
was built to house a family member (e.g., an adult child or niece/nephew) who would be part of 
the farming operation.  Many of my interviewees saw carving off a couple of tillable acres for 
relatives as a positive sign for the farm because it suggests that a younger generation will be 
there to take over.  But because that family member may not have the same last name as that of 
the farmstead owner, there is no easy way to definitively establish whether there is a familial tie 
between the owner of the new house and the owner of the farmland on which it was built without 
asking one of them directly.    
Despite these limitations, I wanted to determine whether I could use building permit data 
to at least probe the claim made by the local official in Developer-friendly (#1) that landowners 
with turbines on their properties were the ones building houses.  According to building permit 
data, permits were issued for seven new homes in this official’s township from January 2008 
through March of 2014 (see Table 6-4).  Only one of the seven of the new homes is definitively 
owned by someone who also hosts a turbine.  Another was owned by someone who is a 
participating landowner in the windfarm but does not host a turbine.  A third was built by a 
landowner who owns farmland in the township but does not receive any income (through either 
leases or royalties) from Windfarm 1.  The remaining four owners of these new homes were not 
listed by name on the sample frame of agricultural landowners, though one of these four built on 
the land of someone who shares his last name (likely a relative). 
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Table 6-4.  Relationship between wind lease and new home building, part of Windfarm 1 
 Owned ag 
land in 2014 
Hosts 
turbine 
Is a 
participating 
lease holder 
New Home 1 X  X 
New Home 2    
New Home 3    
New Home 4    
New Home 5 X X X 
New Home 6    
New Home 7 X   
    
    
Total ag landowners in township 160 22 37 
% of sample frame with new home 1.9% 4.5% 5.4% 
 
 The analysis for this one township shows that 5.4% of owners that receive some income 
from wind developers (either royalties or lease payments) built a house from 2008-2014, 
compared to 1.9% of all agricultural landowners in the township.  Because this finding is based 
on non-sampled data, there is no need for statistics and so these numbers can be treated as 
absolute differences.  Therefore, the interviewee’s assessment that those with revenues from 
wind turbines are building new homes appears to have some merit, though a higher likelihood of 
building a new home is linked to landowners who receive any sort of revenue from a wind 
developer and is not limited to those who host turbines.  However, four of the seven (57%) new 
homes built in the last six years appear to be built by people who do not own farmland and may 
not be associated with a farm.   
Again, given the limitations of the available data, this conclusion is only speculative.  
However, further analysis of building permits and interviews of owners of newly built homes 
would allow for a clearer understanding of who is building new homes in these windfarm 
communities, and how much land these new homes are taking out of production, especially 
compared to the impact of new residences in matched case communities. 
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6.4 Wind Impacts on Property Values 
 
There is a growing body of research on the impact of windfarms on property values of 
existing homes, some of which makes the case that home values decline around windfarms 
because few people want to live near them.  The same reasoning might logically be applied to 
agricultural land prices: if demand for new housing drops in areas with wind turbines, 
agricultural land values might drop as well.  Of course,  this line of reasoning is based on the 
traditional assumption that a greenfield agricultural parcel is most valuable as a residential 
building site.  Indeed, use-value taxation or use-value assessment, a nearly ubiquitous farmland 
preservation tool
25
, is based on the very assumption that taxing a property at its value as 
farmland rather than its potential development value will reduce a farmer’s tax burden, making 
farming more economically viable.  However, as Section 6.2 explained, the demand for 
farmland for residential development has been very low in all of my selected case studies—not 
just recently as a result of the economic downturn, but also historically.   
6.4.1 Realtor Explanations 
 All of the realtor interviewees told me that farmland prices in my study areas have 
historically followed commodity prices—particularly that of corn.  When commodity prices rise, 
so do farmland prices, most recently to unprecedented levels: $12,000 per acre in the Thumb and 
$3,500 per acre in the McBain area, compared to $4,000 and $2,500, respectively, a decade ago.  
In both areas, the parcels that fetch the highest prices are those with rich well-drained soils and 
those that are easier to farm: square or rectangular parcels with few obstructions (e.g., trees, 
rocks, utility poles).  Furthermore, parcels with larger patches of tillable acreage typically fetch a 
                                                 
25 This tool is used in all states except Michigan.  Instead, Michigan has a term-based farmland development rights 
program (P.A. 116) that allows owners of farmland to voluntarily enroll eligible lands for 10 to 90 years, receiving a 
property tax credit and exemption from urban infrastructure special assessments in exchange for agreeing to keep 
the land in an agricultural use.   
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higher per-acre price than smaller tracts.  Thus any negative impact of wind turbines on 
agricultural land values might be tied to reductions in the ease of farming.     
Both of the realtors I interviewed in the McBain area told me that the presence of a 
windfarm was immaterial to an agricultural parcel’s value.  One noted:  “It makes no difference.  
I mean, if they’re looking to expand their farm and it happens to be close to a windmill, believe 
me, I can—it will still get sold for probably $3,500 an acre [the going rate for ag land in that 
area].”  The other noted, after first saying that the presence of the wind turbines has not impacted 
the market price for land, “So I think if anything, maybe it’s had maybe a little more positive 
effect on farm ground from that perspective in terms of cash flow [from a wind lease].” 
In Huron County, realtors expressed much the same sentiment, with all four interviewees 
noting that if there had been any impact on property values, it was negligible.  In the words of 
one realtor, “I haven’t had a single conversation where the windmill has played a part, to be 
honest.”  One of my interviewees in the Thumb, in addition to having a realty company, was an 
appraiser specializing in farmland.  Though he agreed that he hasn’t seen any impact on property 
values, he laid out arguments about how the presence of the turbines might both increase and 
decrease property values.  On one hand, when considering wind leases, he noted, “Any time that 
you have a positive income stream you’re creating value.”  On the other hand, higher values are 
associated with regularly shaped farm tracts without obstacles, so the nuisance of having to farm 
around a turbine or access road in the middle of a field could reduce the land’s value. 
Four of the six realtors had recently been party to the sale of property with a wind lease 
or wind easement attached to it.  In two of the transactions, the seller retained the wind lease; in 
the other two, the lease was transferred to the buyer.  All indicated that although the buyer knew 
there was a wind lease, they did not believe it impacted the selling price.  One realtor who 
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represented a buyer who would not be getting the wind lease as part of the land transaction said, 
“I didn’t see a change in the price from it [not getting the rights].  Maybe he [the buyer] thought 
it privately, but it’s not something he ever talked to me about.”  Another realtor who represented 
the seller in a transaction where they buyer received the rights recounted: 
Realtor:   They [the buyers] did ask about it [the wind lease].  It was not going to be 
a make it or break it part of the deal on that for them.  They prefer that 
they get all the rights, which who doesn’t?  But if they didn’t they weren’t 
going to say, we’re out. 
Interviewer: Got it.  And it didn’t— 
Realtor: Didn’t change what they were willing to offer or anything like that. 
 
To reiterate, in both the McBain area and the Thumb, the value of agricultural parcels is 
driven largely by their value as tillable land and not by their development potential.  Realtors did 
mention, however, that turbines might have an impact on the marketability of existing residential 
properties.  While all interviewees acknowledged that windmills might dissuade some potential 
buyers from moving to the area, I was most commonly told that the turbines were having no 
impact on the value of existing homes.  The most common explanation was that buyers from afar 
might be deterred by the turbines, but local buyers were the primary market for homes, and they 
did not seem as bothered by the potential impacts. 
6.4.2 Landowners’ Perspectives 
The survey of landowners directly asked about the impact of the windfarm on property 
values.  As Table 6-5 shows, opinion is split roughly evenly between those who agree and 
disagree that wind turbines reduce nearby property values.  There is, however, a significant 
difference of opinion between landowners in communities with wind farms and those in the 
matched case communities, with the former group less convinced of a negative impact on 
property values.   There is also a difference across the wind communities themselves:  
landowners in Developer-friendly (#1) are significantly more likely to say that wind turbines 
 132 
 
reduce property values than landowners in High-growth (#4). 
Table 6-5.  Survey responses to the question "How strongly do you agree or disagree that wind turbines reduce nearby 
property values?" 
 
 
Relatively few (n=10) respondents provided additional comments about property values 
in the survey, though the comments were again largely split.  Like many of the realtors I 
interviewed, two respondents noted that there were differential impacts on residential and 
agricultural parcels: reduction in home values but no impact on agricultural land values.  Three 
respondents discussed across-the-board reductions in property values in rural areas (two of the 
three live in windfarm communities but do not have turbines on their property).  Another 
respondent specifically noted that turbines reduce the value of agricultural land “if it was 
intended for future development” and also pointed to possible reductions in value where 
underground transmission lines cross a property.  In contrast, four respondents—one of whom 
had a turbine on her property and three others in the matched case communities—believed that 
All 
respondents
Matched 
case 
All 
windfarm
Developer-
friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-
benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-
friendly     
(#3)
High-
growth      
(#4)
Strongly disagree 12% 8% 14% 10% 19% 14% 14%
Disagree 42% 40% 44% 44% 42% 42% 50%
Agree 31% 36% 28% 28% 27% 28% 29%
Strongly agree 14% 15% 14% 19% 13% 16% 7%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of respondents 1140 457 683 200 216 160 107
Mean 0.1 -0.16 0.02a -0.27ab -0.11ab -0.36b
Standard Deviation 1.3 1.35 1.37 1.36 1.37 1.23
p value
Mean is calculated by assigning numbers to the response categories:Strongly disagree = -2
Disagree = -1
Agree = 1
Strongly agree = 2
The superscripts next to the mean scores indicate whether means across case studies are statistically different.  
   Where columns share a letter, they are statistically indistinguishable.  
Wind cases
<0.001 0.065
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the value of agricultural land might increase as a result of having wind farms in the area.  As one 
respondent noted, “a wind turbine on our property has made the property more valuable because 
of the increased cash flow.”   
 
6.5 Answering Research Questions and Testing Hypotheses 
The data collected for this chapter was intended to test the hypothesis (H3) that proximity 
to a windfarm reduces residential demand for farmland, as well as a follow-up hypothesis (H4) 
that this impact would be felt most acutely in areas with higher demand for new residential 
housing.  Although three of the four case study sites selected for this project had seen growth in 
both the number of occupied housing units and population from 2000 to 2010, interviewees in all 
case study sites insisted that there was no—or at least very little—demand for greenfield building 
sites, even before the recent recession.  This observation holds true even in High-growth (#4), 
which saw an 11% rise in occupied housing units from 2000 to 2010.  As a result, I must reject 
my null hypothesis (H3 and H4), but I suggest replicating this study in a windfarm community 
that has been experiencing development pressure. 
Though these hypotheses proved to be difficult to test, my overarching research question 
about the existence of a demand-side mechanism connecting wind energy and farmland 
preservation did turn up some interesting findings.  Specifically, the data point to a potentially 
unanticipated relationship between wind energy income and new home building.  Notably, many 
interviewees made the distinction between development on farmland by outsiders and houses 
built by family members associated with the farm.  They saw the former as a threat to agriculture 
but perceived the latter as good for the community, a sign of vitality and an increased likelihood 
that there will be someone around to pass the farm onto.  A couple of interviewees also asserted 
that landowners who are receiving wind income are building new houses on their property, either 
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to replace an aging farmhouse or as a retirement home for themselves so that their heirs can 
move into the original farmstead.   Data from my survey of landowners confirm that those with 
turbines on their property are investing more in home improvements.  Building permit data for 
one of the nine windfarm townships show that landowners receiving wind revenues are nearly 
three times as likely to pull a permit to build a new home as farmland owners without turbines; 
however, a greater number of new homes were built by people who did not own farmable tracts 
(i.e., those building rural estates) than by those who owned farmland.  Additional research is 
warranted to determine what relationship, if any, the owners of these new homes have to farmers 
and to see whether these new homes were replacing old homes or not. 
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Chapter 7. The Zoning Mechanism 
While the previous chapters have considered whether wind turbines alter the motivations 
of sellers and buyers of farmland, this chapter looks at the impact of zoning regulations on the 
availability of developable land.  As with other zoning regulations, the premise behind my 
zoning mechanism hypothesis (H5) is that even if sellers desire to sell their land for development 
and buyers are not deterred by the presence of a turbine nearby, the setbacks established by the 
zoning ordinance effectively render some land surrounding the turbines off-limits for 
development.  This chapter not only quantifies this impact in each of the windfarm case studies, 
but also explores the competing interests local officials must balance in establishing zoning 
regulations. I find that although larger setbacks theoretically preserve more land and are 
preferable to neighboring landowners who wish to be buffered from the turbines, setbacks that 
are too large may make wind development infeasible and upset farmland owners who wish to 
site turbines on their property.   
In later sections of this chapter, I introduce evidence from my landowner survey that 
contradicts the zoning hypothesis and suggest additional research that utilizes geospatial analysis 
to further quantify land use change in windfarm communities.  First, I find that in the last five 
years, more farmland has been lost to non-agricultural uses in windfarm communities than in 
their matched case counterparts.  Geospatial analysis could help determine whether these losses 
are occurring within the vicinity of the turbines, which would directly contradict the zoning 
hypothesis; or if they were distant from the turbines, which would essentially transfer farmland 
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loss from one area of the township to another.  Furthermore, survey responses suggest that some 
of this loss is for infrastructure to support the windfarm itself:  access roads, transmission lines, 
and electrical substations.  I explain how quantifying this impact and determining whether this 
impact is minimized through alternative turbine siting practices—e.g., placing turbines and 
access roads on property lines rather than in the middle of fields—would provide local officials 
with additional information as they establish wind zoning ordinances. 
 
7.1 Prevalence as a Stated Goal 
In my interviews with local officials and wind developers, only one interviewee—a wind 
developer—mentioned zoning setback requirements when asked to think about the connection 
between wind development and farmland preservation.  Because this interviewee’s position 
involves researching local ordinances at the early stage of wind development to see if a project 
would be feasible, it is perhaps unsurprising that he would mention it.  In his words: 
I don’t know how it [the windfarm] can do anything but preserve farmland, just 
because the ordinances are in place so you can’t put houses…. Areas 1500 feet 
around a wind farm can’t be developed [according to some zoning ordinances].  
So to me that’s—I think that’s probably gonna help preserve the farmland.  And 
generally if you got a windfarm you’re gonna have a whole slew of them, you’re 
gonna have probably a minimum of 10 and up to 100 [turbines].  …So that’s a big 
area that really you’re not going to be able to do a whole lot of development. 
 
Since this language echoes that of my own hypothesis (H5), it seems that my hypothesis has 
some merit, at least in the experience of this one practitioner.   
It may seem curious, though, that no local officials mentioned a connection between 
zoning ordinances and farmland preservation, especially given that eight of the nine townships in 
my study area regulate wind turbines within their zoning ordinances with setbacks ranging from 
720 to 1,320 feet.  However, as noted in previous chapters, most of these officials do not believe 
that development has posed a threat to farmland in their jurisdictions, so they are unlikely to see 
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reducing the amount of developable land as something that would benefit the local agricultural 
enterprise.  Even so, if development pressures increase in the future, these setbacks might play a 
role.  Furthermore, in rural areas where development is a threat, these setbacks could have an 
impact.  The next section uses the existing zoning ordinances to help quantify that impact. 
 
7.2 Setback Distances 
Of the nine jurisdictions with wind turbines in my study area, three have township-level 
zoning ordinances, five are zoned through a county-level ordinance, and one is unzoned.  
Though there are a number of similarities among these zoning ordinances—especially between 
two of the three in Huron County—they all have some slight differences.  This section looks 
specifically at the impact of their regulations regarding setback distances from inhabited 
structures on the amount of potentially developable land.   
It should be noted that when determining appropriate setback distances for wind turbines, 
local officials most commonly think about suitable distances to buffer existing infrastructure 
from any potentially adverse effects of the turbines.  As a result, setbacks often apply not just to 
buildings, but also to a wide range of other types of infrastructure and land uses (see Table 7-1).  
When a wind developer is planning to site a project, all of these setbacks must be taken into 
consideration and applied to the existing landscape elements to identify the zoning constraints 
for the project.  Because I am effectively reverse-engineering this process and treating the wind 
turbines as the existing landscape elements that constrain locations for habitable structures, this 
analysis ignores the other setback distances.  
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Table 7-1.  Setback distances from various types of infrastructure in the case study windfarm communities 
 
 
7.2.1 Availability of Land for Development  
GIS analysis using the turbine locations for each of the case study windfarms and the 
existing zoning ordinance setback distances shows that there is great variation in terms of the 
number of acres rendered undevelopable as a result of the windfarm, ranging from 187 acres to 
2,860 acres (see Table 7-2).  Even after I account for the number of wind turbines in each wind 
Huron County 
Chandler 
Township
Oliver 
Township
Highland 
Township
Windfarms 1 & 
3, part of 2
Mixed-benefit 
(#2)
Mixed-benefit 
(#2)
High-growth 
(#4)
Inhabited structures
1,000' for 
participating; 
1,320' for non-
participating 1,320'
1000' for 
participating; 
1320 for non-
participating
1.5 x total 
height
Property lines
None; easement 
if less than 1.5 x 
hub height
None; 
easement if 
less than 1.5 x 
hub height
1.5x total 
height
1.5 x total 
height
Border of overlay zone
2 x hub height 2 x hub height
City or village 1,320'
Public Road
(Greater of) 400' 
or 1.5xhub 
height
(Greater of) 
400' or 1.1 x 
hub height
1.5 x total 
height; 1 x hub 
height when 
leased on both 
sides of 
roadway
1.5 x total 
height
Communication & electrical 
lines
(Greater of) 400' 
or 1.5xhub 
height
(Greater of) 
400' or 1.1 x 
hub height
Exceptions with written 
consent from property 
owner?
"Considered" "Considered"
Considered, 
but must be at 
least greater of 
1.5 x total 
height or 660'
"May be 
approved"
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project, the amount of land per turbine rendered undevelopable by the presence of the turbines 
ranges from 6.9 acres per turbine to 84.7 acres per turbine.   
Table 7-2.  Land rendered undevelopable in windfarm case studies, based on existing zoning ordinance in 
each 
 
 
By far, the largest contributing factor in these differences is the specifics of the zoning 
ordinance.  In High-growth (#4), only five of 29 turbines are in a township with zoning, and even 
then, the setback distance is only 720 feet, smaller than the setbacks in all other projects.  By 
contrast, in Mixed-benefits (#2), the 1,320-foot setback applied to the 13 turbines in Chandler 
Township renders 1,433 acres undevelopable, which exceeds the 1,361 acres rendered 
undevelopable from the 20 turbines in neighboring McKinley and Oliver Townships, where the 
setbacks are 1,000 feet for participating landowners.  To demonstrate the impact of setback 
distances on land potentially preserved from development, I also ran a GIS analysis for each of 
the windfarms using the setback distances specified in the zoning ordinances in this study (see 
Table 7-3).   
Developer-friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-friendly     
(#3)
High-growth      
(#4)
Total area  of townships (acres) 46,082 58,224 45,864 46,693
Number of turbines 46 33 40 29
Setback
1,000' for 
participating; 1,320' 
for non-
participating
1 township:  1,320'       
2 townships:  1,000'  
participating / 1,320'  
non-participating
1,000' for 
participating; 
1,320' for non-
participating
1 township:  none      
1 township: 1.5 x 
total height
Total acres "undevelopable," with 
current zoning code* 2,729 2,794 2,860 187
Acres per turbine "undevelopable" 59.3 84.7 71.5 6.4
* Where zoning code differentiates between participating and non-participating landowners, I assume all 
      landowners are participating.
 140 
 
Table 7-3.  Impact of setback distance on the amount of land rendered undevelopable in windfarm case studies 
 
 
Through this second analysis—holding the setback distance constant across projects—it 
becomes evident that there is more at play than simply the setback distance.  Notice, for 
example, that in Developer-friendly (#1), a 1,320-foot setback distance renders 88.7 acres per 
turbine undevelopable.  By contrast, in Neighbor-friendly (#3), the same setback impacts 119.9 
acres per turbine, effectively making 35% more land off limits to development (see Table 7-3).  
A key reason for this is turbine placement.  In Developer-friendly (#1), turbines are placed closer 
together, with as many as seven turbines per township section,
26
 making all but two of the 46 
setback distance circles overlap (see Figure 7-1).  In Neighbor-friendly (#3), though, turbines are 
much farther apart, with no more than five turbines per section and 14 of 40 turbines having non-
overlapping setback distance circles (see Figure 7-2).   
The reason for these differences is rooted in a policy change, but can be instructive in 
understanding how setback distances impact turbine density.  Prior to the construction of 
Developer-friendly (#1), Huron County’s zoning ordinance called for a 1,000-foot setback from 
all properties.  Following complaints, primarily by neighbors of Developer-friendly (#1), the 
county changed its ordinance to require 1,320-foot setbacks from homes of non-participating 
                                                 
26 This unit of measure comes from the Homestead Act of 1862, which standardized the surveying of western 
territories to create townships of 36 square miles divided into 36 sections of one square mile each.  In many rural 
areas in states west of Pennsylvania—including Michigan—most roads still run along section lines, making the 
township section an easily distinguishable geographic feature. 
Acres Acres/turbine Acres Acres/turbine Acres Acres/turbine Acres Acres/turbine
1.5 x total height* 1,104  24 1,272 39 1,570   39 922       32
1000 ft setback 2,729  59 2,262 69 2,860   71 1,907   66
1320 ft setback 4,080  89 3,594 109 4,796   120 3,113   107
* Total  height varies  based on turbines  used in each project Windfarm 1: 389'
Windfarm 2: 489'
Windfarm 3: 492'
Windfarm 4: 458.9' (weighted average of 3 di fferent s izes  of turbines)
Developer-friendly     
(#1)
Mixed-benefit        
(#2)
Neighbor-friendly     
(#3)
High-growth                 
(#4)
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landowners (that is, those not in the royalty pool) and 1,000-foot setbacks from homes of 
participating landowners.  This ordinance change meant that any new turbines—including those 
in Neighbor-friendly (#3)—must be farther from homes of non-participating landowners, though 
turbines within Developer-friendly (#1) were able to continue as non-conforming structures (i.e., 
they were “grandfathered in”).  By increasing the setback distances, the new ordinance expanded 
the footprint of the “no-turbine” zone around these homes, making the areas where turbines 
could be sited both smaller and less contiguous.  While wind developers aim to maximize the 
density of turbines to take advantage of economies of scale within the development process, 
there are technical limits to how proximal turbines can be to each other without wind from one 
turbine disrupting airflow of another downwind.  As a result, increased setback distances have 
the added effect of reducing the density of turbines. 
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Figure 7-1.  Theoretically undevelopable area in Developer-friendly (#1), with a setback distance of 1,320 feet 
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Figure 7-2.  Theoretically undevelopable area in Neighbor-friendly (#3), with a setback distance of 1,320 feet 
 
 
I would be remiss if I did not note that all four of the zoning ordinances in the chosen 
windfarm case studies allow for exceptions (not variances, per say) to the setback distances with 
written consent from the affected property owner.  Interviewees in each of the projects noted 
that, during the turbine siting process, these waivers allowed wind developers to site turbines 
where they might not otherwise have been able to do so.  Conversely, though, someone wishing 
to build a new house closer to the turbine—in the area that I have considered “undevelopable”—
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might also be able to do so.  Tracking how often waivers are granted to build within the wind 
turbine setback zone would be a good follow-up to this part of the analysis. 
7.2.2 Balancing Competing Needs and Property Rights 
As with any land use regulation, local governments must balance a number of competing 
interests when setting regulations related to wind energy.  On one hand, larger setbacks help 
buffer neighbors from some of the noise, flicker, and visual impacts of the turbines, and, as I just 
established, might help preserve more farmland.  On the other hand, large setbacks make it more 
difficult for wind developers to site turbines.  The turbine-siting process effectively involves 
drawing the inverse of the maps generated in Section 7.2.1, establishing “no-turbine” zones 
around the existing houses, property lines, and road right-of-ways to determine areas where 
turbines can be built.  Thus, smaller setbacks give wind developers more flexibility in siting 
turbines and the opportunity to site more turbines within a given area.  As a result, landowners 
who would financially benefit from having a turbine on their property are more likely to favor 
small setback distances, while those who will not directly benefit from wind turbines are more 
likely to favor larger setback distances—perhaps even distances large enough to preclude siting 
any turbines in the jurisdiction. 
This idea of balancing community interests was frequently mentioned by local officials in 
the windfarm communities who were involved in adopting zoning ordinances regulating the 
turbines.  When asked how they arrived at a setback distance that exceeded that of the county 
zoning at the time, an official in Mixed-benefit (#2) recalled:  
I guess always in the back of our minds we said, “Okay, the farmers that have the 
windmills, it’s a benefit to them.  But we do not want it to be a problem for a 
person that’s not benefitting from the windmills.”  So that's why we, we put in 
some more restrictive setbacks and so forth. 
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Another official recounted that, in establishing the wind zoning ordinance, the planning 
commission’s goal was to: 
Try to hit a happy medium that will work [for residents], [but one where] the 
developers will still say, “Yes, we can build.”… It’s impossible to write an 
ordinance that protects everybody in your county. You can’t do it.  Somebody’s 
not going to be happy.  Somebody got stepped on.  Somebody didn’t get what 
they wanted.  But we wanted to try and do what we felt was in the best interest of 
most. 
 
One of my interviewees acknowledged that this balancing act is a bit easier in an area with more 
homogenous land use. He recounted that, in a nearby township that has roughly even numbers of 
farmers and owners of lakeshore recreational homes, the decision to establish setbacks that 
effectively prohibit wind development led to threats of secession by the farmers.  In contrast, he 
noted that his township’s residents—who are predominantly farmers—largely agreed that the 
zoning ordinance should not “dictate to a farmer what they can and can’t do with their property.”   
 This local official was not the only interviewee to note that there was great reluctance 
within these communities to restrict landowners’ ability to do what they want with their land, 
even if that includes hosting a wind turbine.  In Developer-friendly (#1), where the zoning 
process was the most contentious of my case studies, one interviewee noted that nearly all of the 
people who came to hearings about the wind turbines were opposed to them.  “But my feeling 
was what authority do I have to tell you what you can do with your land? ... If you want a 
windmill and they offer you one, take it.  If you don’t want it, you don’t take it.”  Only one 
official overtly tied this issue to property rights, reasoning that if local zoning is too restrictive, it 
“treads on the rights” of large landowners.  “At the same time, the person with two acres should 
have the same amount of rights.”  In this official’s opinion, existing zoning was not adequately 
balancing these two interests.   
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7.2.3 Where There is no Zoning 
Precisely because zoning ordinances are designed to balance the needs of competing 
interests in the community, one might expect that in the one windfarm jurisdiction with no 
zoning, the interests of one class of residents would benefit to the detriment of the others.  When 
I recounted to local officials in Huron County that one of the jurisdictions in High-growth (#4) 
was unzoned, they reacted with astonishment, claiming that there must be lawsuits and many 
unhappy residents as a result.
27
  Indeed, some might point to a recent court case in Windfarm 4, 
where a landowner sued the wind developer for siting a turbine too close to his property, as 
evidence that in the absence of zoning, landowners without turbines on their property are more 
likely to have their rights ignored. 
In examining the battery of questions in the landowner survey about the perceived 
positive and negative impacts of wind energy as an indicator of the landowner’s overall opinion 
of wind turbines (previously discussed in Section 4.3.4), I find quite the opposite.  In Richland 
Township, where there is no zoning, both landowners with (see Table 7-4) and without (see 
Table 7-5) turbines on their property are more convinced of the positive impacts of wind energy 
and less convinced of the negative impacts than their counterparts in all other communities with 
wind turbines.   
                                                 
27 To the best of my knowledge, this is the only unzoned Michigan jurisdiction with a utility-scale windfarm.  
However, there are a number of unzoned jurisdictions in Michigan, including all of the townships in Missaukee 
County, where Richland Township is located.  In future research in my post-doctoral appointment managing the 
Michigan Public Policy Survey, I hope to include a question about zoning on this biannual survey of local officials 
across the state to better understand the prevalence and geography of zoning ordinances.   
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Table 7-4.  Opinions on the possible impacts of wind energy (farmland owners in windfarm townships with turbines on 
their property) 
 
 
Table 7-5.  Opinions on the possible impacts of wind energy (farmland owners in windfarm townships without turbines on 
their property) 
 
 
Richland 
Township 
"turbines"
All other 
windfarm 
"turbines"
Statistical 
significance
Create jobs 1.50 1.14
Disrupt bird migration -1.7 -1.27 *
Create noise pollution -1.5 -0.59 ***
Produce visual or aesthetic problems -1.7 -0.77 ***
Provide revenues for land owners 1.50 1.23
Disrupt local weather patterns -1.60 -1.30
Cause human health problems -1.70 -1.33 *
Preserve rural land 1.33 0.18 ***
Help limit climate change -0.75 -0.46
Reduce nearby property values -1.56 -0.87 **
Mean is calculated by assigning numbers to the response categories: Strongly disagree = -2
Disagree = -1
Agree = 1
Strongly agree = 2
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
Richland 
Township 
"neighbors"
All other 
windfarm 
"neighbors"
Statistical 
significance
Create jobs 0.84 0.70
Disrupt bird migration -0.968 -0.455 *
Create noise pollution -0.167 -0.048
Produce visual or aesthetic problems -0.133 0.0712
Provide revenues for land owners 1.37 1.06 *
Disrupt local weather patterns -1.00 -1.00
Cause human health problems -0.57 -0.73
Preserve rural land -0.30 -0.31
Help limit climate change -0.60 -0.56
Reduce nearby property values -0.19 0.04
Mean is calculated by assigning numbers to the response categories: Strongly disagree = -2
Disagree = -1
Agree = 1
Strongly agree = 2
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
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The wind developer in High-growth (#4) believes that the very absence of zoning 
regulations led to more opportunity to discuss with landowners where turbines would be 
optimally placed:   
Landowners initially were always happy, because we were dealing directly with 
them…. [If a change needed to be made once construction started] we could do 
that on the fly with a couple of landowners’ consent and boom, boom, boom, no 
problem.  If it was an ordinance-regulated deal, we may have to go back through 
the whole site planning for 30 or 60 days.  
 
However, given that in neighboring Highland Township, where there are zoning regulations, 
landowners are similarly enthusiastic about wind energy, the positive attitudes of landowners in 
Richland Township are more likely the result of the wind developer’s practices in Windfarm 4 as 
opposed to the lack of zoning regulations.  Even so, it does not appear that the absence of zoning 
regulations has resulted in an adverse distribution of property rights.   
Such a finding might be at odds with conventional wisdom, but it is not unprecedented in 
the literature, especially in rural communities.  In his 1991 book about cattle grazing in 
California, Robert Ellickson found that "members of tight social groups will informally 
encourage each other to engage in cooperative behavior” (1991, 167), turning to legal rules only 
“when the social distance between them increases, when the magnitude of what is at stake rises, 
and when the legal system provides an opportunity for the disputants to externalize costs to third 
parties” (283).  Indeed, when asked to explain why there has been so little windfarm-related 
conflict between neighbors in Richland Township, one local official explained, “I think first of 
all they try to maintain that good neighbor policy.  And the other:  most of them are all related.  
Yeah.  If you’re related you let things—you accept it.”  Additional research is warranted to 
determine whether Richland Township is an anomaly—a peaceful unzoned jurisdiction with a 
windfarm—or not as rare as most would believe. 
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7.2.4 Township versus County versus State Control 
Though this concern was not the focus of my research, four local officials expressed—
unprompted—a fear that the state might decide to withdraw its delegation of zoning powers for 
wind energy and make all siting decisions at the state level as is done in 12 other states.  While 
most (27 of the 50) states do delegate land use regulation and siting authority for renewable 
technologies to local governments, a move toward centralization would not be unprecedented, 
especially if the state decides to increase its Renewable Portfolio Standard and mandate that a 
higher percentage of electricity come from renewable sources.  Where economically viable 
renewable energy projects sites are limited or local opposition is particularly strong, some states, 
including nearby Ohio and Wisconsin, have chosen to move siting authority to the state level to 
ensure that utilities are able to meet RPS targets (Rynne et al. 2011). 
Michigan has not seriously considered removing local control over wind siting (at least, 
not to the extent that it has entered the public record).  Even so, local officials in Huron County 
voiced concern that overly prohibitive wind zoning ordinances might eventually drive the state to 
make such a change. As a result, they have tried to ensure that wind developers could work 
within any proposed ordinance.  One local official remarked, “We live in fear in this county that 
the state could take over wind ordinance development.  So honestly, when we look at tweaking 
and working on an ordinance, we look at it from the standpoint of if the state got involved, what 
would they also say about what we did.”  Even the most skeptical interviewee, a local official 
who was not keen on additional wind development in his jurisdiction, thought it would be most 
prudent to change existing zoning incrementally to provide residents uncompensated by wind 
developers some additional buffer space.  If local government zoned out wind energy entirely, it 
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would risk a situation where “the state would come in and just set the rules and we would have 
zero control.” 
Landowners in these windfarm jurisdictions, as well as landowners in the matched case 
studies, are largely of the same mindset as their elected officials.  Though no respondents 
mentioned state takeover in the open-ended response, a battery of multiple-choice questions 
asked how much authority each level of government (and landowners) should have in deciding 
where turbines are sited.  Overwhelmingly, respondents believe that such decisions should be 
made by landowners or local government, with a much smaller role for state government, and no 
role for the federal government.  This holds true even when we compare the responses of 
landowners in the matched case communities with those of landowners in communities with 
windfarms (see Table 7-6).  Furthermore, if we compare respondents in windfarms based on their 
current zoning arrangement (e.g., zoned by the local township or county, or not zoned at all), 
those in the only unzoned township in the study are most adamant that the state should stay out 
of wind siting decisions (see Table 7-7). 
One might expect that wind developers would be in favor of state zoning, which would 
allow them to identify project sites where they can maximize energy output—and subsequently 
profits—rather than factoring in whether obstructionist local regulations will delay approval.  My 
interviews with wind developers, though, point to the contrary: wind developers prefer to work 
with townships than with county or state regulatory bodies.  In comparing his experiences in 
Michigan and Ohio, one developer noted that Ohio’s state-level siting “is kind of a good news, 
bad news kind of thing.  You only have one agency to deal with, but the requirements are pretty 
tight…. You basically have got to have a team of lawyers to help you get through the process.  
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It’s more expensive.”  Another developer I interviewed, who worked mostly in Michigan, did not 
address state-level zoning but compared township and county zoning.  He asserted: 
Right now local zoning is more effective, more efficient for us to work with the 
local townships than the county.  The county has a broader area.  They have 
broader agendas.  And they have to look at a broader spectrum, which includes a 
lot of people that are not in favor of wind.  That can drag a process down.  And if 
we deal with local and we have large support and less small parcels you have a 
good momentum of pro wind building. 
 
It is possible that these developers actually do advocate for state zoning but were censoring their 
opinions because we were speaking on the record.  It appears, however, that they currently have 
enough communities with ample wind resources who are also willing to host turbines that they 
do not need the state to intervene.  Should the state increase the RPS targets in the future, it 
would be important to see if and when the wind developers change their opinions. 
 
Table 7-6.  Landowner opinions of how much authority government and landowners should have in deciding where wind 
turbines are sited 
 
 
Response Options
All 
respondents
Matched 
case
 All 
Windfarm
Neighbors Turbines
A great deal of authority 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Some authority 29% 32% 27% 27% 29%
No authority 69% 66% 71% 71% 69%
A great deal of authority 5% 6% 3% 3% 3%
Some authority 55% 56% 55% 55% 52%
No authority 41% 38% 42% 41% 45%
A great deal of authority 28% 23% 32% 34% 22%
Some authority 55% 55% 55% 53% 63%
No authority 17% 23% 13% 13% 15%
A great deal of authority 85% 84% 86% 86% 87%
Some authority 14% 15% 13% 14% 12%
No authority 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Number of Respondents 1,159               470 689 552 137
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05
Windfarm respondents
Federal 
government
State 
government
Local 
governments
Landowners
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Table 7-7.  Opinions of landowners in communities with windfarms, on how much authority government and landowners 
should have in deciding where wind turbines are sited, by current zoning arrangement 
 
 
7.3 Conflicting Evidence:  Recent Land Sales 
The zoning mechanism hypothesis that I have tested so far in this chapter is based on the 
assumption that by rendering some land around wind turbines undevelopable, a community will 
experience less conversion of farmland.  But as long as there is some land that can still be 
developed, it is possible that the presence of the turbines is simply transferring development 
from one area (e.g., in the vicinity of the turbines) to another (e.g., away from the turbines).  This 
might happen at the local level, which would lead to increased development in a portion of a 
windfarm community without turbines; or at a more regional scale, which would shift 
development to similar countryside miles away.  In some ways, this is not unlike what happens 
when suburban jurisdictions adopt low-density zoning to minimize additional population growth:  
Response Options
Local 
zoning
County 
zoning
No 
zoning
p-value
A great deal of authority 2% 2% 0%
Some authority 27% 27% 23%
No authority 71% 71% 77%
A great deal of authority 5% 2% 0%
Some authority 58% 54% 39% *
No authority 37% 44% 61% *
A great deal of authority 34% 31% 23%
Some authority 52% 55% 62%
No authority 14% 13% 15%
A great deal of authority 82% 81% 90%
Some authority 17% 12% 10%
No authority 1% 7% 0%
Number of Respondents 231 390 38
p-values significant:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05;  0.05 - 0.10
Federal government
State government
Local governments
Landowners
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the demand for living in such communities does not disappear but rather just shifts to 
jurisdictions farther afield (thereby exacerbating urban sprawl).   
While a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the survey 
of landowners tested whether zoning was impacting farmland conversion at the township scale 
by asking whether the respondent had sold any farmland in the last five years and following up 
by asking about the purchaser.  Overall, 106 respondents (8.9%) reported selling farmland since 
2008, and all but one of these also gave some indication of how the land was being used.  Of the 
respondents who sold land, most (77%) said that it was still being farmed, either by a family 
member or by someone who was not related to them.  The remaining respondents (n=22) 
indicated that at least some of the land that they had recently sold was being used for some non-
farming purpose.   
Given the small number of transactions, there are no statistically significant differences 
between respondents in communities with windfarms and those in the matched case 
communities.  However, if we set aside the lens of statistics (as I made a case for doing in 
Appendix B), the raw data show that there is actually a slightly higher rate of sales for non-
farming purposes in windfarm communities than in non-windfarm jurisdictions (see Table 7-8). 
This finding is contrary to the zoning hypothesis.  Ironically, it is driven largely by land sales by 
property owners who have turbines on their property, two of whom noted that they had sold land 
to a utility company for a substation.  (More about the non-turbine land use impacts of wind 
energy follows in Section 7.4.)  When I remove sales to electric utility companies (two in 
windfarm communities and one in a matched case community), there is less of difference in the 
rate of farmland sales for non-farming purposes between these two types of respondents.  
However, when we look at the number of acres sold for these non-farm purposes, we see that 
 154 
 
respondents in windfarm communities sold significantly larger parcels (see Table 7-9).  As a 
result, nearly five times more acres (650 compared to 110) were sold for non-farming purposes 
by landowners in the windfarm communities than by landowners in the matched case 
communities. This finding, then, seems to contradict the notion that zoning for wind turbines is 
reducing farmland conversion.   
Table 7-8. The end use of farmland sold by respondents, since 2008 
 
 
Table 7-9.  Sales of parcels for non-farming purposes, since 2008 
 
 
Sold to
All 
respondents
Matched case 
respondents
Windfarm 
respondents Neighbors Turbines
A relative for farming 1.6% 0.6% 2.3% 2.5% 1.5%
A non-relative for farming 5.2% 5.0% 5.4% 5.6% 4.4%
Both a relative and non-relative for non-farming 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0%
A relative for non-farming 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0%
A non-relative for non-farming 0.8% 1.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.7%
Someone for farming and non-farming 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7%
Utility company 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 1.5%
Any farming 7.0% 5.6% 7.9% 8.4% 5.9%
Any non-farming 2.0% 1.9% 2.1% 1.9% 2.9%
Any non-farming (excluding utility company) 1.8% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 1.5%
Did not sell 91.1% 92.5% 90.2% 90.0% 91.2%
Total respondents 1,183 478 705 569 136
Windfarm respondents
All 
respondents
Matched case 
respondents
Windfarm 
respondents Neighbors Turbines
0 - 20 acres 13 8 5 3 2
20 - 39 acres 3 1 2 1 1
40 - 79 acres 5 0 5 5 0
80 acres or more 3 0 3 2 1
Total number of transactions 24 9 15 11 4
Total acres* 760 110 650 520 130
* Calculated taking the mid-point for the range, and conservatively assuming 80 acres  for those who selected the last category.
Windfarm respondents
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Because the landowner survey was not specifically designed to look at farmland 
conversion rates, I would hesitate to make that case without additional research.  Since the sales 
data are not geo-located and the study included landowners across the entire township in which 
the windfarm is located, it is possible that the parcels sold were in parts of the township far from 
the turbines.  If, upon further study, this proves to be the case, the turbines might simply be 
shifting farmland conversion from one area of the township (i.e., near the wind turbines) to 
another.  Furthermore, my landowner survey did not distinguish between different non-farming 
uses (e.g., landowners who sold farmland for a residential development or for recreational use 
would have answered the same way), so there is no way to tell exactly how the land is currently 
being used.  However, since any non-farm use of previously farmed land is, by definition, 
agricultural land conversion, it is counter to farmland preservation goals.   
Finally, this argument has been based on a comparison of farmland conversion rates in the 
windfarm communities and the matched case communities, which is predicated on the 
assumption that these communities would have experienced similar development pressure in the 
absence of the windfarm.  Determining the counterfactual—what the demand would have been if 
not for the windfarm—is difficult, if not impossible.  It could be that the windfarms did dampen 
demand for farmland for non-farming purposes, and that farmland conversion would have been 
even higher if not for the windfarm.   Needless to say, more research is warranted to better 
understand these recent incidents of farmland conversion in the windfarm communities and to 
determine how—if at all—farmland conversion is connected to wind development. 
 
7.4 Countervailing Effects:  Land Taken out of Production 
While the GIS analysis to determine the impact of setback distances utilized single-pixel 
point features to represent wind turbines, in reality, utility-scale wind turbines do have non-
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negligible land requirements.  Though the land requirements of the turbine towers—which often 
exceed ten feet in diameter—are the most obvious, a wind turbine also needs an access road for 
maintenance and emergency personnel, as well as transmission lines and substations to feed the 
power generated into the electric grid.   Thus, for all of their potential to prevent farmland 
conversion, as demonstrated in the last four chapters, the very act of erecting a wind turbine on 
farmland inevitably and immediately converts some land to a non-agricultural use.   
One might argue—as did many of my interviewees and survey respondents—that the land 
taken out of production as a result of wind development is relatively small compared to the 
economic benefit provided by the turbines.  Most commonly, wind developers and landowners 
with turbines on their property told me that each turbine and attendant access road required about 
two acres of land, which is not negligible but is significantly less than the 60+ acres per turbine 
rendered undevelopable as a result of the setback distance.  However, I also consistently heard 
that some siting practices help to minimize agricultural land loss, while other siting practices are 
particularly disruptive to modern farming.  While it was beyond the scope of this project to 
determine exactly how much land is being taken out of production as a result of wind 
development and how improved siting practices might reduce losses, in the next section, I 
recount anecdotal evidence that might be investigated with GIS analysis in the future. 
7.4.1 Siting matters 
When I asked wind developers whether they were doing anything to minimize the impact 
of turbines on farming operations, all three noted that they try to avoid siting the turbine in the 
center of a field.  Instead, where possible, they have been siting the access road and occasionally 
the turbine itself on a property line.  In many cases, the property line or fencerow is a sort of no-
man’s-land that was not being farmed anyway, so there is very little land taken out of production.  
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The wind developers noted, however, that there are additional benefits of siting on a property 
line:   
Rather than having a three- or four-, five-acre impact, now you’re having less 
than half of an acre impact, and you get a nicer road, improves your ability to take 
your crops off of the field, and improves your ability to fertilize your crops, and 
improves your ability to plant your crops 'cause we’re giving you better access 
into your field, and the actual piece of the turbine takes up about a tenth of an 
acre.   
 
In addition, both developers and local officials noted that siting along fencerows prevents the 
placement of an additional obstacle—the turbine—in the field, so farmers can plant and harvest 
just as they always have.  Because of these benefits, while none of the windfarm jurisdictions in 
my study require siting along fencerows, two of the zoning ordinances state that “the location of 
towers and access routes is encouraged along internal property lines.” 
There are, however, drawbacks to siting on fencerows.  First, landowners on both sides 
must agree to have wind leases, or at minimum grant the wind developer an easement for the 
access road.  In addition, wind contours or zoning regulations might make a strict policy of siting 
on property lines infeasible.  Furthermore, removing these fencerows could have ecological 
consequences.  As one landowner noted, “Now there aren't any windbreaks to buffer the blowing 
topsoil, blowing snow, or the wind.  Removing fence lines, the brush and trees have taken away 
cover for deer runs and other wildlife.”  
Developers noted that the second-best solution is often to site the turbine and access road 
in the middle of the field, but parallel to crop rows.  If the access road does not cut across the 
field at an odd angle, the farmer can plant right up to the road without disrupting the planting 
pattern, minimizing “wedges of unproductive land here and there.”  Furthermore, this approach 
provides farmers with another access road into their farm—a benefit mentioned in the survey by 
21% of landowners with turbines on their property.   
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7.4.2 Transmission Lines and Eminent Domain 
While the nuisance of farming around the turbines and access roads was the primary 
concern across all windfarms, mentioned by 39% of landowners with turbines on their property, 
landowners in Mixed-benefits (#2) were also concerned about how the placement of transmission 
line poles were impacting their ability to farm. While in the other case study communities the 
local transmission lines had enough capacity to accept the power generated by the wind turbines, 
a new high-voltage transmission line is being constructed in the vicinity of Mixed-benefits (#2) 
to allow more wind development in the area.  Both landowners and local officials in Mixed-
benefits (#2) noted that, though the transmission line poles take up very little land, there are 
many more transmission line poles than wind turbines, and they are still obstacles that must be 
farmed around, disrupting planting patterns.  Furthermore, because transmission utilities are 
granted the power of eminent domain, landowners have very little say in where the poles are 
placed.  Again, while this is not an issue where wind energy is feeding into a grid where there is 
excess capacity, any calculations of how much land is taken out of production by wind turbines 
should also consider the transmission lines and grid infrastructure needed to move the power 
from the windfarm to electrical consumers. 
7.5 Beyond Setbacks:  Other Regulations 
Though this chapter has so far dealt exclusively with setback distances, there are other 
regulations within a zoning ordinance that, while not having a direct impact on farmland 
preservation, could have indirect effects.  For example, zoning restrictions may influence 
whether a wind project is economically viable from a wind developer’s perspective, or whether it 
is socially acceptable to neighboring landowners.   
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The wind turbine zoning codes in my study area all include at least some regulations 
beyond setbacks (see Table 7-10), and these regulations often reflect some of the common 
concerns voiced by residents in the landowner survey.  All five address the visual appearance of 
the turbine, requiring it to be a non-reflective color and prohibiting it from displaying 
advertisements, addressing the aesthetic concerns which served as the most common complaint 
of survey respondents.  In addition, the zoning ordinances all require some sort of 
decommissioning plan and financial assurance (sometimes in the form of a bond) that the wind 
developer will cover the costs of deconstructing the turbines, addressing residents’ concern over 
what will someday happen to the turbines when they reach the end of their usable life.  Only four 
of the five zoning ordinances set noise limits, either at a residence or property line, though this 
was residents’ second most common concern.  Also, a good number of residents (n=14) as well 
as interviewees expressed concern over the red lights atop the turbine, which are required by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  Notably, three of the five ordinances prohibit the 
turbine from being “artificially lighted, except to the extent required by the FAA.” 
 
Table 7-10.  Regulations present within the wind zoning ordinances of windfarm case communities 
 
 
Chandler 
Township
Huron 
County 
New
Huron 
County 
Old
Oliver 
Township
Highland 
Township
Comments in 
landowner 
survey
Visual appearance      47
At residence, school   
At property line 
Decommissioning      17
Lighting    14
Tower separation     0
Total height    0
Ground clearance    0
Complaint resolution plan    0
31Noise
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7.6 Answering Research Questions and Testing Hypotheses 
This chapter examined the treatment of wind turbines in the zoning ordinances of each 
windfarm township in the study, as a way to better understand what impact these regulations 
have on the availability of developable land—the focus of my zoning mechanism research 
question.  I found that, though farmland preservation considerations are rarely at the top of 
officials’ minds as they establish setback distances for wind turbines, the amount of land 
rendered undevelopable by the presence of the turbines can be substantial.  As I had 
hypothesized (H5), I found that while the size of the windfarm does have some bearing on the 
amount of land theoretically preserved, the specific setback distances may have an even greater 
impact.  Furthermore, I found that turbine spacing is also a determinant:  the more space between 
turbines, the less overlap there is in the setback distance circles between them, which thereby 
preserves more land per turbine than siting regimes where the turbines are closer to each other.  
While turbine separation can be included in the zoning ordinance, larger setback distances reduce 
turbine density, serving as a two-pronged mechanism for rendering additional lands 
undevelopable. 
Local officials, however, should not take this as a carte-blanche recommendation to 
maximize setback distances.  Though land preservation benefits increase with larger setback 
distances, large setbacks also make it more difficult for wind developers to site projects within 
communities; they may effectively “zone out” wind turbines, negating all possible farmland 
preservation benefits.  Instead, I would recommend that local officials have frank conversations 
with the wind developer, seeking to maximize the setback distance without jeopardizing the 
project—a practice that seems to have occurred at least to some extent in all four case studies.   
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In addition, jurisdictions that wish to utilize wind development as a farmland preservation 
tool should exercise their right to amend the wind zoning ordinance over time.  I would suggest 
adopting a zoning ordinance prior to windfarm construction that allows for some flexibility in 
turbine placement.  For example, the zoning ordinance could specify smaller setback distances or 
grant exceptions to the required setbacks to allow landowners with turbines on their property to 
voluntarily agree to have turbines placed closer to their own homes (a feature in many of the 
zoning ordinances I reviewed).  Following construction, once there is no longer interest in or 
capacity for additional wind energy development, local officials could amend the ordinance to 
increase the preservation benefits.  Increasing setback distances and disallowing setback 
exceptions would effectively close the loopholes that allow a new home to be constructed where 
it would otherwise be prohibited due to its proximity to a turbine.  In effect, this would make 
many existing homes non-conforming with the code and require any future construction to be 
built farther from the turbines. 
In this chapter I also noted, however, that these land preservation benefits are only 
theoretical.  Each of the zoning codes within my study allows for waivers to the required 
setbacks with the written consent of affected landowners.  In addition, even if the setbacks are 
upheld, since they apply only to land in the immediate vicinity of the turbines, there is little 
reason to believe that a landowner intent on building a new home in the windfarm community 
would not simply find a building site somewhere else in that township.  The survey of 
landowners seems to indicate that this might, in fact, be happening.  Specifically, I found that 
there is no reduction in the sale of land for non-farming purposes in communities with 
windfarms than in matched case communities, and that the parcels sold for non-farming purposes 
in these windfarm communities are significantly larger than in the matched cases—meaning that 
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more land might actually have been lost. Because of the limitations of this survey question—and 
the startling implications if this finding holds true—more research in the form of geospatial 
analysis is warranted.   
Finally, I note that the very act of erecting a wind turbine on farmland immediately 
converts some land to a non-agricultural use.  While it was beyond the scope of this project to 
quantify that impact, both the landowner survey and interviews with local officials and wind 
developers indicated that some turbine siting practices lead to more loss of productive land than 
others.  Geospatial analysis could quantify the land requirements of turbines and their 
accompanying infrastructure and confirm whether alternate siting practices do indeed keep more 
land in production.  This information would assist local officials in deciding whether additional 
zoning requirements would make wind development more compatible with farmland 
preservation goals. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion, Recommendations, and Future 
Research 
 
The overall aim of this research was to investigate practitioner claims that windfarms 
help to preserve farmland.  I endeavored not only to determine whether windfarms have actually 
impacted rates of farmland conversion, but also to begin to understand why they might be having 
such an impact.  Specifically, I tested three different mechanisms, derived from both the rural 
planning and wind energy literatures, by which wind turbines might be altering the farmland 
conversion process.  Notably, all three of these mechanisms came up, unprompted, in at least one 
of my interviews with local officials and wind developers.  Most commonly, local officials 
talked about the additional revenues that wind energy development provides, especially in direct 
payments to landowners who host turbines on their property.  They noted that high crop prices in 
recent years mean that this revenue is not necessarily required to balance farm budgets, but given 
the long-term instability of crop prices and the ever-present threat of a poor yield, wind 
development income is a good hedge against bad times. 
It is important to note, however, that my research questions and hypotheses were all 
based on wind energy as a possible farmland preservation tool for the “growing” rural America, 
where the primary threat to agricultural land is urbanization.  Instead, the primary concern of 
local officials in all of my selected case studies—even those with recent double-digit housing 
unit gains—was youth flight, a concern typically associated with rural areas in decline, where 
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population numbers are precipitously dropping.  The language of farmland preservation still 
resonated with these interviewees, but their primary concern was with family farm preservation.  
These two issues are certainly related:  a declining proportion of residents connected to 
agriculture makes farmland much more susceptible to non-farm conversion (Healy and Short 
1979).  However, my hypotheses and the theory behind my research questions drew from a 
farmland preservation literature that assumes development pressure is present, whereas the 
interviewees reported near-zero demand for new home construction on farmland even before the 
turbines were built.   
However, not all was lost through the selection of these cases.  In fact, in some ways, it 
may have been a fortunate coincidence that some of my hypotheses intended for communities 
facing urbanization might also translate to those facing decline.  I hypothesized, for example, 
that the additional wind-related income would reduce financial pressure to sell land to a 
developer.  My respondents, however, pointed out that the added income reassured young people 
that farming could be profitable, making them more interested in taking over the family farm.  
Just as I hypothesized, landowners are investing this new wind-related income in the farm.  
While the Impermanence Syndrome of the farmland preservation literature would predict that 
such actions are a strong indication that these landowners themselves expect to be farming longer 
(Adelaja, Sullivan, and Hailu 2011), such investments on behalf of their successors are no less 
powerful indicators of a renewed sense of agriculture’s permanence within the community.  
While additional research needs to be done in communities where local officials identify 
urbanization as the primary concern, I have every reason to believe that some of this work is 
transferable to such a context.   As a result, wind energy development might actually further the 
planning goals of both rural Americas, making it unique among rural planning strategies that 
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have traditionally focused either on land use regulation (to address urbanization) or on economic 
development (to address depopulation).  After two or more decades with few breakthroughs in 
the field of rural planning, this research might help prompt rural planning scholars to take a fresh 
look at whether other types of rural development (e.g., agricultural processing plants or, perhaps 
controversially, gas or oil wells) might have ramifications for both land use and economic 
development. 
Case study selection aside, through a closer look at the effect of wind energy development 
on investment and land use expectations (Chapter 4), local economic development and property 
tax spending (Chapter 5), new home building (Chapter 6), and the possibility of future 
development (Chapter 7), this research provides a number of valuable insights into the social and 
economic impact of wind energy in rural communities.  In the following sections, I summarize 
the study’s contributions to scholarship, both in rural land use planning and wind energy policy, 
and I discuss the implications for practitioners and policymakers in both of these areas.  In 
keeping with my interest (and research fellowships) in sustainability, I also discuss the social, 
economic, and environmental trade-offs suggested by my research findings.  Like any research 
project, this study also uncovered a host of related issues that warrant further investigation, so in 
the final section I outline what could be a career’s worth of follow-up research.   
8.1 Scholarly Contributions 
Taken as a whole, this research constitutes the first contribution to scholarly literature on 
the connection between wind energy development and farmland preservation.  Specifically, I 
found that the connection is twofold: windfarms provide economic benefit to landowners as well 
as reducing the amount of developable land in communities that include wind turbines in their 
zoning ordinance.  The economic benefits are highest for the landowners who host turbines on 
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their property, who are also the landowners most likely to have their land rendered 
undevelopable as a result of zoning ordinance setback distances between turbines and inhabited 
structures.  Accordingly, wind development provides a unique opportunity to prevent 
development on large swaths of land without compensating landowners directly (as in PDR or 
TDR) or incurring their wrath for “downzoning” (Coughlin 1991).  This is a particularly relevant 
contribution for the rural planning literature, which has been relatively inactive in the last decade 
and has struggled to find solutions that are attractive to owners of large tracts of farmland 
(Adelaja and Gottlieb 2009; Schnidman, Smiley, and Woodbury 1990).   
 In addition, this research connects to existing scholarship in both rural land use planning 
and wind energy policy.  Planning scholars might be particularly interested in High-growth (#4), 
where there is no zoning ordinance and wind siting is a private agreement between the wind 
developer and landowner.  While land use scholars tend to assume that zoning is the most 
effective way to mediate competing community interests, my research finds that all landowners 
in this community—those with and without turbines on their property—are more convinced of 
the positive impacts of wind energy and less convinced of the negative impacts than their 
counterparts in all other communities with wind turbines. They also reported very few landowner 
disputes during windfarm planning and construction.  This finding is consistent with Ellickson’s 
(1991) work suggesting that among close-knit communities, personal relationships often lead to 
cooperative behavior, even in the absence of regulation compelling fair play, and it warrants 
more investigation.   
 This research also makes a significant addition to scholarship on the social and economic 
impacts of wind energy development.  It supports and expands the small body of evidence drawn 
from U.S. windfarm communities about the impact of wind development on local jobs (Slattery, 
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Lantz, and Johnson 2011), property taxes (M. E. Kahn 2013), and rural landowners’ attitudes 
towards wind energy (Brannstrom, Jepson, and Persons 2011); it also provides an American 
counterpart to Canadian research on “appropriate” setback distances (Watson, Betts, and 
Rapaport 2012).  Perhaps most notably, this is the first study to look in depth at alternate royalty-
sharing arrangements.  While much of the research from Europe looks at the effect of community 
ownership on local attitudes toward wind energy (Warren and McFadyen 2010; Phimister and 
Roberts 2012), this is the first study to look at differences that derive from the distribution of 
royalty payments in windfarms owned by a wind developer.  While I find that pooling royalties 
leads to less noticeable impacts on farm budgets for landowners who host turbines on their 
property, it also leads to neighbors who are more likely to believe in the positive impacts of wind 
energy and less likely to believe in the negative impacts than are neighbors in communities 
where royalties are not pooled and those in the matched (no-turbine) communities.  Furthermore, 
landowners in communities where there is less pooling also report more community conflict, as 
there is more of a divide between the “haves” and “have nots.”  Pooling, therefore, can help gain 
community acceptance for wind—which in turn might ultimately make more communities 
willing to accept windfarms with their knock-on farmland preservation benefits—and help keep 
the peace among neighbors.  
8.2 Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
8.2.1 Rural Planners and Local Officials 
This research is perhaps most directly applicable to rural communities and landowners 
grappling with the question of whether to welcome wind development.  As my research has 
shown, welcoming wind turbines would almost certainly result in an influx of revenue at both the 
individual and community level, which helps to make farming more profitable and decreases the 
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likelihood that the farm will either be abandoned or sold to a developer in the future.  However, 
wind energy also brings with it landscape changes to both the daytime and nighttime sky, 
disturbances to crops and soil during construction, and the potential for community conflict 
between those who favor local wind development and those who oppose it.  Consequently, rural 
communities need to consider whether wind development and its attendant effects fit within the 
overall goals of the community, and if so, to adopt zoning ordinances that support those goals.   
When considering the specifics of wind turbine zoning regulations, local officials in all of 
the jurisdictions in my case study deliberately tried to strike a balance between competing 
community interests as they set guidelines for where the turbines could be placed.  I found very 
little evidence that local officials were considering what impact the zoning ordinance might have 
on local land use after construction of the windfarm.  While my research suggests that the chosen 
setback distance has a large impact on the farmland preservation benefits of the windfarm after 
construction, many of the decisions made early on might undercut these longer-term benefits.  
Most of the zoning ordinances that I analyzed, for example, allow for written exceptions to the 
setback distances between turbines and inhabited structures.  While these were intended to allow 
landowners with turbines on their property to voluntarily agree to have turbines placed closer to 
their own homes, these same exceptions might also be used in the future to allow for 
construction of a new home where it might otherwise be prohibited due to its proximity to a 
turbine.   
One way around this is for local officials to bear in mind that the zoning ordinance is not 
set in stone but is an evolving tool intended to implement a community’s current and future land 
use plans.  Jurisdictions that wish to utilize wind development as a farmland preservation tool 
might consider establishing a zoning ordinance prior to windfarm construction that allows for 
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more flexibility in turbine placement—i.e., by specifying smaller setback distances or granting 
exceptions to the required setbacks.  Following construction, once there is no further interest in 
or capacity for additional wind energy development, these setback distances might be increased 
or special exceptions might be disallowed.  In effect, this would make many existing structures 
non-conforming with the code and require any future construction to be built farther from the 
turbines. 
Local officials in jurisdictions with windfarms should also consider how their use of the 
added property tax revenues paid by wind developers impacts their community’s long-term 
goals.  If urbanization is seen as a threat, using the revenue to provide urban services—such as 
providing trash collection, paving gravel roads, or increasing access to high-speed internet—
might run counter to goal of minimizing new residential development.  If, in contrast, the 
primary concern is youth flight, putting tax revenues towards such ends might be a good use of 
funds—but probably only if there is money to maintain these services into the future.    
8.2.2 Wind Developers 
The findings on the consequences of alternative leasing and siting policies will also be 
useful to wind developers, who can draw on this research to supplement their own knowledge 
gained from experience in the field.  Wind developers realize, for example, that pooling royalties 
helps to minimize community conflict during the leasing and siting process.  My research also 
provides survey-based evidence that pooling royalties significantly improves neighboring 
landowners’ attitudes towards wind energy, but does little to change their farm budgets or 
investment behaviors.  This study also helps to quantify which siting and construction practices 
landowners see as most disruptive to the farming operation, information wind developers can use 
to tailor their practices so as to minimize crop disturbance.  Of course, their interactions with 
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landowners have made wind developers well aware of these concerns.  My survey findings, 
though, can help identify how prevalent these concerns really are amongst landowners with 
turbines on their property, and wind developers can also use them to better inform potential 
farmland leasers about the kinds of impacts to expect. 
 This study also underscores that it would behoove wind developers to be as frank as 
possible with landowners and community members when they are trying to site a new project.  
My research finds evidence to support wind developers’ claims that landowners who are part of 
the royalty pool in communities with wind turbines are, overall, more convinced of the positive 
impacts of wind energy and less convinced of the negative impacts than similar landowners in a 
community without a windfarm.   However, overselling the benefits can backfire, as I found with 
the local job creation issue.  In places where wind developers make claims of direct job creation, 
once the project has been built, landowners are actually less convinced of such benefits than 
landowners in areas without windfarms, presumably disappointed that so much of the 
construction work is done by outside contractors.  In contrast, when the developer portrays job 
creation as an indirect benefit that results from leaseholders spending wind income on farm 
improvements, landowners in these communities have an even higher opinion of the job creation 
benefits of wind energy.  Rural landowners, perhaps even more than the general public, really 
want the “straight story” when they are contemplating making a change.  Wind developers would 
be well advised to give it to them. 
8.2.3 State Policymakers 
State policymakers—especially those in Michigan—should take away three key lessons 
from this research.  The first is that the uncertainty in property tax treatment of wind turbines is 
delaying local decision-making on how to use additional revenues.  While farmland owners who 
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host turbines benefit from direct payments by wind developers, these tax revenues are the 
primary economic benefit to the other residents in these windfarm communities.  As a result of 
tax treatment uncertainty, the community as a whole is not yet seeing tangible benefits of the 
windfarm.  This has caused some souring of opinion among those who don’t directly benefit, 
which in turn may discourage other communities from welcoming wind energy.  To remedy this, 
state policymakers and the State Tax Commission need to assure local governments that the tax 
valuation of wind equipment will not change in the future. 
The second and third takeaway messages for state policymakers are especially relevant as 
legislators consider increasing the state’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS).  Currently, debate 
at the state level is being framed within the context of a report commissioned by Governor 
Snyder that found that the key hindrances to increasing the state’s renewable portfolio standard 
are local land use regulations that block wind projects and public opposition in rural 
communities where the turbines would be sited (Quackenbush and Bakkal 2013).  This may have 
policymakers wondering if higher RPS targets could be achieved without state takeover of land 
use regulation for wind turbines, or without upsetting a large number of rural constituents.  My 
research provides insights on both questions.  First, I found that both rural residents and wind 
developers prefer regulation at the local level.  While wind developers acknowledged that this 
might allow some local governments to zone out wind development, it also affords communities 
that want wind development the flexibility to establish more wind-friendly ordinances than what 
would likely be set at the state level.   
Second, with respect to public opposition of rural residents, my research found that wind 
development is like many other land use issues in that those opposed to it tend to be the most 
vocal at public meetings, but they are also in the minority.  Though their vocal opposition may 
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derail some proposals, the local leaders I interviewed appeared to be able to look more broadly to 
gauge public opinion in their jurisdiction and act accordingly.  Furthermore, I found that once a 
windfarm is constructed, residents’ opinions of wind energy tend to improve, likely due to the 
direct economic benefits of the windfarm (and perhaps also as a result of familiarity with the 
turbines, which might not seem so bad once they’re in place).  Thus state legislators should not 
be deterred by such vocal opposition but rather should allow local governments to determine 
whether wind development matches local land use goals. 
8.3 Sustainability Trade-offs 
Because it finds evidence for a connection between wind energy and farmland 
preservation, this research on its face suggests that wind energy is a sustainability win-win:  
Those concerned with climate change can feel better knowing that wind turbines are not having 
adverse social impacts on the rural communities in which they are sited and instead are providing 
economic benefits and helping to sustain a tradition of family farming.  In addition, from an 
ecological perspective, farmland is a good place to site turbines because it typically has lower 
biodiversity as a result of monoculture cultivation.  Most inland farming communities don’t pose 
as much threat for birds as potential windfarm sites closer to water bodies, and open fields are 
not a primary habitat for bats, the animal most threatened by wind turbines (Erickson et al. 
2002).  From a social perspective, farmland also seems to be a better fit for wind development 
than ridge-top or off-shore siting in places that are valued more for their scenic beauty than for 
their utility as a working landscape.   
Even so, my research highlights that there are trade-offs.  Though the land requirements 
for siting a wind turbine are relatively small—and may be minimized through better siting 
practices—placing a windfarm in an agricultural area will certainly take some land out of 
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production.  In light of increasing food needs from a growing population, any loss in tillable 
acreage might have adverse downstream sustainability effects on a global scale, from increasing 
global malnutrition to the destruction of tropical rainforests (Foley et al. 2011; Scharlemann and 
Laurance 2008).  If providing food security is the primary concern, directing wind development 
away from agricultural communities—off-shore or to scenic ridge-tops—might be the more 
sustainable solution. 
 In light of research that shows the energy-efficiency benefits of dense urban development 
(Ewing and Rong 2008; Wilson 2013), one might also ask if it is sustainable to revitalize rural 
areas in decline, or if it might rather be better to let these areas depopulate and their residents 
move to higher-density urban communities.  I would argue, however, that much as our bodies 
require good cholesterol to keep the bad cholesterol in check, low-density rural communities are 
needed to help keep low-density suburbs and exurbs in check, thereby containing the footprint of 
cities.  Providing opportunities for young people to stay in more remote rural communities 
means less out-migration to urban areas, which, in turn, drives fewer urban residents to the urban 
fringe.  Furthermore, if farming were both more lucrative in rural communities at the urban 
fringe, landowners in these communities would have less financial need to sell their land off for 
development, which would help prevent cities from expanding outward.  As I argued in my 
recommendations to rural planners and local officials, however, communities that decide to 
welcome wind development must take care to ensure that their land use policies and use of 
additional property tax revenues support sustainable community goals. 
8.4 Areas for Additional Research 
This dissertation was both explanatory and exploratory in nature, aiming to find early 
evidence for a phenomenon suggested by practitioners but one completely absent from the 
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scholarly literature.  As a result, it uncovered a host of additional questions that should be further 
explored to better understand the impact of wind energy development on farmland, farmland 
owners, and agricultural communities more broadly.  Within the selected cases, it did not 
consider all possible social, economic, and environmental impacts, or even the opinions of 
residents in the vicinity of the windfarm who do not own farmland, but rather honed in on those 
issues directly tied to farmland preservation.  Furthermore, because of its case study design, the 
generalizability of these research findings may be limited. While selecting cases from a single 
state allowed me to hold constant a number of contextual factors so that I could better understand 
how royalty pooling and property tax policies affect farmland preservation outcomes, this 
research does directly address whether and how state-level policies might alter these results.  
Consequently, I propose future research that spans three broad areas:  following up on 
unanswered questions with the four windfarm communities studied in this dissertation, 
expanding the scope of this research to windfarms in other policy contexts, and extending this 
research to look beyond wind energy to other policy issues impacting rural communities.   
8.4.1 Follow-on Research  
A number of remaining questions about the four windfarms that I studied would make for 
promising follow-on projects.  The first is to better understand how much land the wind turbine, 
access roads, electric substation and new transmission line poles associated with wind 
development actually take out of production, and further to quantify the impact that alternate 
siting practices have on land use.  This could be achieved through a relatively straightforward 
geospatial analysis comparing pre- and post-windfarm satellite/aerial imagery of my case study 
communities.  It would, however, require high-resolution imagery to measure relatively small 
features (e.g., a 10-foot-wide access road), and this imagery would have to be taken during the 
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growing season to identify whether any previously farmed land was left fallow due to poor 
infrastructure placement.   
 Geospatial analysis of aerial imagery could also help to better answer one of the 
questions related to the demand-side mechanism.  Specifically, it could identify whether new 
homes built since the construction of the windfarm replaced older farmsteads, as interviewees 
suggested, or whether they were built on farmland.  It would also allow me to better visualize 
where this new construction is taking place relative to the wind turbines.  In addition, a more in-
depth analysis of building permit data, perhaps supplemented by interviews or surveys of owners 
of these new homes, would better uncover the motivations of these landowners to build in the 
windfarm community. 
 In addition, when I conducted my research, all four of the windfarms studied were 
relatively new additions to the landscape, having been built within the last five years.  It would 
be instructive to return to these communities in perhaps a decade to see how the social, 
economic, and land use effects of the wind development will have changed.  Expanding the 
research timeframe would allow for more farmland to change hands (e.g., be bought, sold, or 
passed down to the next generation), for wind-related property tax revenues to be invested (or 
not), and for the national housing market to recover, all of which might enable better 
comparisons between windfarm and matched case (non-windfarm) communities.  Finally, such a 
longitudinal study would determine whether, as some suggest, the wind turbines become part of 
the landscape with time (Devine-Wright 2005). 
8.4.2 Expansion to non-Michigan Windfarms  
Though selecting cases within a single state allowed me to look at the impact of royalty 
pooling and partial tax abatements, it also limited my ability to generalize to windfarms beyond 
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Michigan.  Expanding this research to other contexts would be a natural next step.  Replicating 
this in one of the 12 U.S. states with state-level wind siting regulation, for example, might 
challenge my conclusion that the optimal setback distance for maximizing farmland preservation 
benefits is one developed in collaboration between the wind developer and local officials.  
Conducting this study in a state like Indiana, which fully exempts wind turbine equipment from 
property taxes, would better test whether these indirect benefits (or lack thereof) change the 
attitudes, investment behaviors, and land use expectations of neighbors who do not benefit 
directly from the wind development; I expect they might.  Furthermore, as previously mentioned 
in Chapter 7, I hope to find another case of a windfarm sited in an unzoned community to see 
whether Richland Township (in High-growth #4) is an anomaly, or whether it is not unusual to 
have a relatively non-controversial wind project in the absence of land use regulation.   
Replicating this research internationally would provide an endless array of research 
possibilities.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, most of the existing wind energy scholarship comes 
from Europe, which has a longer and more extensive history of windfarm development; and 
more recently from Canada, which has set aggressive targets for increasing its share of 
renewable energy.  Even so, none of this literature has specifically connected wind development 
to farmland (or even farming community) preservation, perhaps as a result of more stringent 
controls on exurban development and less expectation that farmland can be developed.  These 
countries, though, also have wide variation in the structure of their electric power sectors, 
funding sources for renewable energy, level of public participation in land use regulation, and—
perhaps most critically—social and economic structures in rural communities (Ellis et al. 2009; 
Alterman 1997).  An international comparison could examine how each of these factors affects 
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landowners’ and local officials’ opinions of the farmland preservation potential of wind 
development.   
8.4.3 Extensions beyond Wind Energy 
This research also provides a springboard to extend my research beyond wind energy 
development to other issues of importance to rural communities.  For example, it would be a 
valuable contribution to energy policy research to explore how the impacts of oil and gas 
development, which has recently been expanding as a result of enhanced extraction techniques 
such as hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), compare to those of wind energy development.  
Though they have some commonalities including similar land leasing and royalty pooling 
arrangements, their differences (e.g., real and perceived negative impacts, amount of local tax 
revenues, locus of regulatory control) might well have very different social, economic, and land 
use implications for the communities in which they are sited. 
Finally, this research has provided me with a solid methodological foundation for 
conducting research in rural communities.  Though my methods derived from the best available 
practices (e.g., Dillman, Smyth, and Christian 2009), by most measures my response and 
cooperation rates far exceeded expectations.  While I have attributed this to the inclusion of a 
prepaid incentive of a $2 bill, it is impossible to know how much was a function of my research 
topic, target population (Groves and Couper 1998), timing of the survey (Pennings, Irwin, and 
Good 2002) or mode of contact (Smyth et al. 2010).  Further research that systematically varies 
these elements would not only contribute to the survey methodology literature, but also be of 
great utility to social scientists aiming to study a wide range of topics that affect rural 
populations. 
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Appendix A – Details on Case Study Selection 
 
Discussion of criteria for selecting case studies using the diverse case approach 
Early discussions with local officials in areas with wind energy, as well as the rural 
planning and wind energy literatures, were influential in helping me identify criteria with which 
to select these diverse cases.   Perhaps most obviously, one likely determinant of new residential 
development is the amount of development pressure in an area.  Residents in areas that are 
urbanizing often feel as if the change has occurred overnight.  In reality, though, most farmland 
conversion is a slow, almost imperceptible process: first one field is converted and then another, 
until, seemingly suddenly, urban uses outnumber agricultural uses and people start to become 
concerned about loss of farmland (Eberhart 1976).  As a result, in rural areas that are urbanizing, 
past residential development is often a good indicator of future residential development.  This 
can be measured directly though the decennial U.S. Census, which includes data on the number 
of occupied housing units within each jurisdiction.  Including cases in areas that are experiencing 
high growth as well as those that are experiencing low growth fits the diverse case approach. 
In my early discussions with wind developers and local officials in communities with 
wind farms, one key distinction between wind projects is in how direct payments (royalties) to 
landowners are shared within the host community.  At one extreme, only landowners with 
turbines on their property are paid for hosting turbines.  At the other, all property owners in the 
vicinity of the windfarm receive royalties from the wind developer.  In the former case, fewer 
people are each getting paid more money; in the latter, roughly the same amount of money is 
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shared by many more households.  This distinction is particularly important for understanding 
the supply-side mechanism, which deals with the impact that additional revenues have on farm 
investment and subsequently on commitment to farming.  Observing projects that span this 
spectrum allows me to see whether farmland retention is robust to royalty arrangement. 
Finally, differences in how revenues are shared are also a function of state and local tax 
policy.  In many states, wind turbines are considered industrial equipment and are therefore 
subject to property tax, usually assessed by the local government, with revenues going to the 
municipality, county, and state, as well as the local school district.  In other states, wind 
equipment is exempt from property taxes, and municipalities that host turbines receive no 
additional tax revenues.  As a result, including cases where the municipality does and does not 
receive tax revenues from the wind project allows for a wider view of possible scenarios.   
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Figure A-1.  List of utility-scale windfarms in the Great Lakes states 
 
Wind Farm Name County
 Capacity 
(MW) % cropland
County 
population 
change 1990 - 
2010 
Illinois Crescent Ridge Wind Farm Bureau 54.45 79% 3%
As of Providence Heights Wind Farm Bureau 72 79% 3%
May 2012 Big Sky Wind Farm Bureau 239.4 79% 3%
Big Sky Wind Farm Lee 239.4 73% 10%
Lee-Dekalb Wind Energy Center Dekalb 217.5 88% 46%
Lee-Dekalb Wind Energy Center Lee 217.5 73% 10%
Top Crop Wind Farm Phase II Grundy 198 77% 55%
Grand Ridge Energy Center Phase II, III, and IV LaSalle 111 85% 10%
Grand Ridge Wind Farm Phase I LaSalle 99 85% 10%
Top Crop Wind Farm Phase I LaSalle 102 85% 10%
Mendota Hills Wind Farm Lee 51.66 73% 10%
GSG Wind Farm Lee 80 73% 10%
GSG Wind Farm LaSalle 80 85% 10%
Streator Cayuga Ridge South Wind Farm Livingston 300 90% 6%
Rail Splitter Wind Farm Logan 100.5 77% 0%
Rail Splitter Wind Farm Tazewell 100.5 74% 15%
Camp Grove Wind Farm Marshall 150 74% 5%
Camp Grove Wind Farm Stark 150 87% -3%
Twin Groves Wind Farm Phase I McLean 198 85% 39%
Twin Groves Wind Farm Phase II McLean 198 85% 39%
White Oak Wind Farm McLean 150 85% 39%
EcoGrove Wind Farm Phase I Stephenson 100.5 85% 5%
Indiana Benton County Wind Farm Benton 131 101% -1%
As of Fowler Ridge Wind Farm Benton 600 101% -1%
1/2/2013 Hoosier Wind Project Benton 106 101% -1%
Wildcat Wind Farm Madison 200 71% 4%
Wildcat Wind Farm Tipton 200 96% 6%
Meadow Lake Wind Farm White 501.2 93% 9%
Michigan Garden I Delta 20 5% 10%
As of Beebe Gratiot 81 70% 9%
1/1/2013 Gratiot County Gratiot 212.8 70% 9%
Echo Huron 110 74% 8%
Harvest Huron 52.8 74% 8%
Harvest II Huron 59.4 74% 8%
Michigan Wind I Huron 69 74% 8%
Sigel Huron 64 74% 8%
Lake Winds Mason 100.8 18% 20%
Stoney Corners Missaukee 60 17% 33%
Stoney Corners Osceola 60 20% 26%
Michigan Wind II Sanilac 90 60% 17%
Tuscola Bay Wind Tuscola 120 59% 11%
Tuscola Bay Wind Bay 120 59% 6%
Tuscola Bay Wind Saginaw 120 56% 1%
Ohio Buckeye Wind Project Champaign 135 65% 16%
As of Hog Creek Wind Farm I & II Hardin 67 77% 5%
May 2012 Hardin Wind Farm Hardin 300 77% 5%
Timber Road I, II, & III Paulding 199 89% 7%
Blue Creek Wind Farm Project Paulding 350 89% 7%
Blue Creek Wind Farm Project Van Wert 350 90% 2%
Wisconsin We Energies/Glacier Hills Columbia 162 49% 35%
As of Butler Ridge Dodge 54 61% 26%
May 2012 Forward Dodge 129 61% 26%
Forward Fond du Lac 129 61% 25%
Cedar Ridge Fond du Lac 68 61% 25%
Blue Sky Green Field Fond du Lac 145 61% 25%
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Selecting Matched Cases 
In order to understand how the presence of the windfarm is impacting landowners, it 
would be useful to know how landowners in my chosen case studies would have responded in 
the absence of the windfarm.  This, of course, is not possible, so I have chosen to utilize matched 
cases for each of the wind case studies.  To be clear, these are not “control cases” as typically 
understood in experimental research.  Because the presence of a windfarm is not randomly 
assigned to a community, and, indeed, was determined prior to my research, I do not have a true 
control case.  However, I select communities that are as similar as possible to my wind cases, 
except for the absence of a wind project; these matched sites are intended to model what might 
have happened in my wind cases if the wind turbines had not been built.   
Because the matched cases will be included only in the landowner survey portion of my 
research project, it was important to find municipalities that were as similar as possible on the 
variables that may impact the dependent variables associated with that portion of my research:  
long-term expectations for the farm and on-farm investments.
28
  The first is strongly connected 
to the level of development pressure in the area, which, as I explained in the previous section, is 
related to the recent rate of housing unit growth.  The second variable—on-farm investment—is 
tied both to household income (e.g., wealthier landowners have more money to invest in their 
land) and to the type of farming operation (e.g., dairy farming is more capital intensive than 
grain farming).   
Because each of these factors—housing unit growth rate, household income, and type of 
farming operation—is spatially correlated, the best matched cases are likely to be proximal to the 
selected case studies.  My research topic, however, complicates selecting nearby cases.  The 
                                                 
28 Though these are highly correlated to farm characteristics, the USDA’s Census of Agriculture reports only at the 
county level.  As a result, I needed to find correlates available at the sub-county level reported by US Census data.   
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wind turbines in my case studies are over 450 feet tall, and as a result, can be viewed from miles 
away.  Because rural jurisdictions in Michigan have a relatively small footprint,
29
 this means that 
a single windfarm can be seen from two or three townships away.  Furthermore, three of my case 
studies are located in Huron County, where there is literally no township entirely out of the 
viewshed of one of the six existing windfarms.
30
   
To select the matched cases, I first used US Census data to identify the 2000-2010 
housing unit growth rates and average household income of all townships within the counties 
adjacent to my wind case studies.  I identified several municipalities that had similar 
characteristics to my selected wind cases.  I then used Google Earth to compare land use 
characteristics (e.g., size of parcels, type of ground cover) in the candidate communities to those 
in the wind cases.  I also took a reconnaissance trip to these locations to confirm that the 
agricultural operations were similar in appearance to those in the wind cases, and to confirm that 
no windfarm was visible from any part of the candidate municipality.   
This process was much more art than science, in part because each windfarm crosses 
municipal boundaries:  three of the cases span two townships, while the fourth is in three 
townships.  Often, the housing unit growth and average household income in the jurisdictions 
hosting the same windfarm were quite different (see Table A-1).  When that happened, I tried to 
find a matched case that was somewhere in between.  Finding a matched case for Windfarm 4 
was particularly challenging because, although the windfarm is sited in an agricultural 
community, the surrounding townships are predominantly forested.  There was no single best 
match with both a similar average household income and a growing housing unit rate.  As a 
result, I chose two townships to use as the matched community for this case.   
                                                 
29 The prototypical township is six miles by six miles. 
30 I confirmed this on a drive in December 2013, when I was trying, in vain, to find a matched case site within 
Huron County.   
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Table A-1.  Jurisdiction-level variables used in matched case selection 
 
 
The survey respondents’ answers to demographic questions suggest that not all of my 
choices for the matched case communities were wise (see Table A-2).  In High-growth (#4) in 
particular, landowners in the windfarm community owned and farmed more acres of land, were 
nearly twice as likely to report being full-time farmers, and derived over three times as much 
income from farming as landowners in the matched case community.  As I discuss in more detail 
in Chapter 4, since acres farmed is strongly correlated to on-farm investment, this led to 
surprising results in comparing on-farm investment in High-growth (#4).  To a lesser extent, this 
also posed a problem in Neighbor-friendly (#3), where landowners in the windfarm community 
were more likely to be full-time farmers and reported higher farm-related income.    
 
 
 
Case Study Jurisdiction 
Housing Unit 
Change:  2000 - 2010
Median Household 
Income
% Farming 
Occupation
Bingham Township 2% 43,333                         1.8%
Sheridan Township 4% 48,125                         2.9%
Matched Case #1 Elk Township 4% 46,417                         3.5%
Chandler Township 3% 47,917                         7.4%
McKinley Township -1% 48,500                         4.3%
Oliver Township -4% 44,784                         4.8%
Matched Case #2 Marlette Township -5% 46,400                         4.2%
Bloomfield Township -2% 36,103                         8.8%
Sigel Township -4% 54,306                         6.1%
Matched Case #3 Moore Township 0% 37,292                         7.9%
Richland Township 11% 49,792                         5.9%
Highland Township 2% 46,397                         7.3%
Hersey Township 7% 40,357                         0%*
Richmond Township -3% 49,091                         3.0%
Source:  American Community Survey 2008-2012
*I think that there might be an error in this number, perhaps because of too few respondents.  Given my survey results, 
         there are definitely a handful of full-time farmers in this township.
Matched Case #4
Developer-friendly 
(#1)
Mixed-benefit  (#2)
Neighbor-friendly (#3)
High-growth (#4)
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Table A-2.  Comparison of means/proportions for a range of demographic variables to determine fitness of the chosen 
matched case community 
 
  
Windfarm
Matched 
case
Windfarm
Matched 
case
Windfarm
Matched 
case
Windfarm
Matched 
case
Acres farmed 187 216 239 196 249 242 235 155
Acres owned 192 201 229 192 235 223 210** 151**
Percent farm 
income
31% 27% 41%* 29%* 51%*** 34%*** 37%*** 13%***
Full-time 
farmers
31% 29% 37% 30% 47% 37% 38%** 19%**
p-values where there is a significant difference of means:  *** <0.001 ; ** 0.001 - 0.01; * 0.01 - 0.05. 
Developer-friendly 
(#1)
Mixed-benefits       
(#2)
Neighbor-friendly 
(#3)
High-growth           
(#4)
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Appendix B – Details on Landowner Survey Design and 
Implementation 
 
 
Unit of Analysis 
Articulating the unit of analysis for this part of my research was a complex process.  I am 
ultimately interested in the investment (and divestment) decisions of agricultural landowners in 
my case study communities.  While some properties are owned by a single person, most are 
jointly owned—by spouses, siblings, parent and child, or business partners.  As a result, it is 
better to think of my unit of analysis—the agricultural landowner—as an entity that more closely 
resembles a business than an individual.  This distinction has an important implication for 
sample design, which is described in the next section.  
Sample Design and Construction 
A number of address-based frames are available for researchers conducting mail surveys.  
One popular service is based on address lists from the US Postal Service.  In addition, a number 
of commercial sample frame lists are also available.  While some of these lists provide 
demographic information about the address-holder, none of these lists include how many acres 
are associated with each address, or whether that land is agricultural.  As a result, these sample 
frames would contain an unknown number of addresses that would be out of my target 
population (i.e., addresses for rural residents who do not own agricultural land).  The list would 
also exclude people who own farmland in my study area but live outside of the area. 
As a result, I decided to create my own sample frame from tax rolls.  The benefit of using 
tax rolls is that there are far fewer instances of missing data—all property within the 
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municipality is included on the roll, even if it is exempt from taxes.  Furthermore, the tax rolls 
include the mailing address of the taxpayer, not just the physical address of the parcel, so that 
landowners who live outside the study area can be included in the sample frame.  Unique to my 
target population, farmland—actually agricultural land—is one of six property classes within the 
Michigan tax code (Feldman, Courant, and Drake 2003).  As a result, there are rules governing 
which land may be classified as “agricultural” (Michigan State Tax Commission 2013).31   
To build my sample frame, I contacted the office responsible for property tax records for 
each of my case study communities—in most cases, the county Tax Equalization office—and 
asked for a list of all taxpayers of agricultural parcels within that jurisdiction.  In most cases I 
was given the information free of charge, but only in hardcopy, so I needed to transcribe the lists.  
These lists also included many duplicates—sometimes the same people owned many different 
agricultural parcels in a jurisdiction, and sometimes the same residential mailing address was 
associated with different taxpayer names (e.g., Joe Smith, Joe and Jane Smith, Smith Dairy 
Farms).  After purging these duplicates, I compiled a list of unique taxpayers in each jurisdiction 
in my study area.  As Table B-1 demonstrates, a significant proportion (18%) of land owners 
lived outside the township.  Though it was time-consuming to create my sample frame, I believe 
it is much more effective than any frame I could have purchased at identifying all owners of 
agricultural land in my study area.  
                                                 
31 As I later discovered, however, this system wasn’t necessarily foolproof.  Specifically, “tree farms” are included 
in the agricultural land classification, though they don’t fit the aim of my research particularly well.  Furthermore, 
local tax assessors have quite a bit of discretion in determining whether a wooded lot in a predominantly agricultural 
area should be considered agricultural or residential (partially wooded lots are highly sought after for rural estates). 
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Table B-1.   Number of agricultural landowners in study area, by jurisdiction 
 
Once a sample frame is created, there are a number of considerations at play in selecting 
a sample.  The first is about the size of the sample.  Often, practical constraints such as available 
budget drive this consideration.  I was fortunate that, as a result of fellowship funding, my 
budget was not a constraining factor; I had enough money to survey everyone in the sample 
frame (i.e., to conduct a census) rather than draw a sample.  This turned out to be doubly lucky 
because sampling from small populations can lead to greater error than sampling from larger 
populations (Isaac and Michael 1981).  Because my study relies on comparing respondents not 
just between jurisdiction (e.g., those with wind turbines and those without) but also between 
subpopulations within jurisdictions (e.g., those in windfarm jurisdictions with turbines on their 
property and those without), my population sizes are very small.  Even sending the survey to 
90% of the people in my sample frame could have introduced error bars of greater than ±5%.  As 
Case Study Jurisdiction 
Agricultural 
landowners
Out-of-township 
addresses
Bingham Township 160                      23
Sheridan Township 136                      30
Matched Case #1 Elk Township 162                      29
Chandler Township 148                      33
McKinley Township 59                        11
Oliver Township 134                      25
Matched Case #2 Marlette Township 194                      43
Bloomfield Township 135                      18
Sigel Township 104                      11
Matched Case #3 Moore Township 190                      34
Richland Township 73                        8
Highland Township 86                        24
Hersey Township 62                        18
Richmond Township 87                        13
Total 1,730                  320
Developer-
friendly (#1)
Mixed-benefit  
(#2)
Neighbor-friendly 
(#3)
High-growth (#4)
Matched Case #4
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a result, I decided not to sample from my frame, but rather to send the survey to all agricultural 
landowners in each jurisdiction. 
  One of the key risks in most mail surveys is that the researcher has no way to ensure that 
the questionnaire gets into the hands of the person selected to complete it.  In most household 
surveys, the unit of analysis is an individual.  Because the researcher does not know how many 
eligible people reside in the household, the researcher selects a method to randomize which 
member of the household should take the survey (e.g., the member with the next birthday, rather 
than, by default, the person who opened the mail).  When these instructions are not followed, 
responses can be skewed (Gaziano 2005).  My survey, however, does not aim for randomization 
within the household.  Much like a researcher conducting an establishment/business survey, I am 
interested in reaching the person or people with the information most pertinent to my research—
those who make decisions about the farmland.  Thus, my survey cover letter specified that “the 
survey should be answered by the person (or people) that makes decisions about your farmland.” 
(See Appendix C for the full text of the survey cover letter.)  While I have no way to ensure that 
householders who owned the land were the ones taking the survey, the level of detail and 
completeness of survey responses on landowner-specific questions seem to suggest that the 
surveys reached their intended recipients. 
Questionnaire Design 
Most of the questions in my survey were drafted specifically for my particular area of 
study.  (See the complete questionnaire in Appendix C.)  The process of developing these 
questions began with an initial sketch of the issues that I wanted to cover in the survey (i.e., my 
dependent and independent variables).  I then conducted cognitive interviews with farmland 
owners in my hometown (Maybee, Michigan) to better understand what sort of investments they 
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make in their farms; their sensitivity to being asked about land purchases, financial investments, 
or other delicate issues; and what approach I should take in presenting myself to farmers who 
would not know me personally.  Notably, they convinced me that I should offer to thank the 
respondents by sending them my research results (84% of respondents did request these results), 
and that sending a single $2 bill would be more impactful as a novelty than sending $5.   
 Following the cognitive interviews, I produced a first draft of survey questions that I 
vetted with my committee and subsequently revised.  I then pre-tested my survey, in hard copy, 
with a different set of agricultural landowners from my hometown.  This pre-test also asked them 
to keep track of the total time it took to take the questionnaire so that I could provide potential 
respondents with an accurate estimate.  In this pre-test, I looked to see if respondents were 
correctly following skip-patterns, and I asked for verbal feedback following the pre-test for 
questions that were unclear.  While members of my pre-test pool helped me perfect the general 
landowner questions, they had very little familiarity with wind energy and therefore were less 
helpful in identifying aspects related to wind leases or windfarm impacts that I had missed.  Pre-
testing with some landowners in areas with wind turbines would have made my survey much 
stronger.   
 Following the pre-tests, I made additional tweaks to my questions and formatted the 
survey.  Following Dillman and colleagues (2009), I included a full-color cover and spaced out 
my questions to provide lots of white space.  While I could have saved money by reducing the 
font size, I used 12-point font, since many of the landowners in my study area might not have the 
best eyesight.  I also decided to print an ID number on the back of the form that would allow me 
to track participation so I could target follow-up mailings (explained in more detail in the next 
section).  I originally thought that this would also allow me to geocode responses, but because of 
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the high percentage of absentee landowners and the fact that many people own multiple non-
contiguous parcels, I decided to rely on the respondents’ own reporting of their proximity to 
wind turbines in my analysis.  In the end, my questionnaire included 10 pages (plus a front cover 
and instruction page), and six sections.   
Survey Implementation 
A common problem with mail surveys is low response rates, which can lead to non-
response error if the respondents are different from the non-respondents.  My final response rate 
of 71.9% (AAPOR RR2) is exceptionally high for mail surveys, and I largely attribute it to my 
survey implementation decisions, including multiple contacts, personalized communications, a 
pre-paid incentive, and strategic timing based on the schedules of my target population.  I relied 
heavily on Dillman, Smyth, and Christian’s Tailored Design Method to increase response rates 
through carefully timed, frequent communication with sampled households (Dillman, Smyth, 
and Christian 2009).  For this project, each potential respondent was contacted up to four times 
over the course of six weeks (see Table B-2).  Each potential respondent was sent a pre-
notification letter on full-color letterhead, warming them up to the idea of my survey and 
indicating that the survey would soon follow (see Appendix C).  Letters to the selected 
households in the matched case communities included a special line saying: 
Even though your township does not have any large windfarms, your participation 
is important so that we can compare your answers to people like you in areas 
where there are windfarms. Please do not take this survey as any indication 
that wind energy is being considered for your township.  
 
This was an attempt to pre-empt objections that the survey was irrelevant to them, as well as to 
allay fears that wind development was imminent since these communities were near areas that 
already had wind energy.   
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Table B-2.  Survey contact schedule 
Date Mailing To Whom? 
February 5, 2014 Pre-notification letter All selected households 
February 18, 2014 First questionnaire (+ cover letter, 
IRB sheet, return envelope) 
All selected households (less any for 
which the first mailing came back as 
undeliverable) 
February 26, 2014  Follow-up postcard All selected households in 
Missaukee, Osceola, and Sanilac 
Counties 
February 26, 2014  Follow-up letter from Huron 
County Board of Commissioners 
All selected households in Huron 
County 
April 7, 2014 Replacement questionnaire (+ cover 
letter, return envelope) 
All selected households who had not 
responded by the mailing date 
 
Two weeks later,
32
 all selected households were sent a catalog envelope containing a 
cover letter, the IRB disclosure sheet, survey, and a stamped return envelope (see Appendix C).  
Again, the cover letter had a special message for the households in the matched case 
communities.  Attached to the cover letter was a $2 bill affixed with a sticker upon which 
“Thank you” was hand-written.  Previous research has shown that including a small pre-paid 
cash incentive is more effective at boosting response rates than post-paid incentives because it 
evokes in potential respondents a sense of reciprocation (Groves and Couper 1998).  My decision 
to use $2 bills as opposed to two $1 bills was a bit eccentric, but it did not go unnoticed—there 
were 11 unsolicited comments on the survey about the $2 bill.
33
  I also paid extra to have actual 
stamps affixed to the return envelopes, as research has shown that these personal touches can 
improve response rates (Dillman and Parsons 2008).   
A week later, I sent the selected households in Missaukee, Osceola, and Sanilac Counties 
a postcard, thanking those who had responded and encouraging the rest to respond soon (see 
                                                 
32 Dillman et al. (2009) recommend sending the survey one week after the pre-notice letter.  That was my intention.  
However, a printing error (the survey envelopes were sealed before I could insert the $2 pre-paid incentive) and a 
bank holiday (President’s Day) delayed the mailing by one week. 
33 In the future, I would like to do a test to see if using a single $2 bill as opposed to two $1 bills has any impact on 
response rate.  I have no way of knowing how much it helped my response rate but have a gut feeling that at least 
among this particular population, it provided some boost.   
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Appendix C).  Huron County households received a follow-up letter with similar text on Huron 
County Board of Commissioners letterhead, with the return address of the Huron County office 
in Bad Axe (see Appendix C).  I initially tried to have a letter of support sent out in all of the 
case study areas, but only Huron County was responsive to my requests.  Dillman and colleagues 
(2009) suggest sending the letter of support before the first survey, but I was unable to make that 
deadline due to printing lead times.  
While Dillman and colleagues recommend sending a replacement survey four weeks after 
mailing the first survey, at that point I was still receiving a couple of dozen surveys each day (see 
Figure B-1).  I decided to wait until the responses dwindled to only ten surveys a day.  I had 
originally budgeted sending a single replacement survey by regular first class mail to all who had 
not responded in some way (either through a returned survey or through a request not to be 
further contacted), as I had done with my previous mailings.  By the time my response rate had 
dwindled, however, I had achieved a higher-than-anticipated response rate (61%), which meant 
that I had more money than planned for follow-up.  As a result, I decided to incorporate a 
tangential survey methodology experiment into my dissertation.  I randomly selected half of the 
non-responders to receive a complete replacement survey via first class mail, while the 
remainder received the same packet via priority mail.  While a full discussion of the implications 
of this experiment is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 26.4% of potential respondents who 
received the replacement survey via first class mail responded, compared to 28.5% of those who 
received it via priority mail. 
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Figure B-1.  Survey responses, by postmark date 
 
 
As a result of these steps, I achieved a response rate of 71.9% (AAPOR RR2).  While this 
is an exceptional response rate for most urban planning mail surveys, it is only slightly above 
average for my particular population of interest.  According to Groves and Couper, “residents of 
small towns are found to cooperate at a higher level than those in large cities, while those in rural 
areas respond at an even higher rate” (1998, 176).  Furthermore, I was careful to follow the 
advice of Pennings and colleagues (2002) and send the survey during the winter when 
respondents who farm would be snowbound.  Though I did not keep track of exact numbers, I 
did find that a number of respondents with Michigan addresses returned their surveys from 
Florida or were delayed in responding because they had been on vacation. In February and 
March, it may be difficult to reach retirees who seek sunnier weather at the end of winter.   
Data Coding  
 One of the downsides of a mail survey, especially in comparison to a web survey, is that 
rather than having respondents key in their data directly, the researcher is left with the task of 
data coding.  Because of the higher-than-expected response rate, I decided that it would be 
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impractical for me to do all of the data entry myself, and I hired three undergraduate research 
assistants (RAs) to help me.  As a result, I had to devise a data-entry system that would allow 
multiple people to work simultaneously and that would not require special software beyond that 
available in the University computing labs.  I also wanted to make sure that the system allowed 
the RAs to work independently but did not require them to use their discretion on any out-of-the-
ordinary responses, which I wanted them to pass them along to me. 
 I decided to create a bare-bones web-based version of the survey using the Google Form 
functionality.  This allowed me to share the link to the data-entry form exclusively with my RAs, 
who could access it on any computer with an internet connection.  All of the entered data was 
saved to an Excel sheet that I could easy access at any time.  For multiple-choice questions, I 
assigned a number to each response option, a dummy ‘0’ if the question was left blank but 
should have been answered (i.e., missing item), and ‘9’ for inapt responses (e.g., two checked 
boxes instead of just one, something written in when that wasn't an option, etc.).  Whenever the 
RAs coded 9, they flagged the item with a sticky note.  When they finished entering data, they 
gave any flagged surveys directly to me for manual review (I explain that process in more detail 
below).   
 As a way to validate the data entry, each surveys was keyed in twice by two different 
RAs.  While the primary goal was to identify any errant keystrokes, I also used this procedure to 
see if any of the RAs were not flagging items for my review as instructed.  I used Microsoft 
Excel’s “find duplicate” functionality to identify those surveys where the entered data did not 
exactly match.  I reviewed those surveys myself to determine why there was a discrepancy 
between the two records, corrected the errors, and provided the RAs with feedback to improve 
their accuracy.   
 195 
 
 In examining surveys that RAs had flagged, I looked at about 50 of them together to see 
if there were recurring issues I could address by creating a new code.  For example, Question 3.3 
asked how the respondents expected most of their land to be used when sold.  A number of 
respondents were using the ‘other’ option to write sentiments to the effect of “my land is not for 
sale,” so I created code ‘98—no plans to sell’ to accommodate such responses. Similarly, other 
respondents checked both of the first two responses—‘farmed by a family member’ and ‘farmed 
by a non-family member’—so I created code ‘96—farmed (not sure by whom).’ Throughout the 
form, respondents commonly wrote “not sure” or “?” next to the question, so I added ‘code 99—
not sure’ to all questions. 
 Before analyzing the data, I also cleaned it, flagging and removing from analysis survey 
responses where an error might have occurred.  For example, I removed the following 
respondents: 
 Those who reported hosting wind turbines whose location I could not confirm.  Because 
owners of farmland may own additional acreage outside of my study area, this might not 
be an error so much as a complication my analysis cannot account for. 
 Respondents in matched case communities who reported leasing land to a wind developer 
or seeing turbines from their home.  Again, these might not be in error—they might own 
land, including a residence, in an area with wind turbines—but I excluded them because 
they do not satisfy a criterion for the matched cases:  being out of sight of a windfarm. 
 
All told, 21 responses (1.7% of the total) were flagged and excluded from the quantitative 
analysis of survey responses. 
In addition to the multiple-choice questions, the survey also included four short open-
ended response questions and a large blank space on the back cover in which respondents could 
provide any additional responses.  Nearly a quarter (23.7%) of respondents included comments 
on this last page, and some even included additional attached pages with more comments.  All of 
these comments were transcribed by the RAs so that I would have a digital record of them.   
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Coding for the open-ended questions was facilitated with the NVivo software package.  
To code the four short open-ended questions, I first read through all responses for a given 
question, taking note of recurrent themes, and generated a set of codes for that question only.  To 
code the open-ended question on the back page, I started by importing some of the codes used in 
coding the interviews (described in the next section), and adding to them as new and potentially 
relevant points were made.  The final page of open-ended responses often veered off-topic (e.g., 
into commentaries on politics, farming, or family history); I did not create codes for any of the 
themes that strayed far from my research interest.  The final list of survey codes appears in 
Appendix D.  
Data Analysis 
Most of the closed-ended responses in the survey were analyzed using statistical 
methods:  linear regression models for continuous/ordinal values and Chi-squared contingency 
tables for categorical variables.  Though very few questions investigated a truly continuous 
dependent variable, some of the multiple-choice questions clearly indicated a continuum that 
could be treated as continuous.  For questions about investment, for example, I treated the 
midpoint of the range as a continuous rather than categorical response.  I also treated responses 
to a 5-point Likert scale as continuous for the purposes of analysis.   Most often, my null 
hypothesis was testing whether the mean of the dependent variable remained constant across 
three types of respondents:  those with turbines on their property, landowners in windfarm 
communities who did not have turbines on their property, and landowners in the matched case 
community.  These independent variables appeared as factors within the linear model.  In 
addition, I frequently included other independent variables to increase the fit of the linear model:  
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number of acres the respondent owned, number of acres the respondent farmed, whether anyone 
within the respondent’s household was a full-time farmer. 
Where the dependent variable of interest was more categorical (e.g., responses of 
“farmed,” “developed,” or “idle” to the question of how the land would be used in the future), I 
constructed a contingency table and tested the null hypothesis that each of the respondent groups 
(turbines, neighbors, and control) would respond to the question with the same distribution.   
When some of the cells in the contingency table had frequencies fewer than five, I used Fisher’s 
Exact Test rather than a Chi-squared (χ2) statistic to determine statistical significance.  Where 
Fisher’s Exact Test indicated statistically significant differences in the observed data from the 
expected counts (p<0.05), I used a test of proportions of the observed and expected percentages 
in each cell to determine which cells were contributing to the difference. 
Early in the analysis, the data seemed to defy the rules of parametric statistics.  Even after 
trying every sort of data transformation—taking the log, square root, or reciprocal, or turning the 
data into a rate (e.g., investment per acre owned)—I was unable to achieve normality of errors or 
homoscedasticity.  After multiple consultations with statistics instructors, I realized that the rules 
of parametric statistics are particularly important in constructing confidence intervals.  Because I 
had conducted a census, I did not actually need confidence intervals (or perhaps even statistics). 
In analyzing survey data, researchers commonly use statistics to make assertions about 
the entire population based on the sample collected.  Statistics are especially useful in accounting 
for sampling error—the likelihood that the (small) number of people who were randomly 
selected to take the survey are in some way different from the population as a whole.  In a 
census, however, where the entire population is asked to take the survey, the sampling error 
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approaches zero.  Of course, there may be non-response error if the respondents are different 
from the non-respondents, which is always difficult to assess.   
Common approaches to measure non-response error are to track down non-respondents 
and get them to take the survey, to compare late responders to early responders, or to use other  
publicly available information about the entire sample to see if non-responders are 
demographically different from responders.  While the first technique is very difficult, I was able 
to use the latter two to determine whether non-response error might be a problem in my survey.  
Because I tracked when completed surveys were returned, I could compare late responders to 
those who replied earlier.  Specifically, 2.6% of respondents returned a completed survey only 
after they received a second survey in the mail—eight weeks after the first survey was sent.  On 
survey statistics that I expect to impact my analysis, there are very minimal changes in the mean 
values of these two groups, and nothing that rises to the level of statistical significance (see 
Table B-3).  Furthermore, though I know very little demographically about the households in my 
sample frame aside from their mailing addresses, in the wind case study communities, I do know 
which households host wind turbines on their property and which do not.  Comparing the 
response rates of those landowners with and without turbines on their property, I found very little 
difference in the response rates of these groups (see Table B-3). This gave me additional 
confidence that my non-response errors would be relatively low. 
 
Table B-3.  Comparison of early and late responders to determine non-response bias 
 Mean of early 
responders 
Mean of late 
responders (n=32) 
p-value 
Acres Farmed 218 186 .58 
Acres Owned 208 188 .54 
Total Investment 216 196 .76 
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Table B-4.  Comparison of response rates by type of landowner, to determine non-response bias 
  Turbines Neighbors Matched cases 
Total in population 283 741 690 
Returned surveys 203 527 501 
Response rate 71.7% 71.1% 72.6% 
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Appendix C – Landowner Survey Materials   
 
 
 
 Pre-notification letter  
 Survey cover letter 
 Questionnaire  
 IRB information sheet 
 Reminder postcard (Missaukee, Osceola, and Sanilac County respondents only) 
 Reminder letter from Huron County Board of Commissioners  
 Replacement questionnaire cover letter 
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Appendix E – Details on Interview Design and 
Implementation 
 
 
Interview Guide Design 
Semi-structured interviews strike a nice balance between soliciting the same information 
from all interviewees (as in fully scripted interviews), and allowing the conversation to evolve 
and focus on topics specific to a particular interviewee (as in a free-form interview).  As a result, 
semi-structured interviews generally begin with a common set of open-ended questions that set 
the stage for the topics of interest to the researcher but encourage the interviewee to enter into a 
conversation.  A skilled interviewer can ask probing follow-up questions to solicit additional 
details or clarifications and keep the conversation moving.  Some of these follow-up probes 
might be scripted, while others can be developed on the fly.  Having an “interview guide”—a list 
of possible questions—is considered a best practice to ensure that all topics of interest are 
covered within the interview so that follow-up is not necessary, as well as to ensure that question 
wording isn’t unduly biased.   
Because my interviews aimed at soliciting specialized information from three distinct 
groups of people—realtors/auctioneers/appraisers, local officials, and wind developers—I 
developed three different interview guides.  I first asked questions that were relatively easy for 
interviewees to answer to make them feel more comfortable with me.  Only later, after building 
trust, did I move to topics that were more controversial or speculative.  In my interviews with 
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realtors, for example, I first asked about the historic market for farmland in the area.  Only later 
did I inquire about the possible impact of windfarms or ask for anecdotes about recent sales.   
While I did solicit feedback from my committee on the guides, I did not conduct a formal 
pre-test.  Instead, I arranged my early interview schedule so that I could tweak the guide after my 
first couple of interviews.  The guides posted in Appendix F are the final iteration of each 
version.   
As the transcripts show, my interviews rarely followed the interview guide.  Most often, 
we talked about the same questions but in a different order, and I sometimes introduced 
previously unasked questions.  Even so, I found these guides very useful, especially with less-
talkative interviewees.  The list of questions also served as a useful prop during interviews when 
I wanted to pause briefly to decide where to take the interview, when I needed to act distracted 
while my interviewee attended to other business, or when I wanted to give my interviewee 
additional time to formulate an answer.    
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for this portion of my research varies.  For the 
realtor/auctioneer/appraiser interviews, the unit of analysis is the region.  This is because the 
geographic reach of most of these real estate professionals is quite large—often multiple 
counties.  As a result, the three case studies in Huron County (Cases 1, 2, and 3) are all served by 
the same realtors.  While I have multiple observation points (i.e., individual realtors) within a 
particular county, I aggregate my data to compare interviews in the Huron County “Thumb” 
Region with those in the McBain Region.  
Because my interviews with local officials and wind developers are not directly tied to a 
specific research question but rather provide context and background information about the wind 
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projects, the unit of analysis varies.  The local officials spoke largely in terms of their 
jurisdiction:  a township or the entire county.  The township as a unit of analysis is sub-case-
study level (i.e., there are multiple townships within a case study).  Interviews with Huron 
County officials cross three case studies, while the interviews with Missaukee and Osceola 
County officials all pertain to the same High-growth (#4) case study.  The discussions with wind 
developers provide data that corresponds to a specific case study.    
Interview List Construction 
In order to identify realtors to interview, I used online real estate listings to look for 
realtors with active listings of vacant farmland parcels.  I contacted them, explained that I was 
interested in better understanding the market for farmland in their area, and asked if they or a 
colleague would be best able to answer my questions.  Sometimes the realtors would say that 
they themselves were a good fit.  More often, though, they would refer me to another realtor or 
an auctioneer who usually was a much better fit.  I continued to look for additional realtor 
interviewees in each region until I had reached the point of saturation or redundancy (Kuzel 
1999), when I began to hear the same responses over and over again and/or I had run out of 
suggestions for knowledgeable interviewees.  In total, I interviewed six realtors/auctioneers:  
four in the Thumb region, and two near McBain. 
Identifying the remainder of interviewees—local officials and wind developers—was a 
largely formulaic process.  I used publicly available listings of local officials to contact the 
township supervisor in each of the case study townships and tried to be as persistent and 
accommodating as possible in order to get an interview.  Where the jurisdiction was locally 
zoned, I asked the supervisor for contact information for the planning commission chairperson.  I 
also used local listings to contact the chair of the county Board of Commissioners and the chair 
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of the county Board of Commissioners finance (or tax) committee, unless they were the same 
person.  In the end, only two people in this list refused to be interviewed, both of them township 
supervisors.  This resulted in 14 interviews with local officials, including one group interview of 
a supervisor and both the current and past chair of the township planning commission. 
I also tried to interview the wind developers involved in each of the case study projects.  I 
used local newspaper articles about the projects to identify the project manager for the wind farm 
of interest at each wind developer and was often able to find direct contact information through 
additional online searching.  Though they were initially reluctant, I succeeded in talking to 
developers in two of the four projects.
34
  In place of the developer who refused, I spoke to an 
environmental consultant who works for a variety of developers and did much of the feasibility 
analysis and community outreach on Mixed-benefits (#2).   
Finally, I interviewed the Program Manager for the Michigan Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development’s Farmland Preservation Office.    
Interview Procedures 
After identifying potential interviewees, I usually contacted them via telephone to try to 
schedule an interview; for the wind developers, I initially had only email addresses.  When 
possible, I arranged to meet the interviewees in person at their home or office, though I did 
conduct six of the 24 interviews by telephone.   
I began each interview by introducing my topic in very general terms via the interview 
consent form (see Appendix F).  Following each interview, I thanked the interviewee in person 
and then followed up with a hand-written note.  I also asked each of my interviewees if they 
                                                 
34 The Developer-friendly (#1) and Mixed-benefits (#2) cases were done by the same developer, who refused to be 
interviewed, citing legal concerns. 
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would like to be informed of my research findings (all said they would) and solicited an address 
so that I could forward the findings when they became available. 
Data Coding  
To aid in the analysis of the interview data, I coded the transcripts from each of the 
interviews using NVivo.  I began by developing a rubric based on the interview guides for each 
of the questions, on some of the common themes that emerged as I conducted the interviews, and 
on the identifying characteristics of the interview (i.e., the position of the interviewee and the 
case stud(ies) with which the interview was associated).  As I conducted the coding, if I felt that 
a theme was not properly captured by the existing rubric, I would add another code (or set of 
codes) and return to the interviews that I had already transcribed to recode them as necessary.  
The final list of interview codes appears in Appendix G. 
Data Analysis 
Most of the analysis of the interviews focuses on the words of the interviewees 
themselves.  In some situations, I compare the opinions of interviewees within the same case, 
while in others I contrast opinions across different cases.  While I rarely look for an actual count 
of the number of times a given word came up within an interview or the amount of time spent 
talking about a specific topic, in some situations I do quantify the number of interviewees who 
discussed a particular topic, especially if it was in response to a question posed to all 
interviewees. 
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Appendix F – Semi-structured Interview Materials 
 
 Interview guide for realtors 
 Interview guide for wind developers 
 Interview guide for public officials 
 Consent form 
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Interview Guide for Realtors 
 
1. How would you describe real estate market for farmland in [XXX] county/township? 
a. Who is buying the land? 
b. For what purpose? 
c. What size parcels are usually changing hands? 
d. How has the market for farmland changed in the last decade? 
 
2. What kind of demand is there for new construction in the county/township? 
a. Is it out-of-towners or locals looking to build new houses? 
i. If locals, do they buy / receive property from someone in their family, or 
buy it through a realtor? 
b. What are the primary characteristics they are looking for as they find a piece of 
property? 
c. Can you give me some examples of recently built homes? 
 
3. How has the presence of the windfarm impacted the market for farmland? 
a. Are there examples of new homes built or major remodels in area of windfarm? 
b. What are potential buyers worried about? 
c. How far does the impact extend? 
i. Where are new houses getting built? 
ii. Can they still see the turbines? 
d. Do farmers with turbines seem any more or less interested in selling their 
property? 
e. Are you aware of any land with wind leases changing hands? 
i. Was there anything unique about that transaction? 
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Interview Guide for Wind Developers 
1. Can you walk me through the wind planning process as it unfolded for [this] project? 
a. Were there any differences in the process in different municipalities? 
2. What role did you play in the planning commission and township board’s discussion of 
the wind zoning ordinance? 
a. Were you present at meetings? 
b. Did you provide any suggested language? 
c. Did you suggest other windfarms they should visit? 
3. What sort of reception did you receive from the community? 
4. Do you have any figures on the economic benefits that this particular windfarm has on 
the community? 
a. How much are you contributing in property taxes? 
b. Did you pay for any other municipal-level services? 
c. How does the amount you pay in royalties and other direct payments for [this] 
wind project compare to what you pay in property taxes? 
5. How do you decide what terms to offer in a lease agreement? 
6. How do you decide how to handle the royalty payments? 
a. What is the rationale behind deciding [not] to pool royalties? 
b. What is the rationale behind deciding [not] to offer friendly neighbor agreements? 
 
Thinking not just about this project but about all of your projects: 
7. What is the biggest hindrance to wind development? 
8. What makes a project easy? 
9. When you are considering proposing a wind farm in particular place, where does 
receptivity of the community fit into your calculus? 
a. What difference does it make if some of the large landowners are also skeptical? 
b. How does this compare to the specifics of the zoning code in terms of being an 
impediment, or do they go hand-in-hand? 
10. How much “educating the public” do you do in proposed windfarm sites? 
a. If a municipality was really against the idea of wind, do you try to change their 
mind? 
b. At what point in the process do you start this education campaign? 
11. How do you deal with misinformation? 
12. What are the key benefits that you use in educating the public? 
a. Are the public benefits different than landowner benefits? 
b. Does farmland preservation come up? 
i. If so, how do you explain it? 
13. Do you take any measures to minimize impact of wind turbines on farming operations? 
a. During construction? 
b. During siting? 
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Interview Guide for Township Supervisors and Planning Officials 
1. What are the major issues on the minds of large landowners in the township/county? 
a. Are they worried about: 
i. Too much (or not enough) development?   
1. Census shows loss/gain; where?  Is it a concern? 
ii. Crop prices? 
iii. Soil issues like drainage / irrigation? 
iv. Property taxes? 
v. Land fragmentation? 
vi. Succession plans? 
b. How have these issues changed in the last decade? 
c. How do landowners feel about the windfarm? 
i. Impact on the economics of their farm? 
ii. Impact on the easy of farming? 
iii. Impact on possibility for development? 
2. How has this been translated in your master plan and/or zoning ordinance? 
a. What specific policies address these concerns? 
3. Can you walk me through the wind planning process as it unfolded in this township? 
a. How does wind energy development fit in with other township goals? 
b. With farmland preservation, specifically? 
4. What were the major concerns voiced by township residents related to wind energy? 
a. Where there clear divisions among different groups of residents? 
5. How were specifics of the wind zoning regulations determined? 
a. Was there discussion on setback distances? 
i. What were the options? 
ii. Who supported each? 
b. What role did the wind developer play in informing the wind zoning regulations? 
i. Were they present at public meetings? 
ii. Did they provide sample language? 
iii. Did they suggest other windfarms to visit? 
c. How did knowledge of the wind developer’s compensation scheme factor into the zoning 
ordinance? 
d. Are you doing anything to minimize impact of wind turbines on farming? 
e. If you could go back and rewrite your wind ordinance, is there anything you would change?  
Why?  
6. How has the presence of the wind farm impacted this township? 
7. What relationship do you see, if any, between wind energy and farmland preservation?  
8. [for Supervisors only]  How have property tax revenues from the wind farm been used? 
a. Do you have additional plans in the future? 
b. Have you reduced property tax rates? 
9. Do you have any advice for other municipalities considering whether or not to welcome windfarms? 
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FARMING THE WIND:  THE IMPACT OF WIND ENERGY ON FARMING 
 
Research Topic 
This research looks at the impact that windfarms have on farmland owners and rural 
communities more broadly.  
 
Your Role 
If you agree to be part of the research study, you will be asked to participate in one 
face-to-face interview at the location of your choice.  The interview should take about 
one hour.  I would like to audio record the interview to make sure that our conversation 
is recorded accurately.  You may still participate in the research even if you decide not 
to be recorded.  The discussion topics include recounting the process of siting one 
specific windfarm as well as more general topics related to public outreach and the 
siting process.  
 
Benefits of the research  
This research will help inform rural communities who are considering allowing wind 
energy development about the potential impacts—both positive and negative—on their 
community as a whole as well as on individual landowners.   It might also help wind 
developers understand what aspects of a project are most beneficial or disruptive to a 
community, allowing them to accentuate the positives in approaching a community and 
mitigate against the negatives. It is unlikely that you will directly benefit from this 
research. 
 
Risks and discomforts  
There is little risk associated with this study. Participating in this study is no more risky 
than other everyday activities.   
 
Confidentiality 
We plan to publish the results of this study, but will not identify you by name, though 
your official title may be used.  To keep your information safe, the audio file of your 
interview will be stored on a password-protected computer, until a written word-for-word 
copy of the discussion has been created.  As soon as this process is complete, the 
audio file will be deleted.  The researchers will enter study data on a computer that is 
password-protected and uses special coding of the data to protect the information.  The 
researchers plan to keep this study data indefinitely for future research about wind 
energy and farmland. 
 
Compensation  
You will not be paid for your participation, though you may receive a copy of the 
research results of this study.   
 
Important notes 
If you have questions about this research study, you may contact Sarah Mills at 
(734)735-3194 or sbmills@umich.edu; or her advisor Richard Norton at (734)764-1300 
and rknorton@umich.edu. 
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The University of Michigan Institutional Review Board Health Sciences and Behavioral 
Sciences has determined that this study is exempt from IRB oversight. 
 
 
 
By signing this document, you are agreeing to be part of the study.  Participating in this 
research is completely voluntary.  Even if you decide to participate now, you may 
change your mind and stop at any time. You will be given a copy of this document for 
your records and one copy will be kept with the study records.  Be sure that questions 
you have about the study have been answered and that you understand what you are 
being asked to do.  You may contact the researcher if you think of a question later. 
 
 
 
I agree to participate in the study. 
 
_____________________________________  ____________________ 
Signature       Date 
 
 
 
I agree to be audio recorded as part of the study. 
 
_____________________________________  ____________________ 
Signature       Date 
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Appendix G – Interview Code Book 
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